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The authors would like to acknowledge with gratitude the contribution of our friend and colleague, Elizabeth (“Beth”) C. Weimar,
Esq. We have been greatly enriched by Beth’s knowledge and experience, but it was her enthusiasm, good humor, and most of all her
courage that inspired our efforts in completing this Article. All who
knew her were saddened by her untimely passing in 2007. This Article is dedicated to her memory.
I.

INTRODUCTION

In the pages that follow, we initially review and summarize the
evolving landscape of U.S. patent law as interpreted, expounded
upon, and altered by each of the three branches of the U.S. government. We then follow with summaries of the patent decisions of the
United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (“Federal Circuit”) for the calendar year 2007. We conclude with an appendix
presenting statistical data regarding the 2007 decisions of the Federal
Circuit and its judges.
One important note is that the Federal Rules of Appellate Proce1
2
dure, and similarly the Federal Circuit’s rules, have been changed so
as to remove the prohibition on a party’s citation of nonprecedential
opinions issued after January 1, 2007. An opinion may be designated
nonprecedential because it does “not add[] significantly to the body
3
of law.” The Federal Circuit “may look to a nonprecedential disposition for guidance or persuasive reasoning, but will not give one of its
4
own nonprecedential dispositions the effect of binding precedent.”
Because of the non-binding nature of these cases, our case summaries
address only the Federal Circuit’s 2007 precedential decisions. Our
statistical data in the appendix, however, include details on both precedential and nonprecedential decisions.
A. Twenty-Five Years of the Federal Circuit
This year marks the twenty-fifth anniversary of the establishment of
the Federal Circuit. One of the primary goals in creating the court
was to foster uniformity in the application of the patent laws in order
1. See FED. R. APP. P. 32.1(a) (“A court may not prohibit or restrict the citation of
federal judicial opinions, orders, judgments, or other written dispositions that have
been: (i) designated as ‘unpublished,’ ‘not for publication,’ ‘non-precedential,’ ‘not
precedent,’ or the like; and (ii) issued on or after January 1, 2007.”).
2. See FED. CIR. R. 32.1(c) (“Parties are not prohibited or restricted from citing
nonprecedential dispositions issued after January 1, 2007. This rule does not preclude assertion of claim preclusion, issue preclusion, judicial estoppel, law of the
case, and the like based on a nonprecedential disposition issued before that date.”).
3. Id. 32.1(b).
4. Id. 32.1(d).
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5

to promote innovation and further technology. “National uniformity
in the application of the patent laws was perceived as a way of reducing uncertainty regarding the validity of patents[,]” thereby increasing their value and the incentives to invent and disclose, ultimately
6
enhancing technological innovation in the United States. Such innovation would “benefit[] consumers through the development of
7
new and improved goods, services, and processes.” “An economy’s
capacity for invention and innovation helps drive its economic
8
growth and the degree to which standards of living increase.”
“Competition and patents stand out among the federal policies that
9
influence innovation.”
The idea of granting exclusive rights to inventors in order to stimulate innovation was well-established when the Constitution was
drafted in 1789. Indeed, among the explicit powers granted to Congress by the Constitution is the power “[t]o promote the Progress of
Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and
Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discov10
eries.” “The Patent Clause itself reflects a balance between the need
to encourage innovation and [to avoid] monopolies which stifle
competition without any concomitant advance in the ‘Progress of
11
Science and useful Arts.’” The same balance has been embodied in
the federal patent laws since their inception, for they reward innovation while recognizing that imitation and refinement of those innovations are also necessary both to “invention itself and to the very life12
blood of a competitive economy.”
The establishment of a national court for all patent appeals is an
13
idea that also dates back over 100 years, but it was finally achieved
5. See S. REP. NO. 97-275, at 5 (1981) (noting that the uniformity in patent law
resulting from the creation of the Federal Circuit will prevent the forum-shopping
that is so prevalent in patent litigation and, in turn, decrease the “number of appeals
resulting from attempts to obtain different rulings on disputed legal points”).
6. HERBERT SCHWARTZ, PATENT LAW AND PRACTICE 5 (5th ed. 2006).
7. FEDERAL TRADE COMM’N, TO PROMOTE INNOVATION: THE PROPER BALANCE OF
COMPETITION AND PATENT LAW AND POLICY 1 (2003).
8. Id. (citing Roger W. Ferguson, Jr., Vice Chairman, Fed. Reserve Bd., Patent
Policy in a Broader Context, Remarks at the 2003 Financial Markets Conference of
the Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta (Apr. 5, 2003)).
9. Id.
10. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
11. Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 147, 9
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1847, 1850 (1989).
12. Id., 9 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1850.
13. MARGARET M. CONWAY, STUDY OF THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON PATENTS, TRADEMARKS,
AND COPYRIGHTS OF THE S. COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 85TH CONG., SINGLE COURT OF
PATENT APPEALS—A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY 1 (Comm. Print 1959) (explaining that in
the nineteenth century, the Supreme Court had exclusive jurisdiction over patent
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on April 2, 1982, when President Ronald Reagan signed into law the
14
Federal Courts Improvements Act of 1982. The intent of the Federal Courts Improvements Act was to revitalize the American economy and ensure continued economic growth and development by
15
correcting perceived defects in the federal appellate court structure.
Contrary to the perceptions of some, the Federal Circuit is not fairly
characterized as a “specialized” court. The jurisdiction of the Federal
Circuit includes appeals from final decisions of the federal district
courts on patent matters, as well as final decisions of the United
States Court of Federal Claims, the United States Court of International Trade, the United States International Trade Commission, and
16
the United States Court of Appeals for Veteran Claims.
Unlike other appellate courts, the Federal Circuit’s jurisdiction is
based on subject matter and not on geography. Prior to the creation
of the Federal Circuit, the regional courts of appeals were individually charged with the task of hearing patent appeals from their re17
spective district courts. However, because the decision of one appellate court is not binding on another appellate court, layers of
ambiguity and inconsistency overshadowed the patent laws, inconsistencies that could only be resolved by the United States Supreme
18
Court. Yet only rarely did the Supreme Court interject itself into
19
patent issues. The Federal Circuit was thus created to provide a
level of certainty, predictability, and stability to the patent system, to
restore the integrity of the patent system, and to provide the basis for

appeals, but after 1891, when the U.S. circuit courts of appeals obtained jurisdiction
over patent issues, the “section of patent, trademark and copyright law of the American Bar Association consistently supported the establishment of a special court of
patent appeals with jurisdiction throughout the United States”).
14. Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1982, Pub. L. No. 97-164, 96 Stat. 25
(1982) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.).
15. See FRANK P. CIHLAR, THE COURT AMERICAN BUSINESS WANTED AND GOT: THE
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT 11 (1982) (describing
how important the integrity of the patent system is to technological growth and industrial innovation).
16. See 28 U.S.C. § 1295 (2000) (setting forth the jurisdiction of the United States
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit).
17. See Charles W. Adams, The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit: More than a
National Patent Court, 49 MO. L. REV. 43, 61 (1984) (noting that many federal appeals
judges do not regret losing jurisdiction over patent cases).
18. See id. at 50 (stating that intercircuit conflicts in patent law made the enforcement of patents unpredictable and thus public confidence in the patent system
waned).
19. See John F. Duffy, The Festo Decision and the Return of the Supreme Court to the
Bar of Patents, 2002 SUP. CT. REV. 273, 275–76 (2002) (observing that by the middle of
the twentieth century, the Supreme Court’s patent docket declined drastically, hearing on average only one patent case per year, which was significantly less than during
the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries).
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reasoned business judgments about the risks and rewards associated
20
with the development of a patented invention.
The creation of the Federal Circuit has had an enormous impact
on the development of the patent laws of the United States. The
Federal Circuit, in attempting to create a uniform understanding of
patent law, has focused and refined the law on every important issue
of patent law, not the least of which has been the implementation of
holdings by the Supreme Court in such landmark patent cases as
21
Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton
22
23
Davis Chemical Co., Pfaff v. Wells Electronics, Inc., Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu
24
Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., Ltd., Holmes Group, Inc. v. Vornado Air
25
26
Circulation Systems, Inc., and Merck KGaA v. Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd.,
to name a few. The Federal Circuit continues to reexamine many areas of patent law, including claim construction, written description,
jurisdiction, remedies, declaratory judgments, and the doctrine of
equivalents.
While the importance of the Federal Circuit is indisputable, its effectiveness in achieving Congress’s primary goal of increasing uni27
formity of patent law has been the subject of debate. Many people
believe that Federal Circuit jurisprudence has increased patent law
certainty and consistency compared to what existed before its crea28
tion. Others, however, have “questioned the extent to which the
29
Federal Circuit has succeeded in achieving this goal,” while still others believe the Federal Circuit has “conformed [certain areas of] pat30
ent law, but in unhelpful ways.”
No matter what one thinks of the Federal Circuit’s success in
achieving its seminal purpose, one thing is clear—the Federal Cir20. See CIHLAR, supra note 15, at 11 (discussing how detrimental uncertainty and
forum shopping are to patent law, where stability and predictability provide the basis
for reasoned business judgments).
21. 517 U.S. 370, 38 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1461 (1996).
22. 520 U.S. 17, 41 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1865 (1997).
23. 525 U.S. 55, 48 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1641 (1998).
24. 535 U.S. 722, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1705 (2002).
25. 535 U.S. 826, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1801 (2002).
26. 545 U.S. 193, 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1801 (2005).
27. See FEDERAL TRADE COMM’N, supra note 7, at 15 (describing how some panelists view the Federal Circuit’s jurisprudence as bringing “certainty and consistency” to
patent law, while others continue to question whether the Federal Circuit has been
successful).
28. Id.; see also id. at 15 n.89 (noting that the President of the Industrial Research
Institutes, Ross Armbrecht, felt that the IRI members thought that the Federal Circuit brought more stability and predictability to the patent process).
29. FEDERAL TRADE COMM’N, supra note 7, at 15; see also id. at 15 n.90 (listing several commentators who express doubt as to the Federal Circuit’s success).
30. FEDERAL TRADE COMM’N, supra note 7, at 15.
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cuit’s twenty-fifth anniversary was marked by one of the most active
years in the history of U.S. patent law. All three branches of the U.S.
government were actively involved in 2007 in shaping and revising or
attempting to revise several areas of patent law. For example, the Executive Branch, through the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office
(“PTO”), attempted to promulgate new rules of practice before the
office (but is presently enjoined from enacting the rules), which
would dramatically affect patent prosecution and continuation prac31
tices. The U.S. House of Representatives passed significant patent
reform legislation, which, at the time of this writing, is still awaiting
32
action by the U.S. Senate. The U.S. Supreme Court has stepped up
its involvement in patent law by reviewing, and often dramatically al33
tering, the Federal Circuit’s interpretation of existing patent laws.
The following sections provide a brief overview of the actions taken
by each of the branches of government in the sphere of patent law.
B. The Executive Branch: The Rules Promulgated by the U.S. Patent and
Trademark Office
On August 21, 2007, the PTO published new rules regarding con34
tinuation filings and examination of claims (“new rules”). The new
rules limit the number of continuation applications that can be filed
from a patent application without justification, as well as the number
of claims an applicant can include in a patent application without in35
cluding an examination support document. The new rules also require applicants to disclose related patents and patent applications,
as well as to distinguish between claims in related patents and/or ap36
plications. The new rules apply to: (1) any new applications filed
after November 1, 2007, and (2) any applications that were pending

31. See infra Part I.B (discussing in detail the new rules and the current injunction on enforcing those rules).
32. See infra Part I.C (comparing and contrasting in detail the proposed legislation from both the House and the Senate).
33. See infra Part I.D (surveying some of the Supreme Court’s most important patent decisions of the year).
34. Changes to Practice for Continued Examination Filings, Patent Applications
Containing Patentably Indistinct Claims, and Examination of Claims in Patent Applications, 72 Fed. Reg. 46,716 (Aug. 21, 2007) (to be codified at 37 C.F.R. pt. 1) [hereinafter Changes to Practice].
35. See id. (outlining the new revisions to the rules of practice for continued examination practices and for the examination of claims in patent applications).
36. See id. at 46,721–22 (providing that applicants must identify other pending
applications that have been filed within the previous two months, as well as rebut the
presumption that the multiple filings are indistinct by explaining how the various
applications have distinct claims).
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as of November 1, 2007, but had not received a first office action on
37
the merits as of that date.
The new rules contain several marked changes from the status quo.
While the current rules permit applicants to file an unlimited number of continuation applications, the new rules limit applicants to
only two continuation applications, including continuation-in-part
(“CIP”) applications, from a single patent application, and only one
38
request for continued examination (“RCE”) without justification.
These rules would apply to any application filed after November 1,
2007, including those claiming priority to an earlier filed non39
provisional application. In order to file more than two continuations or more than one RCE, an applicant has to explain why the request, amendment, argument, or evidence could not have been pre40
viously submitted.
The new rules also limit an applicant’s right to file continuation
applications from pending applications with an existing priority claim
under 35 U.S.C. §§ 120, 121, or 365(c) that were filed before August
41
21, 2007. In such a case, the applicant can file only “one more” continuation application without justification and without regard to the
42
number of continuations previously filed in that application family.
Specifically, the rules limit an applicant who filed more than two continuation or CIP applications of an initial application before August
21, 2007, to the filing of only “one more” continuing application on
or after November 1, 2007, without a petition and showing, provided
no other application was filed on or after August 21, 2007, that claims
43
the benefit of the prior-filed application.
The new rules require an applicant to identify support for all
44
claims in the parent of a CIP application. Any claims for which such
support is not identified would be entitled only to the filing date of
the CIP and would be subject to prior art based on the actual later fil45
ing date. Moreover, because a CIP application is included in the
definition of “continuation application,” only two CIP applications

37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.

Id. at 46,716–17.
Id. at 46,716.
Id. at 46,716–17.
Id. at 46,716.
Id. at 46,717.
Id. at 46,717, 46,733.
Id. at 46,717.
Id. at 46,723.
Id.
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46

can be filed in an application family. In an October 10, 2007, clarification, the PTO waived this identification requirement for applications in which an office action on the merits was received before No47
vember 1, 2007. In applications in which a first office action on the
merits was not mailed by November 1, 2007, the PTO delayed the re48
quirement for identification until February 1, 2008.
The rules also restrict the number of claims that can be filed in a
49
single patent application in the absence of additional information.
For example, applications that included more than twenty-five claims
or more than five independent claims (the so-called “5/25 rule”)
would have to include an examination support document and prior
art search report with an explanation as to how each claim differs
from the prior art.
For applications filed on or after November 1, 2007, applicants also
have to identify by application number and patent number (if applicable) each other pending application or patent, in which: (1) the
application has a filing date or priority claim that is the same as the
50
filing date of the other pending or patented application; (2) “the
application names at least one inventor in common with the other
pending or patented application; and (3) the application is owned by
the same person, or subject to an obligation of assignment to the
51
same person, as the other pending or patented application.” Applicants would have to identify the other applications or patents by the
later of four months from the filing date of the non-provisional appli52
cation (or national phase application) or February 1, 2008.
Under the new rules, the PTO takes the position that there is a rebuttable presumption that a non-provisional application contains at
least one claim that is not patentably distinct from at least one of the
46. See id. at 46,716 (grouping together “continuation application” and “continuation-in-part application” in all references, thus treating them as equivalents for
the purposes of the new rules).
47. See John Love, Deputy Comm’r for Patent Examination Policy, U.S. Patent
and Trademark Office, Clarification of the Transitional Provisions Relating to Continuing Applications and Applications Containing Patentably Indistinct Claims 2
(Oct. 10, 2007), http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/pac/dapp/opla/preognotice/cl
mcontclarification.pdf (“[F]or any continuation-in-part application in which a first
Office action on the merits has been mailed before November 1, 2007, the requirement . . . that an applicant must identify the claim . . . in the continuation-in-part application for which the subject matter is disclosed . . . in the prior-filed application is
hereby waived.”).
48. Id. at 3.
49. Changes to Practice, supra note 34, at 46,721.
50. See Love, supra note 47, at 3 (waiving the “or within two months of” requirement, previously required by this part of the new rules, in certain instances for applications filed on or after November 1, 2007).
51. Changes to Practice, supra note 34, at 46,734.
52. Id. at 46,717.
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claims in another patent application if: (1) the application has a filing date and/or priority date that is the same as the filing date of the
other application; (2) the two applications have at least one common
inventor; (3) the two applications are owned by the same entity or
subject to an obligation of assignment to the same entity; and (4) the
53
applications contain substantially overlapping subject matter.
The applicant could rebut this presumption by explaining how all
the claims are patentably distinct or by submitting a terminal dis54
claimer. Where patentably indistinct claims are identified, the applicant would have to submit good and sufficient reasons for having
55
multiple applications. The PTO could require elimination of the
indistinct claims from one of the applications without such a show56
ing.
It is noteworthy that the final rules provide that if multiple applications, including applications having a continuity relationship, contain
patentably indistinct claims, the PTO would treat the multiple applications as a single application for purposes of determining whether
each of the multiple applications exceeds the threshold of five inde57
pendent claims or twenty-five total claims (the “5/25” limitation).
The final rules also allow an applicant to file a divisional applica58
tion if the application was subject to a restriction requirement. Multiple divisional applications can be prosecuted in series or in paral59
lel. An applicant can file two continuation applications (but not a
CIP) for each divisional application plus one RCE without justifica60
tion.
Alternatively, an applicant can “suggest” a restriction requirement
61
and elect a group of claims that meets the 5/25 claim requirement.
If accepted by the examiner, this would permit the applicant to pursue the remaining nonelected claims in one or more divisional appli62
cations. If the examiner refused the suggestion, the applicant would
be given two months in which to reduce the number of claims or to
63
file an examination support document.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.

Id. at 46,735.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 46,745.
Id. at 46,718.
Id.
Id. at 46,726.
Id. at 46,726–27.
Id.
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On October 31, 2007, the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia granted a preliminary injunction in favor of
plaintiffs Triantafyllos Tafas and SmithKline Beecham Corporation,
enjoining the PTO from implementing the changes to the patent
64
rules on November 1, 2007. In a detailed opinion, the district court
found in favor of the plaintiffs on all four prongs of the legal test for
65
granting a preliminary injunction.
First, the court found that the plaintiffs had demonstrated a likelihood of success on the merits on its allegations that the rules exceed
the Patent Office’s statutory authority. The court concluded that the
rules are contrary to the Patent Act, the PTO’s application of the
rules to pending applications implicates the prohibition on retroactive application of agency regulations, and the standards for submit66
ting an examination support document are impermissibly vague.
Second, the district court found that plaintiffs would be irreparably
harmed by implementation of the new rules due to the uncertainty
that the regulations would create and the negative impact on invest67
ment to file future patent applications. The district court found the
third prong, “balance of the hardships,” to be in favor of the plaintiffs, stating that “the uncertainty and loss of investment suffered immediately by [the plaintiffs] tilts the balance of hardships in their fa68
vor.” Finally, the court found “the public interest [was] most served
69
by continuing the status quo and granting the TRO.”
On April 1, 2008, the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of
Virginia issued an order permanently enjoining the U.S. Patent and
Trademark Office from implementation and enforcement of the new
rules related to claims and continuation practice in patent applica70
tions. The ruling held that the PTO exceeded its rule-making authority in attempting to implement what the district court deemed to
71
be substantive rules.

64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
2008).
71.

Tafas v. Dudas, 511 F. Supp. 2d 652, 671 (E.D. Va. 2007).
Id. at 670.
Id. at 663–68.
Id. at 668–69.
Id. at 670.
Id.
Tafas v. Dudas, No. 1:07CV846, 2008 WL 859467, at *10 (E.D. Va. Apr. 1,
Id.
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C. The Legislative Branch: The Patent Reform Act of 2007
The Patent Reform Act of 2007 is currently being considered for
72
passage by the United States Congress. As amended, H.R. 1908 was
passed by the House on September 7, 2007, by a vote of 220 (ayes) to
73
175 (nays). The Senate version, S. 1145, was reported out of the
Senate Judiciary Committee on July 19, 2007, and is presently pend74
ing in the Senate.
Regarded as the most significant piece of patent legislation since
75
the 1952 Patent Act, the Patent Reform Act of 2007 would affect
many fundamental and long-established patent law provisions, in76
cluding the loss of right provisions in § 102, the best mode require77
ment, inequitable conduct, injunctive relief, damages, and willful
78
infringement.
Most dramatically, the House-passed bill would change the U.S.
patent system from a first-to-invent system to a first-to-file system, contingent upon a finding that major patenting authorities have adopted
79
a grace period having substantially the same effect as that in the bill.
The Senate bill contains a similar first-to-file provision, but it is not
80
contingent upon such a finding.
The House bill would also change the apportionment of damages
in infringement cases. In particular, H.R. 1908 would allow judges to
select the method of calculating a reasonable royalty from: (1) the
economic value attributable to the patent’s specific contribution over
prior art; (2) its entire market value; or (3) if neither (1) nor (2) is
appropriate, the terms of any nonexclusive marketplace licensing of
the invention and other relevant factors, such as the fifteen factors set
81
forth in Georgia Pacific Corp. v. United States Plywood Corp. The Senate
72. Patent Reform Act of 2007, H.R. 1908, 110th Cong. (2007); S. 1145, 110th
Cong. (2007).
73. THOMAS (The Library of Congress), http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquer
y/z?d110:HR01908:@@@L&summ2=m& (last visited Feb. 14, 2008).
74. THOMAS (The Library of Congress), http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquer
y/z?d110:SN01145:@@@L&summ2=m& (last visited Feb. 14, 2008).
75. 1952 Patent Act, Pub. L. No. 82-593, 66 Stat. 792 (1952) (codified as
amended in scattered sections of 35 U.S.C.).
76. 35 U.S.C. § 102 (2000).
77. Id. § 112(1).
78. Id. §§ 284, 298.
79. See H.R. 1908, 110th Cong. § 3(a) (2007) (“The effective filing date of a
claimed invention is: (1) the filing date of the patent or application for patent containing the claim to the invention . . . .”).
80. S. 1145, 110th Cong. § 2(a) (2007).
81. H.R. 1908 § 5(a)(3); see Georgia-Pacific Corp. v. U.S. Plywood Corp., 318 F.
Supp. 1116, 1120, 166 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 235, 238 (S.D.N.Y. 1970) (listing fifteen factors to consider when determining the amount of a reasonable royalty for a patent
license).
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bill would allow the court to select the method of calculating a reasonable royalty from: (1) the “entire market value”; (2) “an established royalty based on marketplace licensing”; or (3) if neither
(1) nor (2) is appropriate, “the economic value of the infringing
product or process properly attributable to the claimed invention’s
specific contribution over prior art[,]” with special rules for combina82
tion inventions.
Both H.R. 1908 and S. 1145 would heighten the standard for willful
infringement. Both bills would also provide for a post-grant opposition proceeding in the PTO. The House version would establish a
83
first window post-grant review proceeding but no second window.
For the purpose of such a proceeding, the patent would not be entitled to a presumption of validity, and the burden of proof would be
84
lessened to a preponderance of evidence. The Senate version, in
contrast, would establish both first and second window post-grant review proceedings, with different presumptions and burdens of
85
proof. To trigger a second window, a petition would have to be filed
within twelve months of notice alleging infringement and would have
to show that “the continued existence of the challenged claim . . .
causes or is likely to cause the petitioner significant economic
86
harm.” Under the Senate bill, a patent would be entitled to a presumption of validity in the second window but not in the first win87
dow. The burden of proof of invalidity in the first window would be
by the preponderance of evidence, but a showing of invalidity in the
88
second window would require clear and convincing evidence.
The House bill would expand inter partes reexamination in lieu of
second window in post-grant and require that an administrative pat89
ent judge hear petitions rather than an examiner. The Senate ver90
sion would abolish inter partes reexamination entirely.
The House and Senate versions would both allow pre-issuance
prior art submissions for at least six months after publication, a provi91
sion which would become effective one year after enactment. The
House bill also includes defendant-based venue provisions and carveout provisions for certain plaintiffs, such as universities, inventors,
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.

S. 1145 § 4(a).
H.R. 1908 § 6(a)(1).
Id. § 6(f)(1).
S. 1145 § 5(c)(1).
Id.
Id.
Id.
H.R. 1908 § 6(c)(1).
S. 1145 § 5(b)(1).
H.R. 1908 § 9(b); S. 1145 § 7(b).
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and companies engaged in substantial research and development ac92
tivities. Venue for declaratory judgment actions would be the same
93
as for infringement actions. In cases involving foreign defendants
with a U.S. subsidiary, venue would be based on the location of incorporation or primary subsidiary; for foreign defendants without a
94
U.S. subsidiary, venue would be proper in any district. The Senate
version is similar to the House version on these points but does not
95
address foreign corporations without a U.S. subsidiary. Both the
House and Senate versions would require that the Federal Circuit
hear an interlocutory appeal on claim construction upon certification
96
by the district court.
H.R. 1908 would also codify a materiality standard similar to existing PTO Rule 1.56 of whether “a reasonable examiner would have
97
made a prima facie finding of unpatentability.” The Senate version
would codify the “important” to a “reasonable examiner” standard for
98
materiality.
The House bill would also prohibit the use of “best mode” as a ba99
sis for invalidity in either litigation or post-grant proceedings. The
House bill also provides more flexibility in completing the oath re100
quirements, particularly when it is difficult to reach an inventor.
The Senate bill is similar but specifically allows the assignee to apply
101
for the patent.
Other provisions of the Patent Reform Act would
require mandatory search reports submitted by patent applicants and
102
provide the PTO with advanced rule-making authority.
D. The Judicial Branch: Supreme Court Patent Cases in 2007
The Supreme Court has also continued to take an unusually active
role in patent law, handing down three significant decisions in 2007
alone. These cases are discussed below. The Supreme Court also
granted certiorari to review a case on the first-sale doctrine, Quanta
103
Computer, Inc. v. LG Electronics, Inc.
92. H.R. 1908 § 11(a).
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. S. 1145 § 8(a).
96. H.R. 1908 § 11(b); S. 1145 § 8(b).
97. H.R. 1908 § 12(b)(4).
98. S. 1145 § 12.
99. H.R. 1908 § 13.
100. Id. § 4(a)(1).
101. S. 1145 § 3.
102. Id. § 11.
103. LG Elec., Inc. v. Bizcom Elec., Inc., 453 F.3d 1364, 79 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1443
(Fed. Cir. 2006), cert. granted, 128 S. Ct. 28 (2007).
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Declaratory judgments—the MedImmune decision
104
In MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., the U.S. Supreme Court
held that a patent licensee in good standing need not terminate or
breach its license before filing a declaratory judgment action seeking
105
patent invalidity, unenforceability, or non-infringement. The decision thus allows patent licensees to challenge the patent while putting
nothing more at risk than the royalties they would have paid during
the pendency of the litigation.
In 1997, MedImmune licensed a patent and then-pending patent
106
application from Genentech. In 2001, after the patent application
had matured into a U.S. patent, Genentech notified MedImmune
that MedImmune’s drug was covered by the newly issued patent and
that MedImmune would be responsible for paying royalties on that
107
drug in accordance with the license agreement.
MedImmune believed that no royalties were due because the patent was invalid, un108
MedImmune
enforceable, and not infringed by the subject drug.
thereafter paid the demanded royalties under protest and with reservation of all its rights but filed an action in the United States District
Court for the Central District of California for declaratory judgment
109
that the newly issued patent was invalid or unenforceable.
The district court dismissed MedImmune’s declaratory judgment
claims for lack of subject matter jurisdiction in accordance with Gen110
Probe Inc. v. Vysis, Inc., which held that a patent licensee in good
standing cannot establish the requisite “case or controversy” with regard to the validity, enforceability, or scope of a patent because the
license agreement “obliterate[s] any reasonable apprehension” that
111
the licensee would be sued for infringement.
The Federal Circuit
affirmed the lower court’s dismissal of MedImmune’s declaratory
112
judgment claims.
On certiorari, the Supreme Court reversed the Federal Circuit’s
113
Justice Scalia authored the majority opinion, while Justice
ruling.
Thomas was the lone dissenter. The Court held that Article III of the
U.S. Constitution does not require a patent licensee to terminate or

1.

104. 127 S. Ct. 764, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1225 (2007).
105. Id. at 777, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1234.
106. Id. at 767–68, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1227.
107. Id. at 768, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1227.
108. Id., 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1227.
109. Id., 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1227.
110. 359 F.3d 1376, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1087 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
111. MedImmune, 127 S. Ct. at 768, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1227 (alterations in
original) (citing Gen-Probe, 359 F.3d at 1381, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1091).
112. Id., 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1227.
113. Id. at 777, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1234.
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breach its “license agreement before seeking a declaratory judgment
114
The
of invalid[ity], unenforceab[ility], or [non]-infringe[ment].
Court analogized this situation to a suit challenging the basis for a
governmental action, wherein the plaintiff need not expose itself to
liability before contesting the constitutionality of the law threatened
115
to be enforced. The Court also cited its decision in Altvater v. Free116
man, in which it held that Article III’s requirements were satisfied
where a licensee brought a declaratory judgment action seeking invalidity of two patents arguably covered by a license agreement while
117
continuing to pay royalties under protest.
The Federal Circuit’s
Gen-Probe decision had distinguished Altvater because it concerned a
118
The Supreme Court dismissed this
privately obtained injunction.
distinction because the coercive actions in Altvater were not govern119
mental but those of a private party.
The Supreme Court also rejected Genentech’s argument that the
parties’ license agreement had effectively settled their dispute and
that permitting MedImmune to contest the validity of the patent
120
without terminating the agreement would alter the parties’ bargain.
While the license did obligate MedImmune to pay royalties on patents that have not been held invalid, the Court found that such a
promise “does not amount to a promise not to seek a holding of their
121
invalidity.” Thus, there was no contractual prohibition against chal122
lenging the validity of the patents.
The MedImmune decision, which effectively overrules the Federal
Circuit’s Gen-Probe decision, has implications for patent licensees and
licensors alike. Patent licensees may now simultaneously bring declaratory judgment claims to challenge licensed patents while continuing to pay contractual royalties, thereby risking nothing more
than the royalties paid during the pendency of the litigation. Licensors must thus consider whether to press for the inclusion of express
prohibitions on future patent challenges and must draft any such potential prohibitions with an eye to MedImmune and other court decisions evaluating such provisions.
114. Id., 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1234.
115. Id. at 772, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1230.
116. 319 U.S. 359, 57 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 285 (1943).
117. MedImmune, 127 S. Ct. at 773, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1231.
118. Gen-Probe Inc. v. Vysis, Inc., 359 F.3d 1376, 1381–82, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1087, 1091 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
119. MedImmune, 127 S. Ct. at 774, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1231–32.
120. Id. at 775–76, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1233.
121. Id. at 776, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1233.
122. Id., 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1233.
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Exportation and infringement—the Microsoft decision
123
In Microsoft Corp. v. AT&T Corp., the Supreme Court analyzed
“the applicability of § 271(f) [of the Patent Act] to computer software
first sent from the United States to a foreign manufacturer on a master disk, or by electronic transmission, then copied by the foreign re124
cipient for installation on computers made and sold abroad.” The
Court concluded that defendant Microsoft was not liable for infringement because it was not exporting copies of Windows and thus
was not supplying “components” from the United States for installa125
tion on foreign-made computers, as that term is used in § 271(f).
Section 271(f), adopted in 1984, is an exception to the territorial
limitations of U.S. patents, which generally cannot be infringed when
126
a patented product is made and sold outside of the United States.
In pertinent part, § 271(f)(1) provides that infringement occurs
whenever one

2.

without authority supplies or causes to be supplied in or from the
United States all or a substantial portion of the components of a
patented invention, where such components are uncombined in
whole or in part, in such manner as to actively induce the combination of such components outside of the United States in a manner
that would infringe the patent if such combination occurred within
the United States . . . .127

In this case, AT&T sued Microsoft under § 271(f) for selling
abroad a software “component” that was being used to make computers that allegedly infringed AT&T’s patent on speech-processing
128
devices.
Microsoft argued it did not infringe AT&T’s patent because intangible information like software is not a “component” un129
der § 271(f).
Microsoft also argued that it does not actually sell
copies of Windows, or “components,” abroad for installation on for130
eign-made computers. Rather, Microsoft sends a foreign manufacturer a master version of Windows, either on a disk or via an encrypted electronic transmission, from which the manufacturer
generates the copies it installs on the computer products it sells
131
abroad. The district court rejected these arguments and found Mi123. Microsoft Corp. v. AT&T Corp., 127 S. Ct. 1746, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1400
(2007).
124. Id. at 1750, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1404.
125. Id. at 1756–57, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1404.
126. 35 U.S.C. § 271(f) (2000).
127. Id. § 271(f)(1).
128. Microsoft, 127 S. Ct. at 1750–51, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1406.
129. Id. at 1753, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1406.
130. Id., 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1406.
131. Id., 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1406.
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132

crosoft liable under § 271(f).
A divided Federal Circuit panel af133
firmed.
The Supreme Court reversed, finding that an actual “copy of Windows, not Windows in the abstract, qualifies as a ‘component’ under
134
§ 271(f)”:
The provision thus applies only to “such components” as are combined to form the “patented invention” at issue. The patented invention here is AT&T’s speech-processing computer.
Until it is expressed as a computer-readable “copy,” e.g., on a
CD-ROM, Windows software—indeed any software detached from
an activating medium—remains uncombinable. It cannot be inserted into a CD-ROM drive or downloaded from the Internet; it
cannot be installed or executed on a computer. Abstract software
code is an idea without physical embodiment, and as such, it does
not match § 271(f)’s categorization: “components” amenable to
“combination.” Windows abstracted from a tangible copy no doubt
is information—a detailed set of instructions—and thus might be
compared to a blueprint (or anything containing design information . . .). A blueprint may contain precise instructions for the construction and combination of the components of a patented device,
but it is not itself a combinable component of that device.135

Whether or not encoding software onto a computer-readable me136
dium is easy, the answer remains the same.
The copy-producing
step is “what renders the software a usable, combinable part of a
137
computer.” According to the Court, regardless of whether that ex138
tra copying step is easy or not, it is essential to liability.
Section
271(f) also contains no indication that if duplication is easy or cheap
enough, the copy made abroad is deemed to have been “sup139
plie[d] . . . from the United States.”
Many tools, in fact, “may be
used easily and inexpensively to generate the parts of a device[,]” but
inclusion of those parts does not render the tools “components” of
the device, “at least not under any ordinary understanding of the
140
Congress, moreover, declined to expand
term ‘component.’”
132. Id., 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1406.
133. Id., 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1406.
134. Id. at 1756, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1408.
135. Id. at 1755, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1407–08 (footnote omitted).
136. See id. at 1756, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1408 (declining to accept AT&T’s argument that “[b]ecause it is so easy to encode software’s instructions onto a medium
that can be read by a computer . . . [the copy-producing] step should not play a decisive role under § 271(f)”).
137. Id., 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1408.
138. Id., 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1408.
139. Id. at 1757, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1409 (alteration in original).
140. Id. at 1756, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1408.
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§ 271(f)’s scope beyond supplying a patented invention’s “components” to also include “information, instructions, or tools from which
141
those components readily may be generated.”
The Supreme Court further held that under a conventional reading of § 271(f), those copies must be supplied from the United
142
States.
Thus, Microsoft did not infringe AT&T’s patent because it
did not “suppl[y] . . . from the United States” the foreign-made cop143
ies of Windows that were installed on the accused computers. In so
holding, the Supreme Court rejected the majority opinion of the
Federal Circuit panel, which had concluded that “in the case of software the act of copying is subsumed in the act of supplying” because
the master is identical to the copies, which are generated quickly,
144
cheaply, and easily from the master. Judge Rader had similarly dissented from that majority opinion on the basis that “‘supplying’ is ordinarily understood to mean an activity separate and distinct from
any subsequent ‘copying, replicating, reproducing—in effect manu145
facturing.’” “[N]othing in § 271(f)’s text, Judge Rader maintained,
renders ease of copying a relevant, no less decisive, factor in trigger146
ing liability for infringement.” The Supreme Court agreed, finding
that liability is triggered only when the actual “components [are]
supplied from the United States, and not foreign-made copies
thereof,” and “combined abroad to form the patented invention at
147
issue.”
“The absence of anything addressing copying in the statutory text weighs against a judicial determination that replication
abroad of a master dispatched from the United States ‘supplies’ the
148
foreign-made copies from the United States . . . .”
The Court added that “[a]ny doubt that Microsoft’s conduct falls
outside § 271(f)’s compass would be resolved by the presumption
149
against extraterritoriality.”
Foreign conduct, explained the Court,
“is [generally] the domain of foreign law,” which in the context of
patent law “may embody different policy judgments about the relative
rights of inventors, competitors, and the public in patented inven-

141. Id., 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1408.
142. Id., 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1408–09.
143. Id., 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1408.
144. Id., 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1408–09.
145. Id., 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1409 (citing AT&T Corp. v. Microsoft Corp., 414
F.3d 1366, 1372–73, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1506, 1510 (Fed. Cir. 2005)).
146. Id. at 1757, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1409 (citing AT&T, 414 F.3d at 1374, 75
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1511).
147. Id., 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1409.
148. Id., 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1409.
149. Id. at 1758, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1410.
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150

tions.”
In short, the Court stated that “foreign law alone, not
United States law, currently governs the manufacture and sale of
151
Thus,
components of patented inventions in foreign countries.”
“the presumption tugs strongly against construction of § 271(f) to
encompass as a ‘component’ not only a physical copy of software, but
also software’s intangible code, and to render ‘supplie[d] . . . from
the United States’ not only exported copies of software, but also du152
plicates made abroad.” The Court admonished that “[i]f AT&T desires to prevent copying in foreign countries, its remedy today lies in
153
obtaining and enforcing foreign patents.”
Although the Court acknowledged AT&T’s argument that “reading
§ 271(f) to cover only those copies of software actually dispatched
from the United States creates a ‘loophole’ for software makers[,]”
the Court was “not persuaded that dynamic judicial interpretation of
154
Rather, the Court noted that any “loop§ 271(f) [was] in order.”
hole” is properly within the province of Congress to consider and
155
close, if it deems it warranted. Section 271(f), the Supreme Court
noted,
was a direct response to a gap in [U.S.] patent law revealed by
[Deepsouth Packing Co. v. Laitram Corp.,156 where] . . . the items exported were kits containing all the physical, readily assemblable
parts of a . . . machine (not an intangible set of instructions), and
those parts themselves (not foreign-made copies of them) would be
combined abroad by foreign buyers.157

In contrast, the Court found that Congress has not addressed other
arguable gaps or taken into account the ease by which electronic me158
dia such as software can be copied. Any adjustments in the patent
law to account for the realities of software distribution should be
made only after focused legislative consideration and not by the judiciary, the Court explained, especially in view of the extraterritorial
159
implications of this issue.
150. Id., 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1410 (internal citation omitted) (alteration in
original).
151. Id. at 1759, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1410.
152. Id. at 1758, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1410 (alteration in original).
153. Id. at 1759, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1410.
154. Id., 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1410–11.
155. Id., 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1411.
156. 406 U.S. 518, 173 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 769 (1972).
157. Microsoft, 127 S. Ct. at 1759, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1411.
158. Id. at 1759–60, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1411.
159. Id. at 1760, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1411; cf. Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal
City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 431, 220 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 665, 673 (1984) (noting
that as new technology comes about, Congress is the entity that creates the appropriate and necessary new rules).
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Obviousness—The KSR decision
Overshadowing the Microsoft decision was the U.S. Supreme Court’s
160
April 30, 2007, ruling in KSR International v. Teleflex Inc. In KSR, the
Supreme Court did not just reverse another Federal Circuit decision
but overturned the lower court’s supposedly “rigid” application of the
161
“teaching, suggestion, or motivation” (“TSM”) test for evaluating
162
The Sucombinations of references in an obviousness analysis.
preme Court clarified that an obviousness analysis “need not seek out
163
precise teachings” but rather must take account of “the inferences
and creative steps that a person of ordinary skill in the art would em164
ploy.”
Teleflex, the exclusive licensee under the patent-in-suit, sued KSR
for infringement of the claimed invention, which was “a mechanism
for combining an electronic sensor with an adjustable automobile
pedal” in order to transmit the pedal’s position to a computer that
165
KSR counterclaimed
controls the throttle in the vehicle’s engine.
166
that claim 4 of the patent was invalid as obvious. The district court
167
granted summary judgment in KSR’s favor by applying a Graham
168
analysis as well as the Federal Circuit’s TSM test. The Federal Circuit reversed the lower court’s grant of summary judgment of invalidity because “the District Court had not been strict enough in applying
169
the test.” According to the Federal Circuit, the lower court failed to
make “‘finding[s] as to the specific understanding or principle within
the knowledge of a skilled artisan that would have motivated one with
no knowledge of [the] invention’ . . . to attach an electronic control
170
to the support bracket of the [prior art] assembly.”
The Supreme Court began its analysis by rejecting the “rigid ap171
Justice
proach” of the Federal Circuit in applying its TSM test.
Kennedy, writing for a unanimous Court, stated, “[t]hroughout this
Court’s engagement with the question of obviousness, our cases have
3.

160. 127 S. Ct. 1727, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1385 (2007).
161. Id. at 1734, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1391.
162. Id. at 1739, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1395.
163. Id. at 1741, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1396.
164. Id., 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1396.
165. Id. at 1734, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1391.
166. Id., 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1391.
167. Graham v. John Deere Co. of Kan. City, 383 U.S. 1, 148 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 459
(1966).
168. KSR, 127 S. Ct. at 1737–38, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1393–94.
169. Id. at 1738, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1394.
170. Id., 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1394 (quoting Teleflex, Inc. v. KSR Int’l Co., 119
F. App’x 282, 288 (Fed. Cir. 2007), rev’d KSR, 127 S. Ct. 1727, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1385 (2007)).
171. Id. at 1739, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1395.
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set forth an expansive and flexible approach inconsistent with the
172
way the Court of Appeals applied its TSM test here.” The Supreme
Court explicitly warned that there was a “need for caution in granting
a patent based on the combination of elements found in the prior
173
art” because “[t]he combination of familiar elements according to
known methods is likely to be obvious when it does no more than
174
yield predictable results.”
As a result, the Supreme Court insisted
that when adjudicating an obviousness issue, particularly when the
analysis centers on a combination patent, “a court must ask whether
the improvement is more than the predictable use of prior art ele175
ments according to their established functions.”
However, the Supreme Court cautioned that “[r]ejections on obviousness grounds
176
cannot be sustained by mere conclusory statements.”
Based on the reasoning above, the Supreme Court found that Teleflex’s patent for an adjustable gas pedal was invalid due to obviousness. In so holding, the Supreme Court found that although “[t]here
is no necessary inconsistency between the idea underlying the TSM
177
test and the Graham analysis[,]” a court errs when it “transforms the
general principle [of the TSM test] into a rigid rule that limits the
178
obviousness inquiry.”
The Supreme Court proceeded to broaden the application of the
TSM test in several ways. The Supreme Court reiterated that “any
need or problem known in the field of endeavor at the time of invention and addressed by the patent can provide a reason for combining
179
the elements in the manner claimed[,]” not just the problem the
180
Similarly, “in many cases a person of
inventor was trying to solve.
ordinary skill will be able to fit the teachings of multiple patents together like pieces of a puzzle”—not just “those elements of prior art
designed to solve the same problem” on which the inventor is work181
ing.
Finally, and in the context of “a finite number of identified,
predictable solutions,” the Supreme Court stated that “the fact that a
172. Id., 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1395.
173. Id., 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1395.
174. Id., 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1395.
175. Id. at 1740, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1396.
176. Id. at 1741, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1396 (quoting In re Kahn, 441 F.3d 977,
988, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1329, 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2006)).
177. Id., 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1396.
178. Id., 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1396–97.
179. Id. at 1742, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1397.
180. See id., 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1397 (asserting that the obviousness analysis is
not conducted from the perspective of the patentee but from the perspective of any
person with ordinary skill in the art).
181. Id., 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1397.
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combination was obvious to try might show that it was obvious under
[35 U.S.C.] § 103,” which further blurred the line between invalidat182
ing obviousness and the non-invalidating “obvious to try” standard.
This “expansive” and “flexible” approach toward a defense of obviousness will potentially make it easier to find a patent invalid for obviousness in court challenges, or for Patent Office examiners to maintain claim rejections for obviousness. This is particularly true for
those inventions that combine previously known elements without
demonstrating any unexpected or synergistic results. Additionally,
the Supreme Court has broadened the definition of the legal construct of a person of ordinary skill in the art by stating that “[a] per183
son of ordinary skill is also a person of ordinary creativity,” who may
184
rely on “common sense” to render an invention obvious.
The Supreme Court’s rationale was that “[g]ranting patent protection to advances that would occur in the ordinary course without real innova185
tion retards progress.”
It should be noted that one of the prior art references relied upon
by the Supreme Court in rendering the patent-in-suit invalid was not
mentioned in the patent’s prosecution. While the Supreme Court
did not address the question of whether the “failure to disclose” prior
art during prosecution “voids the presumption of validity given to issued patents,” it explicitly “note[d] that the rationale underlying the
186
presumption . . . seems much diminished here.”
II. PROCEDURAL ASPECTS
A. Appellate Jurisdiction
The Federal Circuit is charged with the duty of increasing doctrinal
187
stability in the field of patent law.
To this end, Congress granted
the Federal Circuit exclusive jurisdiction over appeals from a final
decision of a federal district court when the subject matter jurisdiction of that court was based, in whole or in part, on 28 U.S.C.

182. Id., 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1397.
183. Id., 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1397.
184. See id., 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1397 (proposing that technological advances
driven by design needs or market pressures are likely the result of common sense
and not necessarily patent-worthy innovation).
185. Id. at 1741, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1396.
186. Id. at 1745, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1399.
187. See generally S. REP. NO. 97-275, at 2–7 (1981), reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N.
11, 12–17 (explaining the purpose and structure of the new Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit).
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188

§ 1338(a), and the case was not based solely on a copyright or trade189
mark claim.
Congress indicated that its grant of exclusive jurisdiction should
not be manipulated:
This measure is intended to alleviate the serious problems of forums [sic] shopping among the regional courts of appeals on patent claims by investing exclusive jurisdiction in one court of appeals. It is not intended to create forum shopping opportunities
between the Federal Circuit and the regional courts of appeals on
other claims.190

Like all courts, the Federal Circuit “has inherent jurisdiction to de191
The court has strictly construed its
termine its own jurisdiction.”
192
jurisdiction in harmony with its congressional mandate. Substance,
not form, controls the determination, and jurisdiction “cannot be
193
conferred [on the court] by waiver or acquiescence.” Thus, implicit
in the court’s mandate is the authority to recharacterize pleadings
that would improperly evade the intent of Congress. The following
cases demonstrate the court’s scrutiny of its jurisdiction.
194
In Biotechnology Industry Organization v. District of Columbia, two
drug industry groups challenged a District of Columbia statute that
195
“Because this
regulated the price of patented prescription drugs.
case [did] not pose the typical questions of patent law—
infringement, validity, enforceability, and the like[,]” the Federal
Circuit “raised the issue of whether [its] statutory grant of jurisdiction
196
encompasse[d] this case sua sponte at oral argument.” The Federal
Circuit concluded that it did have jurisdiction over the matter, pursu197
ant to the Supreme Court’s decision in Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc.
In Shaw, the Supreme Court stated:
188. See 28 U.S.C. § 1338(a) (2000) (providing original jurisdiction to federal district courts for all federal actions relating to patents, plant variety protection, copyrights, and trademarks).
189. Id. § 1295(a).
190. S. REP. NO. 97-275, at 19–20, reprinted in 1982 U.S.C.C.A.N. 11, 29–30.
191. C.R. Bard, Inc. v. Schwartz, 716 F.2d 874, 877, 219 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 197, 200
(Fed. Cir. 1983).
192. See C.P.C. v. Nosco Plastics, Inc., 719 F.2d 400, 401 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (recognizing—in an order granting motion to dismiss and denying motion to assess damages,
costs, and attorney’s fees—that the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit is limited
in its jurisdiction to certain appeals from district courts and that it does not have any
supervisory authority over the district courts).
193. Coastal Corp. v. United States, 713 F.2d 728, 730 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
194. 496 F.3d 1362, 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1639 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
195. Id. at 1366, 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1642.
196. Id. at 1367, 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1642.
197. Id. at 1368–69, 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1644 (citing Shaw v. Delta Air Lines,
Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 96 n.14 (1983)).
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A plaintiff who seeks injunctive relief from state regulation, on the
ground that such regulation is pre-empted by a federal statute
which, by virtue of the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution, must
prevail, thus presents a federal question which the federal courts
have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 to resolve.198

The Federal Circuit determined that “[t]he phrase ‘arising under’
has the same meaning in § 1338 as it does in § 1331, the general fed199
eral-question provision.”
Therefore, the Federal Circuit concluded that the preemption action at issue arose under an Act of Congress relating to patents, that
the district court had jurisdiction based in part on § 1338, and that
200
this case fell within its exclusive jurisdiction under § 1295. Thus, it
determined that the appeal was properly before the court and should
201
not be transferred back to the D.C. Circuit.
202
In Immunocept, LLC v. Fulbright & Jaworski, LLP and Air Measure203
ment Technologies, Inc. v. Akin Gump Strauss Hauer & Feld, LLP, the
Federal Circuit concluded that federal jurisdiction can extend even
204
to patent malpractice suits arising under state law. As noted in Air
205
Measurement, this was a question of first impression for the court.
The Federal Circuit relied on the Supreme Court’s holding in
206
Christianson v. Colt Industries Operating Corp. that federal district
courts have jurisdiction, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1338, over any case
“in which a well-pleaded complaint establishes either that federal
patent law creates the cause of action or that the plaintiff’s right to
relief necessarily depends on resolution of a substantial question of
federal patent law, in that patent law is a necessary element of one of
207
the well-pleaded claims.”
The “substantial question of federal patent law” in Immunocept and
Air Measurement involved prosecution, claim construction, and litigation of the patents at issue. In Immunocept, the patentee claimed that
198. Id. at 1368, 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1644 (quoting Shaw, 463 U.S. at 96 n.14).
199. Id., 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1644 (citing Holmes Group, Inc. v. Vornado Air
Circulation Sys., Inc., 535 U.S. 826, 829–30, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d 1801, 1801–02 (2002)).
200. Id. at 1369, 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1644.
201. Id., 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1644.
202. 504 F.3d 1281, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1085 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
203. 504 F.3d 1262, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 2002 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
204. See Immunocept, 504 F.3d at 1285–86, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1087–88 (holding that the court has jurisdiction under § 1338 for determination of patent claim
scope); Air Measurement, 504 F.3d at 1268–69, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 2005–06 (holding that the court had jurisdiction under § 1338 because the malpractice claim involved substantial questions of federal patent law).
205. 504 F.3d at 1267, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 2004–05.
206. 486 U.S. 800, 7 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1109 (1988).
207. Immunocept, 504 F.3d at 1284, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1087 (quoting
Christianson, 486 U.S. at 809, 7 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1113).
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the prosecuting attorney had made a “fatal flaw” by using the limiting phrase “consisting of,” instead of “comprising,” in the claim pre209
This flaw allegedly caused the collapse of Immunocept’s
ambles.
and a Johnson & Johnson subsidiary’s negotiations to conduct clinical
210
trials and commercialize the invention.
In Air Measurement, the
plaintiff alleged that it would have prevailed in an earlier litigation
had it not been for certain errors committed by its attorneys during
211
prosecution and litigation of the patent in question.
In both cases the Federal Circuit found that the plaintiffs’ state-law
malpractice claims rested on substantial questions of patent law. In
Immunocept, for example, the Federal Circuit found that the determination of claim scope is a “complex” issue due to its diverse claim
construction doctrines and thus would “benefit from federal judges
212
who are used to handling these complicated rules.” In Air Measurement, the court found that the issue of damages, which is not unique
to malpractice or patent law, also invokes federal jurisdiction because
the plaintiff must prove that its patent was infringed in order to re213
cover damages. Even the prior litigant’s invalidity defenses may be
taken into account for jurisdictional purposes because the plaintiff
must show that it would have prevailed in that suit had it not been for
214
its attorneys’ alleged malpractice. Notably, the law firm’s own patent-based defenses were not relevant to jurisdiction, which under
215
§ 1338 is limited to examining the “well-pleaded complaint.”
216
In Voda v. Cordis Corp., the Federal Circuit, in a split decision with
217
Judge Newman dissenting, addressed whether it had supplemental
218
jurisdiction over infringement claims based on foreign patents.
208. Id. at 1283, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1086.
209. Id. at 1286, 1285 n.3, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1087 n.3, 1088.
210. Id. at 1283, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1086.
211. Air Measurement Tech., Inc. v. Akin Gump Strauss Hauer & Feld, LLP, 504
F.3d 1262, 1266, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 2002, 2003–04 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
212. 504 F.3d at 1285, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1088. Unfortunately for Immunocept, the court affirmed that the two-year statute of limitations had run because Immunocept’s attorney knew or should have known of the limiting effects of the term
“consisting of” when he examined the patents. The attorney’s knowledge was imputed to Immunocept because he was acting within the scope of his authority when
he reviewed the patents, even if he did not have the duty to communicate such
knowledge to Immunocept. Id. at 1286–89, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1088–90.
213. 504 F.3d at 1270–71, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 2007.
214. Id. at 1268–69, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 2006.
215. See id. at 1268, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 2005 (determining that under the
well-pleaded complaint rule, jurisdiction arises only from statements appearing in
the plaintiff’s claim); see also Immunocept, 504 F.3d at 1284, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at
1087 (invoking the well-pleaded complaint rule to establish federal jurisdiction).
216. 476 F.3d 887, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1769 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
217. Id. at 905, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1782 (Newman, J., dissenting).
218. Id. at 893, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1772 (majority opinion).
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The district court, having jurisdiction over Voda’s original patent infringement claims, had granted leave for Voda to amend his com219
The
plaint to add infringement claims based on foreign patents.
district court rested its jurisdiction on 28 U.S.C. § 1367, which grants
federal district courts “supplemental jurisdiction over other claims
within the same case or controversy, as long as the action is one in
220
which the district courts would have original jurisdiction.” Pursuant
to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b), the district court certified an order for interlocutory review to determine “whether the district court has supplemental subject matter jurisdiction over Dr. Voda’s five foreign pat221
ents.”
The Federal Circuit answered in the negative. The court relied on
the Supreme Court’s interpretation of § 1367(a)’s requirement “that
foreign claims be ‘so related to claims in the action within such original jurisdiction that they form part of the same case or contro222
versy.’” The Federal Circuit explained that the Supreme Court had
interpreted this provision as codification by Congress of the Court’s
principles of pendent and ancillary jurisdiction by which the federal courts’ original jurisdiction over federal questions carries with
it jurisdiction over state law claims that “derive from a common nucleus of operative fact,” such that “the relationship between [the federal] claim and the state claim permits the conclusion that the entire action before the court comprises but one constitutional
‘case.’”223
224

Quoting Stein Associates, Inc. v. Heat & Control, Inc., the Federal
Circuit stated that “[w]ith regard to the relationship between foreign
and U.S. patent infringement claims, . . . ‘the issues are not the same’
where ‘one action involv[es] United States patents and the other in225
volv[es] British patents.’”
The court also cited Mars, Inc. v. Kabu226
shiki-Kaisha Nippon Conlux, in which the Federal Circuit had concluded that the district court did not have jurisdiction over Japanese
patent claims because: “[1] [t]he respective patents [were] different,
[2] the accused devices [were] different, [3] the alleged acts [were]
219. Id. at 889, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1770.
220. Id. at 893, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1772 (quoting Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Servs., Inc., 545 U.S. 546, 558 (2005)).
221. Id. at 890, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1770 (quoting Voda v. Cordis Corp., 122
Fed. App’x 515, 515 (Fed. Cir. 2005)).
222. Id. at 894, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1773.
223. Id., 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1773 (alteration in original) (quoting Chicago v.
Int’l Coll. of Surgeons, 522 U.S. 156, 164–65 (1997)).
224. 748 F.2d 653, 223 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 1277 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
225. Voda, 476 F.3d at 894, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1773 (alteration in original)
(quoting Stein, 748 F.2d at 658, 223 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 1280).
226. 24 F.3d 1368, 30 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1621 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
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different, and [4] the governing laws [were] different.”
However,
“the district court did not articulate any findings regarding the Mars
228
factors.”
The Federal Circuit thus found several reasons why the district
court did not have subject matter jurisdiction over the foreign patent
claims: (1) there was no “common nucleus of operative fact” because
the foreign patent claims were different, the accused devices were different, the alleged acts were different, and the governing laws were
229
different; (2) nothing in patent treaties contemplates or allows one
230
jurisdiction to adjudicate the patents of another; (3) Voda did not
show that it would be more convenient for a U.S. court to assume
231
supplemental jurisdiction; (4) Voda did not show that the foreign
232
courts would inadequately protect his foreign patent rights; and
(5) the act of state doctrine, which “requires that, in the process of
deciding, the acts of foreign sovereigns taken within their own jurisdictions shall be deemed valid,” given that the grant of a patent by a
233
sovereign is an act of state.
The Federal Circuit also compared the limits of rights granted by
patents to those conferred by land grants and found that “adjudication of Voda’s foreign patent infringement claims should be left to
234
the sovereigns that create the property rights in the first instance.”
Supplemental jurisdiction over the foreign patent infringement
claims would not further judicial economy due to the lack of institutional competence of the U.S. courts in foreign patent regimes, and
“the likelihood of jury confusion in applying the different patent re235
gimes could result in separate trials.”
Judge Newman dissented on the basis that U.S. courts routinely
236
apply foreign law; there were probably not any differences between
237
patents beyond the understanding of a U.S. court; judges should
238
not avoid cases on the basis of complexity; granting a patent is not
227. Voda, 476 F.3d at 895, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1773–74 (quoting Mars, 24
F.3d at 1375, 30 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1625–26).
228. Id. at 896, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1774.
229. Id. at 895–96, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1774.
230. Id. at 899–901, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1777–79.
231. Id. at 901, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1778.
232. Id., 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1778.
233. Id. at 904, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1781 (quoting W.S. Kirkpatrick & Co. v.
Envtl. Tectonics Corp., Int’l, 493 U.S. 400, 409 (1990)).
234. Id. at 902, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1779.
235. Id. at 903, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1780.
236. Id. at 906–10, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1782–85 (Newman, J., dissenting).
237. Id. at 911, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1786.
238. Id. at 912–13, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1786–88.

850

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 57:821

239

an act of state; and the case “does not raise issues of comity, treaty,
and diplomacy, when judgments are sought to be enforced in an240
other country.”
241
In HIF Bio, Inc. v. Yung Shin Pharmaceuticals Industrial Co., the
Federal Circuit was faced with an issue of first impression, namely,
whether the district court’s decision under 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c) to decline to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over state-law claims and
to remand to the state court was within the class of remands set forth
in 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c) and thus barred from appellate review under
242
28 U.S.C. § 1447(d). In pertinent part, defendants successfully removed HIF’s original complaint from a California state court to a
243
federal district court. HIF filed an amended complaint, in which it
asserted a federal claim under the federal Racketeer Influenced and
Corrupt Organizations Act (“RICO”) and eleven purported state-law
claims, including claims for declaratory judgment of inventorship
244
and ownership of various anti-cancer, anti-angiogenesis drugs. The
district court dismissed the RICO claim, declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining state-law claims, and re245
manded the case to state court.
On appeal, the Federal Circuit declined to consider whether HIF’s
remanded claims raised a substantial issue of federal patent law—
inventorship—but disposed of the appeal “on a threshold issue—
whether [the] court ha[d] appellate jurisdiction to review the district
246
While acknowledging that it had not yet
court’s remand order.”
addressed this particular issue, the Federal Circuit noted that several
other Courts of Appeals, relying on the U.S. Supreme Court’s deci247
sion in Carnegie-Mellon University v. Cohill, have held that § 1447(d)
does not bar review of a remand order based on declining supple-

239. Id. at 914–15, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1788–89. Newman explained:
the common thread [in determining whether a particular governmental action is an act of state] is whether the issue is one that is normally consigned
to the executive branches, such that an international dispute is resolved by
political negotiations between diplomats; or whether the issue is more suitable to the individual review that is given to litigants in judicial proceedings
dealing with specific facts.
Id. at 914, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1788.
240. Id. at 915, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1789.
241. 508 F.3d 659, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1240 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
242. Id. at 665, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1244.
243. Id. at 661, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1241.
244. Id. at 662, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1241.
245. Id., 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1242.
246. Id. at 663, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1242.
247. 484 U.S. 343 (1988).
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248

mental jurisdiction.
Nonetheless, the Federal Circuit further observed that a concurring opinion by Justices Kennedy and Ginsberg
249
in Things Remembered, Inc. v. Petrarca introduced a degree of uncertainty about this conclusion, when they explained that the Court in
Cohill “did not find it necessary to decide whether [§ 1447](d) would
250
bar review of a remand on these grounds.”
While there is “no decision that grapples with Justice Kennedy’s
251
Things Remembered concurrence,” the Federal Circuit found that the
Supreme Court’s recent decision in Powerex Corp. v. Reliant Energy Ser252
vices, Inc.
“made the uncertainty introduced by Justice Ken253
nedy’s . . . concurrence precedential.” In particular, Powerex stated,
“[i]t is far from clear . . . that when discretionary supplemental jurisdiction is declined the remand is not based on lack of subject-matter
254
jurisdiction for purposes of § 1447(c) and § 1447(d)” and further
that the Court has “never passed on whether Cohill remands are subject matter jurisdictional for purposes of post-1988 versions of
255
§ 1447(c) and § 1447(d).”
Left to its own analysis, the Federal Circuit held that when a district
court declines to exercise supplemental jurisdiction to claims “over
which it has no independent basis of subject matter jurisdiction, i.e.,
state claims[,] . . . [it] strips the claims of the only basis on which they
256
are within the jurisdiction of the court.” The court concluded:
In short, because every § 1367(c) remand necessarily involves a
predicate finding that the claims at issue lack an independent basis
of subject matter jurisdiction, a remand based on declining supplemental jurisdiction can be colorably characterized as a remand
based on lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Accordingly, a remand
based on declining supplemental jurisdiction must be considered

248. HIF Bio, 508 F.3d at 665, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1244; see, e.g., Trans Penn
Wax Corp. v. McCandless, 50 F.3d 217, 223–24 (3d Cir. 1995) (citing precedents in
the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, Eighth, Ninth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits); see
also 14C CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & EDWARD H. COOPER, FEDERAL
PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 3740 n.39 (3d ed. 1998) (listing examples of cases that discuss the appealability of removal orders by district courts on discretionary grounds).
249. 516 U.S. 124 (1995).
250. HIF Bio, 508 F.3d at 665, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1244 (alteration in original)
(quoting Things Remembered, 516 U.S. at 130 (Kennedy, J., concurring)).
251. Id. at 665, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1244.
252. 127 S. Ct. 2411 (2007).
253. HIF Bio, 508 F.3d at 666, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1244.
254. Id., 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1244 (alteration in original) (quoting Powerex,
127 S. Ct. at 2418–19).
255. Id., 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1244 (quoting Powerex, 127 S. Ct. at 2419 n.4).
256. Id. at 667, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1245.
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within the class of remands described in § 1447(c) and thus barred
from appellate review by § 1447(d).257

B. Final Judgment Rule
Appellate courts have historically disfavored piecemeal litigation
and thus, with limited exceptions, have permitted appeals only from
258
complete and final judgments.
In the case of the Federal Circuit,
the “final judgment rule” for patent disputes arising under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1338 is set forth at 28 U.S.C. § 1295, which states that parties may
259
appeal only a “final decision of a district court.”
The Supreme
Court has defined a final judgment as a decision by the district court
that “ends the litigation on the merits and leaves nothing for the
260
court to do but execute the judgment.”
By requiring parties to
“raise all claims of error in a single appeal following final judgment
261
on the merits,” § 1295, like its counterpart § 1291, “forbid[s]
piecemeal disposition on appeal of what for practical purposes is a
262
Thus, there is no “final decision” under 28
single controversy.”
U.S.C. § 1295(a)(1), and therefore no Federal Circuit jurisdiction,
unless a case has been fully adjudicated as to all claims for all parties
or there was an express determination that there is no just reason for
delay or express direction for entry of judgment as to fewer than all
263
of the parties or claims.
The finality of the judgment was a central issue in SafeTCare Manu264
facturing, Inc. v. Tele-Made, Inc., in which the district court had entered summary judgment of non-infringement in favor of appellee
Burke and another defendant, and then proceeded to enter a “final
judgment” and dismissed the action, even though it had not yet resolved the claims against the other defendants or their counter265
claims.
The Federal Circuit explained that a court of appeals has jurisdiction over a “final judgment” only “when it terminates the litigation
257. Id., 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1245.
258. See Catlin v. United States, 324 U.S. 229, 233–34 (1945) (pointing to the conservation of judicial energy and the prevention of delays as policy reasons for limiting
appellate review to final judgments).
259. 28 U.S.C. § 1295 (2000).
260. Catlin, 324 U.S. at 233.
261. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co. v. Risjord, 449 U.S. 368, 374 (1981).
262. Cobbledick v. United States, 309 U.S. 323, 325 (1940).
263. See Pandrol USA, LP v. Airboss Ry. Prod., Inc., 320 F.3d 1354, 1362, 65
U.S.P.Q.2d 1985, 1990–91 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (holding that determining whether a district court’s order constitutes a final judgment is a function of pragmatic and not
formalistic analysis).
264. 497 F.3d 1262, 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1618 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
265. Id. at 1266, 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1620.
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between the parties on the merits of the case, and leaves nothing to
266
be done but to enforce by execution what has been determined.”
The “final judgment” in this case was premature because it did not
resolve SafeTCare’s claims against the other defendants or their
267
counterclaims.
As a result, the district court’s purported “final
judgment” did not establish appellate subject matter jurisdiction, regardless of the district court’s own description of its order or any be268
lief, concession, or agreement by the parties.
Nonetheless, this issue became moot once the district court belatedly entered a Rule 54(b) judgment nunc pro tunc, following the
Federal Circuit’s notification to the parties of the jurisdictional prob269
lem. A Rule 54(b) judgment is an exception to the final judgment
rule, for it ripened SafeTCare’s appeal and vested the Federal Circuit
270
with jurisdiction.
In Walter Kidde Portable Equipment, Inc. v. Universal Security Instru271
ments, Inc., the Federal Circuit rejected Kidde’s argument that the
court lacked jurisdiction because the district court’s dismissal order
272
was not a final and appealable judgment. In limited circumstances,
the court explained, it could also “entertain an appeal from an order
deciding less than the entire case, such as . . . an interlocutory order
273
certified by a district court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b).” In this
case, the district court’s order stated “that the ‘action’ was dismissed,
274
not simply the complaint.” The court interpreted the term “action”
to encompass the entire proceeding, including termination of the de275
fendant’s counterclaims.
“Accordingly, [the Federal Circuit] construed the district court’s order granting Kidde’s motion for voluntary dismissal as disposing of the entire case, including [Universal’s]
counterclaims, and [asserted] jurisdiction over th[e] appeal, pursu276
ant to 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(1).”

266. Id. at 1267, 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1621 (quoting Parr v. United States, 351
U.S. 513, 518 (1956)).
267. Id. at 1266, 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1620.
268. Id. at 1267, 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1621.
269. Id., 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1621.
270. Id., 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1621.
271. 479 F.3d 1330, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1929 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
272. Id. at 1334–35, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1932.
273. Id. at 1335, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1932.
274. Id., 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1932.
275. Id., 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1932; cf. Local Union No. 38, Sheet Metal Workers’ Int’l Ass’n v. Pelella, 350 F.3d 73, 81 (2d Cir. 2003) (“The word ‘action,’ without
more, is arguably broad enough to encompass any type of judicial proceeding, including counterclaims.”).
276. Walter Kidde, 479 F.3d at 1335, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1933.
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In International Electronic Technology Corp. v. Hughes Aircraft Co.,
however, the Federal Circuit warned that “the parties and other
members of the bar are hereby placed on notice that the court shall
in the future begin to cite counsel for failure to determine whether
278
or not the appealed judgment is final.”
The district court had
granted summary judgment to Hughes, but Hughes had not dismissed its outstanding counterclaims before the plaintiff filed a no279
tice of appeal. “A final decision, as defined by the Supreme Court,
is a decision issued by the trial court which ‘ends the litigation on the
merits and leaves nothing for the court to do but execute the judg280
ment.’” Under Rule 54(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
however, a district court may “direct the entry of a final judgment as
to one or more but fewer than all of the claims or parties only upon
an express determination that there is no just reason for delay and
281
upon an express direction for the entry of judgment.”
Since the
parties had failed to obtain such a partial judgment, the court found
282
that the appeal was premature.
C. Interlocutory Appeals
Although the Federal Circuit has the authority to hear interlocu283
tory appeals under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(c)(1), interlocutory appeals
have not been widely pursued, due to the court’s reluctance to hear
them. However, in Regents of the University of California v. Dako North
284
America, Inc., the Federal Circuit took the unusual step of granting a
petition for an interlocutory appeal from a claim construction rul285
ing. The claim constructions at issue had already been put before
the court in two pending appeals from the district court’s denial of
286
After those apthe appellant’s motion for preliminary injunction.
peals had been filed, however, the district court revisited its claim
287
construction rulings in light of new evidence. The Federal Circuit
found that it would be “an efficient use of judicial resources and
277. 476 F.3d 1329, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1543 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
278. Id. at 1331, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1544.
279. Id. at 1330, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1544.
280. Id., 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1543 (quoting Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437
U.S. 463, 467 (1978)).
281. FED. R. CIV. P. 54(b).
282. Int’l Elec., 476 F.3d at 1331, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1544.
283. See 28 U.S.C. § 1292(c)(1) (2000) (authorizing the Federal Circuit’s jurisdiction over “an appeal from an interlocutory order or decree . . . in any case over which
the court would have jurisdiction of an appeal under section 1295 of this title”).
284. 477 F.3d 1335, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1926 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
285. Id. at 1337, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1927.
286. Id. at 1336, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1926.
287. Id., 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1927.
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would facilitate resolution of all of the claim construction disputes” to
grant the petition for interlocutory review and consider the district
court’s revised claim construction in conjunction with the pending
288
appeals. Indeed, denial of the interlocutory appeals would have left
the merits panel to review an admittedly outdated claim construction
289
order. “Because the matters in the recent [claim construction] order [were] thus intertwined with the issues in the pending appeals,
[the Federal Circuit] determine[d] that granting the petition in
290
these unusual circumstances [was] warranted.”
The Federal Circuit declined to consider an interlocutory appeal of
291
a civil contempt order in Entegris, Inc. v. Pall Corp.
The district
court had initially granted Entegris’s motion for a preliminary injunction but dissolved it after Pall had presented new evidence that chal292
lenged the validity of the patents at issue. Nonetheless, the district
court held Pall in civil contempt for violating the (now dissolved) preliminary injunction by continuing to sell the accused products after it
293
had been ordered not to do so.
Pall appealed the civil contempt
order, while Entegris cross-appealed the dismissal of the preliminary
294
injunction order.
The Federal Circuit concluded it did not have jurisdiction over the
295
Pursuant to 28
civil contempt order and dismissed Pall’s appeal.
U.S.C. § 1292, the court’s jurisdiction over interlocutory appeals extends only to interlocutory orders “granting, continuing, modifying,
refusing or dissolving injunctions, or refusing to dissolve or modify
injunctions, except where a direct review may be had in the Supreme
296
Court.” Since Pall’s contempt order did not fall under any of these
categories, and Pall did not allege that it would suffer “irreparable
consequence” if it were unable to appeal the order, the Federal Circuit concluded that it did not have jurisdiction over Pall’s interlocu297
tory appeal.
Neither did the court find jurisdiction under the “final judgment
298
rule” of 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a).
A contempt order against a party288. Id., 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1927.
289. Id. at 1337, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1927.
290. Id., 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1927.
291. 490 F.3d 1340, 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1001 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
292. Id. at 1341–42, 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1003.
293. Id. at 1342, 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1003.
294. Id., 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1003.
295. Id. at 1345–46, 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1006.
296. Id. at 1343, 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1005 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)
(2000)).
297. Id. at 1345–46, 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1006.
298. Id. at 1348, 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1008.
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litigant is appealable only from the final judgment in the litigation; in
other words, it is not an appealable final judgment unless the party in
299
The Federal Circuit also
contempt is not a party to the action.
found it would have been inappropriate to exercise pendent jurisdiction over the civil contempt order because the facts underlying that
order were not “inextricably intertwined” with those underlying the
300
preliminary injunction order.
The Federal Circuit then held that it did have jurisdiction over
Entegris’s cross-appeal of the order dissolving the preliminary injunc301
tion. That order, the court found, rested only on the alleged inva302
lidity of patents in view of newly discovered prior art. In so holding,
the court rejected Pall’s argument that non-infringement was a sec303
ond, independent basis to support that order. Pall’s assertion that
its new product was not infringing instead went to the question of ir304
Having satisfied itself of its jurisdiction over Enreparable harm.
tergis’s cross-appeal, the Federal Circuit rejected that appeal on its
merits, finding that the district court had not abused its discretion in
dissolving the preliminary injunction because Pall’s new invalidity de305
fense had substantial merit.
D. Declaratory Judgment
In the wake of the Supreme Court’s decision in MedImmune, Inc. v.
306
Genentech Inc., which rejected the Federal Circuit’s “reasonable ap307
prehension of suit” test for declaratory judgment jurisdiction, the
Federal Circuit has significantly lowered the bar for determining
when “a case of actual controversy” exists within its jurisdiction. The
following cases highlight the Federal Circuit’s new standard for determining whether declaratory judgment jurisdiction will arise.
308
SanDisk Corp. v. STMicroelectronics, Inc. was the Federal Circuit’s
first substantive examination of declaratory judgment jurisdiction after MedImmune. While MedImmune examined declaratory judgment
299. See Doyle v. London Guarantee & Accident Co., 204 U.S. 599, 603 (1907)
(holding that contempt orders were to be viewed as interlocutory and were only to
be reviewed on appeal from a final judgment in the case); see also Fox v. Capital Co.,
299 U.S. 105, 107 (1936) (restating the rule that civil contempt orders may only be
reviewed on appeal from a final judgment).
300. Entegris, 490 F.3d at 1349, 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1009.
301. Id. at 1350, 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1009.
302. Id. at 1351, 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1010.
303. Id., 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1010.
304. Id. at 1350, 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1010.
305. Id. at 1352, 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1011.
306. 127 S. Ct. 764, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1225 (2007).
307. Id. at 774 n.11, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1232 n.11.
308. 480 F.3d 1372, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1173 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
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309

jurisdiction in the context of a signed license agreement, SanDisk
took those principles one step farther by applying them to conduct
310
prior to the existence of a license.
STMicroelectronics (“ST”) had contacted SanDisk in April 2004 to
311
propose cross-licensing their patents on flash memory technology.
Despite extensive discussions over the next six months, including
representations that the parties would not sue each other, the parties
312
were unable to reach an agreement.
SanDisk finally brought a
complaint against ST for infringement of one of its patents and declaratory judgment of non-infringement and invalidity with respect to
313
fourteen ST patents.
The district court granted ST’s motion to
dismiss SanDisk’s declaratory judgment claims because SanDisk did
not have a reasonable apprehension of suit under the pre-MedImmune
314
315
standard. SanDisk appealed.
The Federal Circuit vacated the district court’s opinion and re316
manded for further proceedings.
In MedImmune, the Supreme
Court interpreted the Declaratory Judgment Act, in light of Article
III, to require “a substantial controversy, between parties having adverse legal interests, of sufficient immediacy and reality to warrant the
317
issuance of a declaratory judgment.” The dispute must be “‘definite
and concrete, touching the legal relations of parties having adverse
legal interests’; and . . . be ‘real and substantial’ and ‘admi[t] of specific relief through a decree of a conclusive character, as distinguished from an opinion advising what the law would be upon a hy318
pothetical state of facts.’”
A declaratory judgment plaintiff,
however, is not required “to expose himself to liability before bringing suit to challenge the basis for the threat” because “the declaratory
judgment procedure is an alternative to pursuit of the arguably illegal
319
activity.” “The dilemma posed by that coercion—putting the challenger to the choice between abandoning his rights or risking prose309. MedImmune, 127 S. Ct. at 767, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1227.
310. See SanDisk, 480 F.3d at 1381, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1180 (holding that declaratory judgment jurisdiction can exist prior to the existence of a patent license).
311. Id. at 1374, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1175.
312. Id. at 1374–76, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1175–76.
313. Id. at 1376, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1176.
314. Id. at 1376–77, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1176–77.
315. Id. at 1377, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1177.
316. Id. at 1383, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1181.
317. Id. at 1378, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1178 (quoting MedImmune Inc. v.
Genentech Inc., 127 S. Ct. 764, 771, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1225, 1229 (2007)).
318. Id., 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1178 (second alteration in original) (quoting
MedImmune, 127 S. Ct. at 771, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1229).
319. Id., 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1178 (quoting MedImmune, 127 S. Ct. at 772, 81
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1230).
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cution—is a dilemma that it was the very purpose of the Declaratory
320
Judgment Act to ameliorate.”
With those principles in mind, the Federal Circuit explained that
“Article III jurisdiction may be met where the patentee takes a position that puts the declaratory judgment plaintiff in the position of either pursuing arguably illegal behavior or abandoning that which he
321
claims a right to do.”
While declining to set forth “the outer
boundaries of declaratory judgment jurisdiction,” the court stated:
We hold only that where a patentee asserts rights under a patent
based on certain identified ongoing or planned activity of another
party, and where that party contends that it has the right to engage
in the accused activity without license, an Article III case or controversy will arise and the party need not risk a suit for infringement
by engaging in the identified activity before seeking a declaration
of its legal rights.322

The Federal Circuit concluded that ST’s pursuit of “a royalty under
its patents based on specific, identified activity by SanDisk” gave rise
323
to declaratory judgment jurisdiction.
In particular, ST had made
detailed infringement presentations to SanDisk, which included a
324
“thorough infringement analysis . . . by seasoned litigation experts,”
an “element-by-element” analysis of each of SanDisk’s allegedly in325
fringing products, “liberal[] refer[ences] to SanDisk’s present, ongoing infringement of ST’s patents and the need for SanDisk to li326
cense those patents[,]” a 300-page “packet of materials” containing
327
each of ST’s fourteen allegedly infringed patents, “reverse engineering reports for certain of SanDisk’s products, and diagrams
328
showing a detailed infringement analysis of SanDisk’s products[,]”
329
In response, SanDisk “maintained
and related communications.
that it could proceed in its conduct without the payment of royalties
330
to ST.” Those facts were sufficient to evince the creation of “a substantial controversy, between parties having adverse legal interest, of
sufficient immediacy and reality to warrant the issuance of a declara320. Id. at 1378–79, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1178 (quoting MedImmune, 127 S. Ct.
at 773, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1230).
321. Id. at 1381, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1179–80.
322. Id., 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1180.
323. Id. at 1382, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1180.
324. Id., 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1180.
325. Id., 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1180.
326. Id. at 1382, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1180–81.
327. Id., 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1181.
328. Id., 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1181.
329. See id., 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1181 (relating that ST communicated to SanDisk its determination of infringement and its assertion of the right to royalties).
330. Id., 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1181.
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331

tory judgment.”
Furthermore, borrowing language from MedImmune, the court concluded that “SanDisk need not ‘bet the farm,’ so
to speak, and risk a suit for infringement by cutting off licensing discussions and continuing in the identified activity before seeking a
332
declaration of its legal rights.”
Declaratory judgment jurisdiction was not defeated by SanDisk’s
assertions that it would not sue ST
because ST has engaged in a course of conduct that shows a preparedness and willingness to enforce its patent rights despite [this]
statement. Having approached SanDisk, having made a studied
and considered determination of infringement by SanDisk, having
communicated that determination to SanDisk, and then saying that
it does not intend to sue, ST is engaging in the kinds of “extrajudicial patent enforcement with scare-the-customer-and-run tactics” that the Declaratory Judgment Act was intended to obviate.333

The Supreme Court, moreover, has rejected the “reasonable apprehension” test, which had provided the only “sound basis” for the
district court’s refusal to adjudicate SanDisk’s declaratory judgment
334
claims. Accordingly, the Federal Circuit vacated that decision and
335
remanded the case.
SanDisk figured prominently in the Federal Circuit’s decision in
336
Sony Electronics, Inc. v. Guardian Media Technologies, Ltd. Defendantpatentee Guardian had contacted a number of companies about allegedly infringing its patents on “methods and apparatuses for block337
ing the viewing of certain television programs.” Guardian provided
each company with detailed claim charts setting forth its infringement contentions and engaged in protracted discussions and corre338
spondence. None of the companies accepted Guardian’s offer of a
license, however, and instead filed separate actions for declaratory
339
judgment of non-infringement, invalidity, and unenforceability.
The complaints were consolidated and dismissed by the district court
331. Id., 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1181 (quoting Md. Cas. Co. v. Pac. Coal & Oil
Co., 312 U.S. 270, 273 (1941)).
332. Id., 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1181 (quoting MedImmune Inc. v. Genentech
Inc., 127 S. Ct. 764, 774 n.11, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1225, 1232 n.11 (2007)).
333. Id. at 1383, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1181 (quoting Arrowhead Indus. Water,
Inc. v. Ecolochem, Inc., 846 F.2d 731, 735, 6 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1685, 1688 (1988)).
334. Id., 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1181.
335. Id., 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1181.
336. 497 F.3d 1271, 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1798 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
337. See id. at 1274–81, 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1800–06 (documenting the correspondence between Guardian and Sony, Matsushita, JVC, and Mitsubishi).
338. Id., 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1800–06.
339. Id., 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1800–06.
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340

for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
As in SanDisk, the Federal
Circuit vacated the district court’s dismissals because the parties’
conduct and adverse positions demonstrated the presence of an “ac341
tual controversy,” which was ripe for judicial determination.
In so holding, the Federal Circuit found no affirmative evidence to
support Guardian’s allegations that the declaratory judgment plaintiffs had filed their complaints as an “intimidation tactic to gain lev342
erage in the licensing negotiations.” Even if the lawsuits did place
the plaintiffs in a more favorable negotiating position, “that effect is
343
not a sufficient reason to decline to hear the suit,” the court wrote.
Nonetheless, the court instructed the district court to reconsider on
remand whether to exercise its discretion to dismiss or stay the
claims, particularly in light of the fact that the patents were undergo344
ing reexamination.
SanDisk was also followed by Teva Pharmaceuticals USA, Inc. v. Novar345
tis Pharmaceuticals Corp., in which the Federal Circuit examined declaratory judgment jurisdiction in the context of Abbreviated New
346
In 2004,
Drug Applications (“ANDAs”) and 21 U.S.C. § 355(j).
Teva filed an ANDA for generic famciclovir tablets, in which it certified that the five Novartis Famvir Orange Book patents were either
347
invalid or not infringed by Teva’s proposed drug.
When Novartis
sued for infringement of one of its five patents under 35 U.S.C.
§ 271(e)(1), Teva brought a declaratory judgment suit on the four
remaining patents under 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(5) and 21 U.S.C.
§ 355(j)(5)(C), which entitles an ANDA applicant to bring a declaratory judgment action “to obtain patent certainty” on any patent identified in the paragraph IV certification but not included in an in348
fringement suit. On Novartis’s motion, the district court dismissed
Teva’s declaratory judgment complaint because Teva had no reasonable apprehension of being sued on the four patents Novartis had
349
350
not asserted in its complaint. Teva appealed.

340. Id. at 1281, 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1806.
341. Id. at 1285–87, 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1809–10.
342. Id. at 1289, 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1811.
343. Id., 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1812.
344. Id., 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1812.
345. 482 F.3d 1330, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1225 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
346. Id. at 1334–35, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1226–27.
347. Id. at 1334, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1226–27.
348. Id. at 1334–35, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1227 (quoting 21 U.S.C.
§ 355(j)(5)(c) (2000)).
349. Id. at 1335, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1227.
350. Id., 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1227.
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The Federal Circuit reversed the district court’s dismissal of Teva’s
351
declaratory judgment action. As in SanDisk, the Federal Circuit recounted in detail the Supreme Court’s analysis of the “actual controversy” requirements of the Declaratory Judgment Act and 35 U.S.C.
352
§ 271(e)(5). With that framework in mind, the court proceeded to
find that Teva had an “injury-in-fact” and thus a justiciable contro353
versy under Article III.
The court explained that Novartis had created a present and actual
controversy by suing Teva under 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(2)(A) for filing
354
355
an ANDA.
Since an ANDA is a “single act of infringement,” regardless of the number of patents it identified, it did not matter that
Novartis had elected to sue on only one of the five patents, or that
Teva had filed a separate declaratory judgment action on the other
356
four patents.
Those complaints all arose from the same “controversy” created when Novartis listed its Famvir patents in the Orange
357
Book.
The Federal Circuit then found that other actions by the parties
collectively established a “justiciable controversy,” which could be resolved by allowing Teva to bring a declaratory judgment action
358
against Novartis.
For example, Novartis’s listing of its Famvir patents in the Orange Book meant that it could reasonably assert a claim
of infringement against an unlicensed party making, using, or selling
359
its claimed inventions. Second, Teva’s submission of an ANDA gave
rise to Novartis’s infringement suit as well as Teva’s “justiciable de360
claratory judgment controversy.”
Third, the statutory “civil action
361
to obtain patent certainty,” the ANDA declaratory judgment provi362
363
sion, and the Hatch-Waxman Act combine to prevent patentees
like Novartis from “gaming” the system by bringing suit on only one
of the five patents Teva named in its ANDA in order to invoke the
statute’s thirty-month stay on Teva’s ANDA while shielding the other
351. Id. at 1334, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1226.
352. Id. at 1336–39, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1227–30.
353. Id. at 1340, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1230.
354. Id., 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1231.
355. Id., 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1230.
356. Id., 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1230–31.
357. Id., 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1231.
358. Id. at 1341, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1231.
359. Id., 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1231.
360. Id. at 1342, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1232.
361. 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(5)(C) (2000).
362. 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(5) (2000).
363. Pub. L. No. 98-417, 98 Stat. 1585 (1984) (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C.
§ 355 and 35 U.S.C. § 271(E)).
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patents from a validity challenge.
Fourth, Novartis’s infringement
suit against Teva on one patent was sufficient to create “an actual declaratory judgment controversy as to all the paragraph IV certified
365
patents.” Finally, there was a “present and real harm” that Novartis
could bring a future litigation against Teva on its other four Famvir
patents if Teva was not allowed to bring a declaratory judgment ac366
tion against Novartis on those patents.
The Federal Circuit concluded that these factors demonstrated
that “Teva has an injury-in-fact and a justiciable controversy that can
367
be fully resolved by a declaratory judgment.” Since “Teva’s injuries
are traceable to Novartis’ conduct and those injuries can be redressed
by a favorable judicial decision[,]” the Federal Circuit concluded that
“Teva has established standing and an actual controversy . . . to con368
fer jurisdiction under the Declaratory Judgment Act.”
369
In Adenta GmbH v. OrthoArm, Inc., OrthoArm argued that the dis370
trict court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to decide the case. According to OrthoArm, “the court itself stated that it lacked adequate
information to decide the jurisdictional issue, but then proceeded to
deny OrthoArm’s motion, thereby improperly assuming jurisdic371
tion.” OrthoArm further argued that “the court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to decide the case” because the “reasonable appre372
hension of an imminent infringement suit” was absent.
In
particular, according to OrthoArm, a letter threatening Adenta, stating that Orthoarm would “pursue its available legal remedies” in the
event of a breach of the License Agreement, did not create in Adenta
373
the reasonable apprehension that it would be sued.
The Federal Circuit quoted its earlier holding in SanDisk, stating
that “where a patentee asserts rights under a patent based on certain
identified ongoing or planned activity of another party,” and where
that party asserts its “right to engage in the accused activity without a
license under the patent,” a case or controversy will arise and the

364.
365.
366.
367.
368.
369.
370.
371.
372.
373.

Teva, 482 F.3d at 1342, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1232.
Id. at 1344, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1234.
Id. at 1345, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1234.
Id. at 1346, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1235.
Id., 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1235.
501 F.3d 1364, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1428 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
Id. at 1369, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1432.
Id., 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1432.
Id., 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1432.
Id., 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1432.
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party does not have to risk an infringement suit “by engaging in the
374
identified activity before seeking a declaration of its legal rights.”
While SanDisk, Sony, Teva, and Adenta all examined when prelitigation activities may create declaratory judgment jurisdiction, at the
375
other end of the spectrum is Benitec Australia, Ltd. v. Nucleonics, Inc.,
which examined when post-litigation conduct may remove declaratory
376
judgment jurisdiction.
In pertinent part, Benitec’s original infringement case was rendered moot by the Supreme Court’s broad interpretation of the safe
harbor provision of 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1) in its Merck KGaA v. Integra
377
378
Life Sciences decision.
After Benitec voluntarily dismissed its
claims, the district court dismissed Nucleonics’s counterclaims of pat379
ent invalidity for lack of declaratory judgment jurisdiction. Benitec,
however, covenanted not to sue Nucleonics only with respect to Nucleonics’s prior activities but not with respect to its ongoing and fu380
ture research activities.
Nucleonics argued that these potential
claims for infringement were sufficient to support jurisdiction for a
381
declaratory judgment. The Federal Circuit rejected that argument,
finding that Nucleonics had failed to show that it was “engaged in any
present activity that could subject it to a claim of infringement by
Benitec” and had further failed to show a claim of “‘sufficient imme382
diacy and reality’ to support declaratory judgment jurisdiction.”
Judge Dyk dissented, citing the Supreme Court’s holding in Cardi383
nal Chemical Co. v. Morton International, Inc. that once declaratory jurisdiction has been established, jurisdiction continues unless the
party seeking to divest the court of jurisdiction can prove that there is
384
no longer a current case or controversy.
Thus, even if the patentee’s infringement claim becomes moot, “a counterclaim for invalidity should not be dismissed unless the patentee demonstrates that
there is no possibility of a future controversy with respect to invalid385
ity.” Cardinal Chemical reversed the Federal Circuit’s initial holding
374. Id. at 1370, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1432 (quoting SanDisk Corp. v.
STMicroelectronics, Inc., 480 F.3d 1372, 1381, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1173, 1180
(Fed. Cir. 2007)).
375. 495 F.3d 1340, 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1449 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
376. Id. at 1345, 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1453.
377. 545 U.S. 193, 74 U.S.P.Q.2d 1801 (2005).
378. Benitec, 495 F.3d at 1342–43, 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1451.
379. Id. at 1343, 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1451.
380. Id., 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1451.
381. Id., 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1451.
382. Id. at 1348–49, 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1456.
383. 508 U.S. 83, 26 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1721 (1993).
384. Benitec, 495 F.3d at 1352, 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1458 (Dyk, J., dissenting).
385. Id. at 1350, 83 U.S.P.Q.D.2d (BNA) at 1456.
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“that a finding of non-infringement moots a declaratory counterclaim
386
for invalidity,” according to Judge Dyk.
E. Motion to Dismiss
A motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief
can be granted is a purely procedural question not pertaining to patent law. Thus, on review the Federal Circuit applies the law of the
387
regional circuit.
388
In McZeal v. Sprint Nextel Corp., the Federal Circuit reversed the
district court’s dismissal of a pro se plaintiff’s complaint for failure to
389
adequately state a claim for patent and trademark infringement.
The court, relying on the law of the regional circuit, noted that the
bar for pro se litigants may be lower than that for litigants repre390
sented by an attorney.
McZeal met this low bar, according to the
majority, by pleading that he owned the patent and trademark in
question and that they were infringed by the defendants’ Motorola
391
i930 and related cell phone products.
It was not necessary for
McZeal to know how the accused devices worked for the purpose of
392
satisfying Rule 12(b)(6). Nor was it proper for the district court at
the pleading stage to determine that McZeal’s trademark is invalid as
393
generic, which is a question of fact.
Judge Dyk dissented with respect to the majority’s vacatur of the
394
dismissal of the patent infringement claim.
Since the claim was
predicated on the doctrine of equivalents, Judge Dyk argued that
even a pro se plaintiff was required to plead with more specificity regarding which limitations were infringed literally or by equivalents
and how the accused product was insubstantially different from the
395
claims.
396
In RFR Industries, Inc. v. Century Steps, Inc., the Federal Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal of the action pursuant to Rule
41(a)(1)(i) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which authorizes
a plaintiff to dismiss the action without a court order by filing a no386. Id. at 1352, 83 U.S.P.Q.D.2d (BNA) at 1458.
387. See, e.g., C&F Packing Co. v. IBP, Inc., 224 F.3d 1296, 1306, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1865, 1872 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (applying Seventh Circuit jurisprudence to a motion to dismiss in a patent law case).
388. 501 F.3d 1354, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1315 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
389. Id. at 1355, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1316.
390. Id. at 1356, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1317.
391. Id. at 1358, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1318.
392. Id. at 1357–58, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1317–18.
393. Id. at 1358, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1318.
394. Id. at 1359–61, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1319–21 (Dyk, J., dissenting).
395. Id., 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1319–21.
396. 477 F.3d 1348, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1915 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
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tice before the defendant serves its answer.
In this case, Century
claimed Rule 41(a)(1)(i) did not apply because it had faxed its an398
swer to the complaint before RFR voluntarily dismissed the action.
The Federal Circuit disagreed, finding there was no “exceptional
good cause” exception to Rule 5(b)(2)’s requirement that service by
399
fax be consented to in writing.
The court further noted that, according to the advisory committee notes for Rule 5, consent to service
400
by fax “must be express, and cannot be implied from conduct.”
The Federal Circuit also affirmed the district court’s order granting
the plaintiff’s motion for voluntary dismissal in Walter Kidde Portable
401
Equipment, Inc. v. Universal Security Instruments, Inc., despite certain
harmless legal errors. In what the court described as a “tortuous procedural history,” Kidde filed a complaint (“Kidde I”), which Defendant Universal Security Instruments (“USI”) moved to dismiss for
improper venue and lack of standing because Kidde allegedly did not
402
own the patent at the time it filed suit.
The district court denied
the motion without addressing the standing issue, and the parties
403
proceeded to litigate Kidde I. However, Kidde eventually moved to
dismiss the action after the court granted USI’s motion to exclude
Kidde’s expert reports as untimely and began to examine Kidde’s
404
standing more closely. On the same day, Kidde filed a new action
(“Kidde II”) in which it sought to resolve the standing issue by point405
ing to a corrected assignment of the patent at issue.
The district
court dismissed Kidde I without prejudice or conditions, and USI ap406
pealed.
The Federal Circuit concluded that the district court had acted
within its discretion in dismissing Kidde I without prejudice or condi407
tions.
USI had not shown any severe prejudice, the court found,
because USI could rely on the same factual and legal resources in
408
Furthermore, the in
Kidde II that it had developed in Kidde I.
limine ruling excluding Kidde’s expert reports was due to the timing
of trial, and thus did not convey any rights to USI that were improp397.
398.
399.
400.
401.
402.
403.
404.
405.
406.
407.
408.

Id. at 1349, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1916–17.
Id. at 1350–51, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1917.
Id. at 1351–52, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1918.
Id. at 1352, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1918.
479 F.3d 1330, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1929 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
Id. at 1332–33, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1930.
Id. at 1333–34, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1931–32.
Id. at 1334, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1931–32.
Id., 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1931–32.
Id., 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1931–32.
Id. at 1337–38, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1934–35.
Id. at 1337, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1934.
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409

erly taken away when Kidde I was dismissed.
However, the Federal
Circuit found the district court had erred in dismissing USI’s counterclaims and failing to resolve the standing issue when it dismissed
410
Kidde I.
Nonetheless, these were harmless errors, which did not
warrant a remand, because USI could reassert its counterclaims in
Kidde II, and Kidde resolved the standing question before filing Kidde
411
II.
412
In General Mills, Inc. v. Kraft Foods Global, Inc. (General Mills II), the
Federal Circuit initially affirmed the district court’s decision that
Kraft did not have a counterclaim pending at the time judgment was
413
entered. Although Kraft responded to General Mills’ original complaint with a counterclaim, Kraft later secured the dismissal of Gen414
eral Mills’ subsequently filed amended complaint.
The Federal
Circuit held that Kraft did not “toll its deadline to answer the
amended complaint and reassert its counterclaim” by filing its mo415
tion to dismiss. “Accordingly, [the Federal Circuit] concluded that
the district court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to permit
Kraft to reassert the counterclaim after the motion to dismiss was
416
granted.” Kraft subsequently petitioned for rehearing, arguing that
the Federal Circuit “misapprehended Rule 12 of the Federal Rules of
417
Civil Procedure.”
The Federal Circuit did not agree, stating “[o]ur holding is narrower than Kraft’s petition suggests. We did not and do not hold that
the tolling provision of Rule 12(a)(4)(A) never applies to responses
418
to amended pleadings.” According to the court,
Rule 15(a), which sets the deadline for answering an amended
pleading, has two prongs: “A party shall plead in response to an
amended pleading [(1)] within the time remaining for response to
the original pleading or [(2)] within 10 days after service of the
amended pleading, whichever period may be the longer.” Ordinarily, the time remaining for response to the original pleading”
will be defined by one of the periods of time enumerated in Rule
12(a) and tolled by Rule 12(a)(4)(A). Thus, when there is time
remaining for response to the original pleading—for example,
409. Id. at 1338, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1935.
410. Id. at 1339–43, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1934–36.
411. Id., 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1934–36.
412. 495 F.3d 1378, 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1606 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
413. Gen. Mills, Inc. v. Kraft Foods Global, Inc. (Gen. Mills I), 487 F.3d 1368,
1376–77, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1773, 1778 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
414. Gen. Mills II, 495 F.3d at 1378–79, 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1607.
415. Id. at 1379, 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1607.
416. Id., 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1607.
417. Id., 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1607.
418. Id., 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1607.
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when a plaintiff amends her complaint as a matter of right before
serving the defendant or before the defendant answers—the first
prong of Rule 15(a) (which refers to a deadline that is tolled by
Rule 12(a)(4)(A)) becomes the longer of the two prongs, and the
extended deadline of Rule 12(a)(4) controls.419

Kraft then argued in its petition that the Federal Circuit decision
“undermines the ‘clearly expressed intent’ of Rule 12—to permit certain defenses, including failure to state a claim upon which relief can
be granted, to be raised by motion instead of in a responsive plead420
ing.” The Federal Circuit again disagreed, stating “where the meaning of Rule 12 is unambiguous, we decline to ignore the text of the
421
rule in service of a purported purpose.”
The court further stated
that “[t]he language of the rule is unambiguous: Rule 12(a)(4) does
not extend the time for filing an answer to an amended complaint
when ‘the time remaining for response to the original pleading’ has
422
elapsed.”
F.

Standing

“The doctrine of standing limits federal judicial power and has
423
both constitutional and prudential components.”
Constitutional
standing requires only that a plaintiff have suffered an injury in fact,
that there be a causal connection between the injury and a defendant’s conduct, and that the injury be redressable by a favorable
424
court decision.
The Federal Circuit addressed the issue of standing in MyMail, Ltd.
425
v. America Online, Inc. MyMail acquired the pending patent application that became the patent at issue (“the ‘290 patent”) through an
assignment from an individual, who had obtained it “through a state
court foreclosure action on a promissory note secured by the applica426
tion.” Defendants asserted that the promissory note was fraudulent,
which meant MyMail’s chain of title was insufficient to establish ownership of the ‘290 patent or to create standing to bring an infringe427
ment action.
419. Id., 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1607 (additional internal quotations omitted)
(citing FED. R. CIV. P. 15(a)).
420. Id., 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1607.
421. Id., 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1607.
422. Id., 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1607 (citing FED. R. CIV. P. 15(a)).
423. Media Techs. Licensing, LLC v. Upper Deck Co., 334 F.3d 1366, 1369, 67
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1374, 1376 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
424. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992).
425. 476 F.3d 1372, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1832 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
426. Id. at 1375, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1834.
427. Id., 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1834.
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The Federal Circuit disagreed and affirmed the district court’s
finding that the state court judgment through which the individual
had acquired the application was not subject to collateral attack in
428
the federal case. In so holding, the court rejected the defendants’
reliance on cases involving inequitable conduct in their attempt to
429
show that, “as a matter of law, anyone can assert fraud at any time.”
The Federal Circuit explained that “[f]raud in the procurement
bears on the enforceability of the patent and thus implicates the public’s interest in ensuring that the grant of patent rights is legiti430
mate.” MyMail, on the other hand, dealt with patent ownership, a
431
property matter dealt with by state law.
432
In PODS, Inc. v. Porta Stor, Inc., the Federal Circuit determined
that Porta Stor “lack[ed] standing to appeal the jury’s finding of a
433
violation of the Florida Deceptive and Unfair Trade Practices Act.”
There had been no award of damages, no injunction, and no award
of attorney’s fees, and PODS had not sought a declaratory judg434
ment. Thus, Porta Stor was seeking no more than a “review of un435
favorable findings,” which was insufficient to create standing. Pur436
suant to Penda Corp. v. United States, “the law is well-settled that a
party lacks standing to appeal from a judgment by which it is not ag437
grieved.”
The Federal Circuit also examined standing in the context of federal research grants in Central Admixture Pharmacy Services, Inc. v. Ad438
vanced Cardiac Solutions, P.C. In that case, co-plaintiff Dr. Buckberg
had performed research under a grant from the National Institutes of
439
Health (“NIH”), which led to the ‘515 patent at issue.
The grant
entitled the federal government to certain rights in the patent under
440
the Bayh-Dole Act, 35 U.S.C. §§ 200–212.
Defendant Advanced
Cardiac Solutions argued that Central Admixture Pharmacy Services
(“CAPS”) lacked standing because Dr. Buckberg had failed to exe428. Id., 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1834.
429. Id. at 1375, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1834.
430. Id. at 1375–76, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1834–35.
431. Id. at 1376, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1835.
432. 484 F.3d 1359, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1553 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
433. Id. at 1366, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1557.
434. Id., 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1557.
435. Id., 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1557 (citing Penda Corp. v. United States, 44
F.3d 967, 972, 33 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1200, 1203 (Fed. Cir. 1994)).
436. 44 F.3d 967, 33 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1200 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
437. Pods, 484 F.3d at 1366, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1557 (quoting Penda Corp., 44
F.3d at 971, 33 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1203).
438. 482 F.3d 1347, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1293 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
439. Id. at 1351, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1295–96.
440. Id., 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1296.
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cute a license, as required by the NIH. The Federal Circuit rejected
this argument, finding that the Bayh-Dole Act gives the government
only discretionary authority to take title but does not mandate such a
442
transfer. Because NIH had made no effort to take title to Dr. Buckberg’s invention, the patent remained with Dr. Buckberg, which
meant his exclusive license to CAPS was valid, and CAPS had suffi443
cient standing to sue for infringement. In so holding, the court distinguished Campbell Plastics Engineering & Manufacturing, Inc. v.
444
Brownlee, in which title to a patent had been forfeited to the federal
government after it had demanded those rights from a contractor,
445
who had failed to disclose the invention.
446
In Propat International Corp. v. RPost, Inc., the plaintiff Propat had
been granted responsibility by patentee Authentix to license its pat447
ent, enforce license agreements, and sue infringers.
The district
court found that Propat did not have standing to sue without joining
Authentix because Propat was not the owner of the patent but only a
bare licensee, lacking any proprietary or substantial rights in the pat448
ent.
Accordingly, the district court dismissed the case without
449
prejudice and without ruling on Propat’s motion to join Authentix.
450
The Federal Circuit affirmed. Propat had not been assigned any
right to make, use, and sell the patented invention but had received
only a share of licensing royalties and any judgment or settlement re451
sulting from litigation. Authentix, on the other hand, retained “an
economic interest in the patent and a substantial measure of control
452
over decisions affecting the patent rights.”
Moreover, Propat was
obligated to notify Authentix of targets for licensing or suit and ob453
Authentix thus retain Authentix’s consent before proceeding.
tained the “right to veto any transfer of Propat’s rights under the
agreement,” even if it did so “arbitrarily,” as well as the right to ter454
minate the contract if Propat failed to meet certain conditions.
The Federal Circuit concluded that Authentix “retains sufficient
441.
442.
443.
444.
445.
446.
447.
448.
449.
450.
451.
452.
453.
454.

Id. at 1352, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1296.
Id. at 1352–53, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1297.
Id. at 1353, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1297.
389 F.3d 1243, 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1357 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
Central Admixture, 482 F.3d at 1352, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1296.
473 F.3d 1187, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
Id. at 1189, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1352.
Id. at 1188–89, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1351.
Id., 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1351.
Id. at 1189, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1351.
Id. at 1190–91, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1352–53.
Id. at 1191, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1353.
Id., 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1353.
Id., 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1353.
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rights in the patent that it cannot be said to have assigned ‘all sub455
stantial rights’ in the patent to Propat.”
456
In Israeli Bio-Engineering Project v. Amgen Inc., the Federal Circuit
found that Israeli Bio-Engineering Project (“IBEP”) lacked standing
to sue in its own name because it did not have full ownership of the
patent in dispute and could not voluntarily join the co-owner of the
457
patent. In particular, it was argued that certain inventors of claims
two and three of the patent at issue had an ownership interest in
those claims because work on the project that resulted in the invention described in those claims had not begun until after the contract
458
assigning all patents to IBEP had expired.
The Federal Circuit affirmed the district court’s summary judgment that IBEP lacked stand459
ing to sue for infringement.
Non-party standing was the issue in Nisus Corp. v. Perma-Chink Sys460
tems, Inc., in which the parties settled their infringement dispute after the district court had found the patent unenforceable due to in461
equitable conduct.
An attorney involved in prosecution of the
unenforceable patent moved to intervene to amend and reconsider
462
463
the judgment. The district court denied the motions.
464
Ordinarily, non-parties do not
The Federal Circuit affirmed.
have standing to appeal from judgments of a district court, even
when the non-party alleges that the judgment has an adverse impact
465
on him.
Although there are rare exceptions when an attorney is
sanctioned by the court in the course of litigation, those cases required some change in the legal rights of the non-party as a result of
466
the court’s action. Critical remarks in the record about a non-party
467
are not sufficient to confer standing upon that non-party. The Federal Circuit further pointed out that allowing attorneys (or members
of other professions) to appeal mere criticisms would stretch the
468
concept of collateral proceedings into an unrecognizable form.
The court thus affirmed the district court’s denial of the attorney’s
455.
456.
457.
458.
459.
460.
461.
462.
463.
464.
465.
466.
467.
468.

Id. at 1190–91, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1353.
475 F.3d 1256, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1558 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
Id. at 1258, 1268, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1560, 1568.
Id. at 1261–62, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1562–63.
Id. at 1268, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1568.
497 F.3d 1316, 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1758 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
Id. at 1318, 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1758–59.
Id., 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1758–59.
Id., 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1758–59.
Id., 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1759.
Id., 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1759.
Id. at 1319, 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1759–60.
Id. at 1319–21, 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1760–61.
Id. at 1320, 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1760.
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motion to intervene, although it noted that “[t]o the extent that an
individual is harmed by the mere existence of a statement in an opinion, that individual ‘is free to petition for a writ of mandamus, . . .
and request that offending commentary be expunged from the pub469
lic record.’”
470
In Hydril Co. LP v. Grant Prideco LP, the question was whether Hy471
dril could state a Walker Process fraud claim based on Grant
Prideco’s threat to bring infringement suits against Hydril’s custom472
ers. The district court dismissed Hydril’s antitrust claim “[b]ecause
Hydril ha[d] failed to allege enforcement activity by Grant Prideco
which would create an objectively reasonable apprehension that
473
Grant Prideco intended to enforce the ‘631 Patent against Hydril.”
The district court also dismissed the patent claim on the ground that
the parties had waived their right to sue for patent infringement in
their merger agreement, which left breach of contract as the only
474
available remedy for such claims. Having dismissed Hydril’s federal
claims, “the district court declined to exercise ‘supplemental jurisdic475
tion’ over the ‘state law breach of contract claim.’”
The Federal Circuit reversed the district court’s dismissal of the
Walker Process fraud claim and its determination that the merger
476
agreement barred a claim for patent infringement.
The court
noted that if Hydril could prove allegations that Grant Prideco had
withheld material prior art, it could state a claim for a violation of § 2
477
of the Sherman Act. The court also found that “a valid Walker Process claim may be based upon enforcement activity directed against the
plaintiff’s customers” because threatening to bring patent infringe469. Id. at 1322, 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1761 (quoting In re Williams, 156 F.3d 86,
92 (1st Cir. 1998)).
470. 474 F.3d 1344, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1507 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
471. Walker Process Equipment, Inc. v. Food Machinery & Chemical Co., 382 U.S. 172,
147 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 404 (1965), involved patent fraud under the Sherman Act. In
essence, Walker Process fraud is common law fraud applied to a patentee’s conduct in
patent prosecution. It is more difficult to establish than inequitable conduct because
the plaintiff must show that there was either fraudulent misrepresentation or fraudulent omission in the prosecution of a patent with a clear intent to deceive the examiner, resulting in an invalid patent. Id. at 177–78, 147 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 406–07. In
addition, the patentee must have been aware of the fraud when bringing suit to enforce its patent. Id., 147 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 406–07. Finally, there must also be a violation of the antitrust laws. Id., 147 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 405–07.
472. Hydril Co., 474 F.3d at 1346, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1509–10.
473. Id. at 1348, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1511 (first alteration in original) (quoting Hydril Co., L.P. v. Grant Prideco L.P., 385 F. Supp. 2d 609, 612 (S.D. Tex.
2005)).
474. Id., 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1511.
475. Id., 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1511.
476. Id. at 1353, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1514–15.
477. Id. at 1349, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1511.
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ment suits against customers to cause them to stop dealing with their
suppliers “is the kind of economic coercion that the antitrust laws are
478
intended to prevent.”
As for the alleged waiver of the right to sue for patent infringement, the court determined that
[i]n view of the length and detail relating to all aspects of the
merger set forth in the Merger Agreement, the text of which occupies [forty-seven] pages of the joint appendix, one would think that
if the parties intended to preclude the patent infringement suits,
they would have explicitly so provided.479

Further, “[a]lthough in other contexts patent infringement sometimes has been referred to as a tort, the term ‘tort’ . . . cannot prop480
erly be read to cover a claim for patent infringement.”
481
Judge Mayer dissented with respect to the antitrust claim. Hydril
had only alleged competing with Grant Prideco outside the United
States, which ruled out standing to bring a Walker Process claim, he
482
wrote.
Judge Mayer also would have affirmed the district court’s
determination that the parties had waived any patent infringement
claims, finding that such claims were covered by the term “tort” in the
483
parties’ merger agreement.
484
In Biotechnology Industry Organization v. District of Columbia, the
Federal Circuit concluded that Biotechnology Industry Organization
and another industry group had standing to challenge the constitu485
tionality of the District of Columbia’s Excessive Pricing Act.
The
Act made it “unlawful for any drug manufacturer or licensee . . . to
sell or supply for sale or impose minimum resale requirements for a
patented prescription drug that results in the prescription drug being
486
sold in the District for an excessive price.”
The plaintiffs alleged
that the Act violated the Commerce Clause of the Constitution by
seeking to control prices outside the District and was preempted by
487
federal patent law.
The district court agreed with the industry
groups and issued a permanent injunction preventing the enforce488
ment of the act.
The District of Columbia appealed the lower
478. Id. at 1350, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1512.
479. Id. at 1352, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1514.
480. Id., 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1514 (citation omitted).
481. Id. at 1353, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1515 (Mayer, C.J., dissenting).
482. Id. at 1353–54, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1515.
483. Id. at 1355, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1516.
484. 496 F.3d 1362, 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1639 (Fed. Cir. 2007), aff’g Pharm. Res.
& Mfrs. of Am. v. District of Columbia, 406 F. Supp. 2d 56 (D.D.C. 2005).
485. Id. at 1371, 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1646.
486. D.C. Code § 28-4553 (2006).
487. Biotechnology Indus. Org., 496 F.3d at 1366, 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1642.
488. Id., 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1642.
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court’s decision and challenged the standing of the industry organi489
The Federal Circuit affirmed that the
zations to bring the suit.
plaintiffs had standing because at least one member of the group had
“some threatened or actual injury resulting from the putatively illegal
490
action.”
491
In IpVenture, Inc. v. Prostar Computer, Inc., the court considered
whether an organization can have standing if the inventor failed to
assign his invention to his previous employer, as directed by his em492
ployment agreement with that employer.
In particular, IpVenture
owned and licensed the patent at issue and others on inventions re493
lating to the management of personal computer systems.
The coinventors of the ‘235 patent included a part owner of IpVenture, who
had been working as a patent attorney for Hewlett-Packard Company
494
(“HP”) at the time of the invention.
IpVenture sued two computer manufacturers, ProStar Computer
495
and Midern Computer, for infringing its ‘235 patent.
The defendants moved to dismiss on the ground that IpVenture lacked standing to sue because one of the inventors had been obligated under his
496
employment contract to assign his ‘235 patent to HP. The district
497
IpVenture
court agreed and dismissed the suit without prejudice.
subsequently appealed the dismissal, and the ProStar cross-appealed
498
for attorney fees. The Federal Circuit found the dismissal was in er499
The inventor’s emror and vacated the lower court’s decision.
500
ployment agreement with HP used the language “agree to assign,”
which the Federal Circuit stated was not equivalent to a “does hereby
501
grant” provision, as the district court had concluded.
In the absence of any actual written assignment to HP, the Federal Circuit concluded that HP had no immediate ownership interest in the patent,
which meant IpVenture held the rights by virtue of an assignment
502
from the inventor.
489. Id., 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1642.
490. Id. at 1370, 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1645 (quoting Virginia v. Am. Booksellers Ass’n, 484 U.S. 383, 392 (1988)).
491. 503 F.3d 1324, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1853 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
492. Id. at 1326, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1854.
493. Id. at 1325, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1853.
494. Id., 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1854.
495. Id., 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1854.
496. Id., 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1854.
497. Id., 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1854.
498. Id., 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1854.
499. Id. at 1327, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1855–56.
500. Id., 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1855.
501. Id., 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1855.
502. Id., 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1855.
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Furthermore, HP had expressly disclaimed any interest in the pat503
Even though HP had
ent in a 2005 agreement with IpVenture.
executed this agreement after IpVenture had filed the present lawsuit, the Federal Circuit found it was error to disregard it, as it removed any doubt that HP had no rights to the patent and had essen504
tially acknowledged that it could not sue ProStar for infringement.
Consequently, the court concluded that IpVenture had standing to
505
assert the ‘254 patent on its own and without joining HP.
506
Schwarz Pharma, Inc. v. Paddock Labs., Inc. was a case of first impression in which the Federal Circuit considered whether an exclusive licensee, Schwarz Pharma, had standing to appeal, when the patent owner, Warner-Lambert, which had participated in the original
507
suit, declined to join the appeal.
Paddock Labs argued that
508
Schwarz Pharma lacked standing without Warner-Lambert.
Schwarz Pharma responded that joinder of the patent owner by an
509
exclusive licensee is merely prudential and not constitutional. The
Federal Circuit concluded, “Warner-Lambert need not have joined in
the appeal and Schwarz has standing to appeal on its own” because
Warner-Lambert had already had an opportunity to protect its inter510
ests as a plaintiff in the original lawsuit. Thus, this case satisfied the
Supreme Court’s directives in Independent Wireless Telegraph Co. v. Ra511
dio Corp. of America, in which the Court held that a patent owner
should be joined so that “a patent should not be placed at risk of invalidation by the licensee without the participation of the pat512
entee.” Warner-Lambert’s presence in the original action also “enable[d] the alleged infringer to respond in one action to all claims of
infringement for his act, and thus either to defeat all claims in the
one action, or by satisfying one adverse decree to bar all subsequent
513
actions.” Thus, the Federal Circuit found no need to join WarnerLambert in the appeal.
The Federal Circuit also addressed a question of first impression in
514
Morrow v. Microsoft Corporation, in which it considered “how bankruptcy or trust law relationships affect the standing analysis in a pat503.
504.
505.
506.
507.
508.
509.
510.
511.
512.
513.
514.

Id., 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1855.
Id. at 1326–27, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1855–56.
Id., 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1855.
504 F.3d 1371, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1900 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
Id. at 1373, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1902.
Id., 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1902.
Id., 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1902.
Id. at 1374, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1903.
269 U.S. 459 (1926).
Schwarz Pharma, 504 F.3d at 1374, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1903.
Id., 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1903.
499 F.3d 1332, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1377 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
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ent infringement case.”
After internet service provider At Home
Corporation (“AHC”) went bankrupt, the liquidation agreement created three separate trusts—the At Home Liquidating Trust
(“AHLT”), the General Unsecured Creditors’ Liquidating Trust
516
(“GUCLT”), and the Bondholders Liquidating Trust (“BHLT”). In
pertinent part, AHLT was given ownership and liquidation rights in
AHC’s intellectual property, including the ‘647 patent at issue, but
517
not the right to bring suit.
GUCLT, on the other hand, received
the rights to all causes of action, including patent infringement, but
did not receive any ownership or liquidation rights under the ‘647 or
518
other patents.
GUCLT’s trustee subsequently sued Microsoft for infringement of
519
the ACH’s ‘647 patent.
The district court denied Microsoft’s motion to dismiss for lack of standing, citing GUCLT’s status as trust
beneficiary and other bankruptcy principles, but granted Microsoft’s
520
motion for summary judgment of non-infringement.
The trustees
for GUCLT and AHLT appealed the non-infringement ruling, while
521
Microsoft cross-appealed the ruling on standing.
The Federal Circuit reversed the lower court’s ruling on standing
522
and vacated the non-infringement ruling as moot.
Although the
parties’ rights were granted through bankruptcy law, their standing
must be determined according to the patent laws, which “govern the
creation and protection of patent rights, how rights can be trans523
ferred, and the parties entitled to assert those rights[,]” including
“when patent rights have been transferred as a result of bankruptcy
or proceedings in equity” or “[w]here parties have contractually di524
vided patent rights.”
Of particular importance was the principle
that the party holding the exclusionary rights to the patent is the one
525
that suffers legal injury when another party infringes the patent.
Plaintiffs in patent infringement suits can be divided into three
526
general categories for standing purposes.
The first category consists of those who can sue in their own name alone because they hold
515.
516.
517.
518.
519.
520.
521.
522.
523.
524.
525.
526.

Id. at 1336, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1380.
Id. at 1335, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1379.
Id., 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1379.
Id., 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1379.
Id., 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1379.
Id., 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1379–80.
Id. at 1336, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1380.
Id. at 1344, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1385.
Id. at 1336, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1380.
Id. at 1337, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1381.
Id. at 1339, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1382.
Id., 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1382.
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or have been assigned all rights or all substantial rights to the pat527
ent. The second category consists of those who do not hold all the
substantial rights to the patent but hold sufficient exclusionary rights
and interests that they suffer injury by the infringing acts of an528
other. Accordingly, this category of plaintiffs, which includes exclusive licensees, can sue as long as the patent owner is joined in the
529
suit.
The third and final category of patent plaintiffs consists of
those who do not hold all substantial rights or sufficient exclusionary
rights to meet the injury requirement for standing and thus cannot
participate as a party to the infringement suit even if joined with an530
other.
In this case,
[t]he question is whether GUCLT’s interests in the patent include
sufficient exclusionary rights such that GUCLT suffers an injury in
fact from infringing activities. If GUCLT holds all substantial
rights, it can sue in its name alone. If GUCLT holds less than all
substantial rights but sufficient exclusionary rights that it suffers injury in fact, it can sue as a co-party with legal title holder AHLT. If
it lacks injury in fact, GUCLT lacks standing to be a party to this
case.531

According to the majority, “[t]he problem for GUCLT and AHLT
is that the exclusionary rights have been separated from the right to
532
Although GUCLT had the right to sue for
sue for infringement.”
patent infringement, that right was not unlimited, for GUCLT could
not sue controlling shareholders or settle a lawsuit without AHLT’s
533
approval. Thus, GUCLT lacked sufficient exclusionary rights to suf534
fer legal injury from infringement.
Those exclusionary rights belonged instead to AHLT, which held the title to the patent as well as
the rights to sell, grant, transfer, or license any rights under the pat535
ent to another party. Even though AHLT required the consent of
GUCLT and BHLT to transfer its patent rights, the majority found
this was not a substantial restriction and did not transfer any exclu536
sionary rights to GUCLT. Moreover, there was no restriction on the
parties to whom AHLT could transfer its exclusionary rights or to
527.
528.
529.
530.
531.
532.
533.
534.
535.
536.

Id., 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1382.
Id. at 1339–40, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1382–83.
Id. at 1340, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1383.
Id. at 1339–41, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1382–83.
Id. at 1341, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1383–84.
Id. at 1342, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1384.
Id., 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1384.
Id., 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1384.
Id., 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1384.
Id., 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1384.
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537

whom it could confer an exclusive license. As a result, the majority
concluded that GUCLT did not have standing to bring suit, even as a
538
co-plaintiff with AHLT.
Judge Prost dissented, arguing that GUCLT held “a sufficient bundle of rights to support co-plaintiff standing” with AHLT because nei539
ther party could enforce the patent on its own. GUCLT, he further
argued, had suffered an injury in fact by virtue of its equitable title to
the patent as beneficiary to AHLT, as well as its explicit right to sue as
540
part of the bankruptcy agreement.
The lack of exclusionary rights was also the basis for finding that
exclusive distributor Mitutoyo America Corporation (“MAC”) lacked
541
standing in Mitutoyo Corp. v. Central Purchasing, LLC.
MAC had
joined the patentee Mitutoyo in a suit against Central Purchasing
(“Central”) for infringement and breach of a 1994 settlement agree542
ment. The Federal Circuit concluded:
In order for a licensee to have co-plaintiff standing, it must hold at
least some of the proprietary rights under the patent. Consequently, the pertinent question is whether MAC has the exclusive
right to sell products made according to the ‘902 patent in the
United States; the exclusive right to sell only Mitutoyo’s products
made according to the ‘902 patent, however, is not a sufficient basis
for standing.543

In another question of first impression, the Federal Circuit found
that the holder of an “exclusive enterprise license” lacked sufficient
exclusionary rights to sue in its own name in International Gamco, Inc.
544
v. Multimedia Games, Inc.
An “exclusive enterprise license,” the
court explained, is “an amalgam of an exclusive territorial license and
545
Specifically, plaintiff Gamco asan exclusive field of use license.”
signed the patent at issue to International Game Technology (“IGT”)
as part of an asset purchase agreement but reserved to itself the exclusive right to sue for infringement within a particular territory,
which was defined as “the lawful operation of lottery games author546
ized by the New York State Lottery in the state of New York.” Since
Gamco’s license contained a field of use restriction (“lottery games”),
537.
538.
539.
540.
541.
542.
543.
544.
545.
546.

Id., 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1384.
Id. at 1343–44, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1385–86.
Id. at 1344, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1386 (Prost, J., dissenting).
Id. at 1344–48, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1386–89.
499 F.3d 1284, 1291, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1001, 1006 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
Id. at 1287, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1003.
Id. at 1291, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1006 (citation omitted).
504 F.3d 1273, 1280, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 2017, 2022 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
Id. at 1274, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 2018.
Id. at 1275, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 2018–19.
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the Federal Circuit found that it created the risk that an accused infringer could be subjected to a multiplicity of lawsuits by different
547
persons holding different game-specific rights to the patent. “The
problem of a multiplicity of lawsuits arising from an exclusive field of
use license is not cured by adding a geographic restriction[,]” the
548
court stated.
Accordingly, the Federal Circuit concluded that
Gamco lacked substantial rights in the licensed patent within the li549
censed territory to sue in its own name, without joining IGT. Judge
Friedman, in an opinion dubitante, doubted there was a serious danger of a multiplicity of lawsuits in this case and thus remained uncon550
vinced that Gamco could not sue in its own name.
G. Collateral Estoppel
The Federal Circuit has held that issue preclusion (or collateral estoppel) has four prerequisites: (1) an identity of issues between the
prior and present proceedings, (2) the issue in question was actually
litigated in the prior proceeding, (3) the determination of the issue
in the prior proceeding was necessary to the resulting judgment, and
(4) the party defending against preclusion had a full and fair oppor551
tunity to litigate the issue in the prior proceeding.
The absence of the last prerequisite led the court to conclude that
the PTO did not have to give preclusive effect to a district court’s
552
Markman opinion in In re Trans Texas Holdings Corp.
At Trans
Texas’s request, the PTO reexamined two of Trans Texas’s patents on
business methods for insulating deposit and loan accounts from infla553
tion and providing stability to financial institutions.
The PTO,
however, refused to give preclusive effect to a claim construction
opinion by a district court in an earlier infringement proceeding and
554
eventually rejected all of the claims as obvious.
The Federal Circuit affirmed that the PTO was not bound by the
district court’s Markman order, emphasizing that it had “never ap555
plied issue preclusion against a non-party to the first action.” Since
the PTO was not a party to the earlier litigation, it did not have a “full
and fair opportunity to litigate” the claim construction issue, as re547. Id. at 1279, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 2022.
548. Id., 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 2022.
549. Id. at 1280, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 2022.
550. Id., 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 2023 (Friedman, J., dubitante).
551. In re Trans Texas Holdings Corp., 498 F.3d 1290, 1297, 83 U.S.P.Q.2d 1835,
1840 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
552. Id., 83 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1840.
553. Id. at 1294, 83 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1838.
554. Id. at 1295–96, 83 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1839.
555. Id. at 1297, 83 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1840.
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556

quired for estoppel to apply.
The Federal Circuit also rejected
Trans Texas’s argument that it had “somehow represented the PTO’s
interests in the district court action” by arguing against the construc557
tion that was ultimately adopted by the district court.
The presumption that a non-party can be bound by a judgment in an earlier
proceeding can be rebutted only in limited circumstances, e.g.,
“when the non-party [is] in privity with the party, has interests that
are derivative from a party, or ‘participated in an active and control558
ling way in the earlier litigation.’” Since none of those exceptions
applied here, and the PTO was not a party, the Federal Circuit found
that the PTO had properly declined to give preclusive effect to the
559
district court’s claim construction.
560
In Abbott Laboratories v. Andrx Pharmaceuticals, Inc., Andrx asserted
on appeal that Abbott was “collaterally estopped from seeking a preliminary injunction based on holdings in the preliminary injunction
proceedings . . . that all of the asserted claims are invalid or unen561
forceable.”
The Federal Circuit concluded:
[T]he determinations made in proceedings against defendants
Teva and Ranbaxy were not full litigation and decision on the merits for purposes of issue preclusion. Andrx argues that there has
been a final resolution on the limited issue of whether there is a
substantial question of invalidity of Abbott’s patents, but Seventh
Circuit law does not support this view.562

However, the Federal Circuit stated that “[a] determination that
there is merely a likelihood of proving invalidity is a determination
made solely in terms of probabilities, not certainties and is therefore
not full litigation and decision on the merits for purposes of issue
563
preclusion.”
The Federal Circuit determined that “[i]n both the
Teva and Ranbaxy cases, the district court judge did not intend to
firmly and finally resolve the issue for which preclusion [was] asserted, the validity or enforceability of the Abbott patents, in its pre564
liminary injunction proceedings.”
556. Id., 83 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1840 (internal quotation marks omitted).
557. Id., 83 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1840.
558. Id., 83 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1840 (quoting 18 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R.
MILLER, & EDWARD H. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 4449 (2d ed.
2002)).
559. Id. at 1297–98, 83 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1840.
560. 473 F.3d 1196, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1289 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
561. Id. at 1200, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1290.
562. Id. at 1206, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1296 (internal quotation marks omitted).
563. Id., 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1296 (internal quotation marks omitted).
564. Id., 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1296 (internal quotation marks omitted).
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In Transclean Corp. v. Jiffy Lube International, Inc. (Transclean II),
“the district court granted summary judgment in favor of Jiffy Lube
and . . . other defendants . . ., holding that under the doctrine of
claim preclusion, a judgment against Bridgewood [in a prior litigation barred] Transclean from bringing a separate infringement action against Bridgewood’s customers” (i.e., the defendants in the in566
567
stant litigation). In particular, the Federal Circuit in Transclean I
affirmed the judgment against Bridgewood that Bridgewood infringed claims one, two, three, four, and twelve of a patent to which
568
Transclean was the exclusive licensee. Transclean then filed the instant patent infringement suit against the defendants who had pur569
chased the accused devices from Bridgewood.
“[T]he trial court granted Jiffy Lube’s motion for summary judgment that Transclean was precluded from bringing infringement
claims against Jiffy Lube[,]” concluding that Jiffy Lube had satisfied
570
the elements of claim preclusion.
First, there was no dispute that the Bridgewood litigation ended in
a final judgment on the merits or that the court properly exercised
jurisdiction in that matter. Nor did Transclean dispute that Jiffy
Lube was in privity with Bridgewood, the defendant in the prior
litigation. Finally, Transclean did not dispute that during the first
litigation it was aware of Jiffy Lube’s use of T-Tech machines and
could have brought claims against Jiffy Lube.571

Transclean argued that its claim should not be precluded because
“the law generally allows a patentee to sue manufacturers or sellers
and users of an infringing device as joint tortfeasors, and that the law
572
permits multiple suits, just not multiple (i.e., double) recoveries.”
According to the Federal Circuit, “the real question [was] whether
the relationship between the defendants and Bridgewood was so close
573
that they were in privity for claim preclusion purposes.”
“[A]
manufacturer or seller of a product who is sued for patent infringement typically is not in privity with a party, otherwise unrelated, who
574
does no more than purchase and use the product.” Defendants argued that Transclean’s admission that Bridgewood and its customers
565. 474 F.3d 1298, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1400 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
566. Id. at 1301, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1401.
567. Transclean Corp. v. Bridgewood Servs., Inc. (Transclean I), 290 F.3d 1364, 62
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1865 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
568. Transclean Corp., 474 F.3d at 1301, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1401.
569. Id., 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1401.
570. Id. at 1302, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1402.
571. Id. at 1302–03, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1402.
572. Id. at 1303, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1403.
573. Id. at 1305, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1404.
574. Id. at 1306, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1405.
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were in privity was “binding because privity is a question of fact that
575
Transclean contended that “privity cannot be
can be admitted.”
admitted because it is a question of law and [the Federal Circuit is]
free to determine that Bridgewood and the Participating Defendants
were not in privity if that conclusion is supported by the actual
576
facts.”
The Federal Circuit concluded that “even if Transclean is correct
that the issue should be characterized as a legal conclusion, . . .
Transclean should be bound by its concession under the doctrine of
577
judicial estoppel.”
Thus, the court held that judicial estoppel
bound Transclean to its repeated, prior concessions that competitor’s
customers were in privity with competitor, for claim preclusion purposes, and patentee’s infringement claims against defaulting defen578
dants were barred by claim preclusion.
Interestingly, “[t]he district court previously had entered default
judgment in favor of Transclean against several other defendants
(‘Defaulting Defendants’), none of whom had answered the com579
plaint.”
According to the Federal Circuit, however, preclusion issues may be raised by a court sua sponte even though the Defaulting
Defendants had not pleaded claim preclusion as an affirmative de580
fense. “Although the general rule is that claim preclusion and issue
preclusion must be pleaded, an exception exists where all relevant
data and legal records are before the court and the demands of comity, continuity in the law, and essential justice mandate invocation of
581
preclusion principles.” As such, the court “believe[d] that as a matter of law and fairness, claim preclusion should bar Transclean’s in582
fringement claims against the Defaulting Defendants.” The Federal
Circuit therefore reversed the judgment against the Defaulting De583
fendants.

575.
576.
577.
578.
579.
580.
581.
582.
583.

Id., 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1405.
Id., 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1405.
Id., 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1405.
Id. at 1307, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1406.
Id. at 1301, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1401.
Id. at 1308, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1406.
Id., 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1406 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Id., 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1406–07.
Id., 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1407.
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H. Trial Procedures
1.

Right to a jury trial
584
The right to a jury trial was a central issue in Shum v. Intel Corp.,
which stemmed from an unsuccessful venture between Plaintiff Frank
585
Shum and co-defendant Jean-Marc Verdiell. After the partners had
dissolved their joint corporation Radiance Design (“Radiance”),
Shum sued Verdiell, his corporation LightLogic, and its purchaser
Intel for fraud, unjust enrichment, and other state law claims and as586
serted a claim for improper inventorship of Verdiell’s patents.
In
particular, Shum accused Verdill of forming LightLogic to file patent
applications in Verdiell’s name based on technology developed at
Radiance, misrepresenting to the PTO and third parties that Verdiell
was the sole inventor of a patent application by Shum, improperly
causing the PTO to abandon Shum’s application, transferring Radiance’s funds to Verdiell’s exclusive control, excluding Shum from
meetings with Radiance investors, removing Shum as a “principal investigator” from government contracts, and engaging in other ques587
tionable activity.
In pertinent part, the district court dismissed Shum’s unjust enrichment claim and granted defendants’ motion to bifurcate the trial,
with Shum’s inventorship claim to be tried before the court and the
588
state law claims to be tried before the jury. The district court held a
bench trial and concluded Shum had not met his burden of proving
589
that he was the inventor of any of the patents at issue.
Based on
that result, the court granted defendants’ motion for summary judgment on Shum’s remaining state law claims and entered judgment in
590
591
their favor. Shum appealed.
The Federal Circuit concluded that the district court violated
Shum’s constitutional right to a jury by holding a bench trial on his
592
inventorship claim before holding a jury trial.
The U.S. Supreme
Court has held that “only under the most imperative circumstances . . . can the right to a jury trial of legal issues be lost through

584.
585.
586.
587.
588.
589.
590.
591.
592.

499 F.3d 1272, 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1933 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
Id. at 1274–75, 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1934–35.
Id. at 1275, 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1935.
Id., 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1935.
Id., 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1935.
Id., 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1935.
Id. at 1275–76, 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1935.
Id. at 1276, 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1935.
Id. at 1279, 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1938.

2008]

2007 PATENT LAW DECISIONS

883

593

prior determination of equitable claims.”
Although Shum’s claim
for correction of inventorship was an equitable claim with no right to
a jury trial, it had common factual issues with his state law claims, including proofs that Shum conceived the invention, the degree of his
594
inventive contribution, and the time and place of conception. Both
the district court and the appellees implicitly recognized these facts
were common to both sets of claims when they stated that Shum’s
595
state law claims would fail if he was not the inventor. The Federal
Circuit thus vacated the district court’s determination on inventorship and its summary judgment on the state law claims, and re596
manded the case for further proceedings.
The Federal Circuit also reversed the district court’s dismissal of
Shum’s unjust enrichment claim because it rested on different elements and was not “merely duplicative and dependent” upon Shum’s
597
fraudulent concealment claim, as the lower court had found.
Moreover, under California law, unjust enrichment can exist as a
separate cause of action where, as here, it is grounded in equitable
598
principles of restitution.
Judge Friedman dissented on the Seventh Amendment issue, arguing that Shum had no common-law right to a jury trial on his improper inventorship claim, which was sufficiently different from his
599
state law claims as to justify bifurcation. Judge Friedman also found
a “striking parallel” between this case and Markman v. Westview In600
struments, Inc., where the Supreme Court found that claim construction was a legal issue exclusively within the province of the court,
even though it may be dispositive of the remaining issues to be tried
601
before the jury.
602
In Paice LLC v. Toyota Motor Corp., the Federal Circuit found that
a patentee does not necessarily have a Seventh Amendment right to a
trial by jury on the question of the reasonable royalty a court may im603
pose on an infringer.
Although the court agreed with Paice that
593. Id. at 1276, 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1936 (quoting Beacon Theaters, Inc. v.
Westover, 359 U.S. 500, 510–11 (1959)).
594. Id. at 1277, 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1937–38.
595. Id. at 1278, 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1937.
596. Id. at 1280, 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1939.
597. Id. at 1279–88, 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1938–39.
598. Id. at 1279, 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1938.
599. Id. at 1280, 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1939 (Friedman, J., dissenting).
600. 517 U.S. 370, 38 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1461 (1996).
601. Shum, 499 F.3d at 1284, 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1942 (Friedman, J., dissenting).
602. 504 F.3d 1293, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1001 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
603. Id. at 1316, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1017.
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the determination of damages is generally a legal question that invokes the Seventh Amendment, it noted that “not all monetary relief
604
The Federal Circuit conis properly characterized as ‘damages.’”
cluded that “the fact that monetary relief is at issue in this case does
not, standing alone, warrant a jury trial[,]” and rejected Paice’s Sev605
enth Amendment argument.
2.

District court’s interpretation of remand
606
In E-Pass Technologies, Inc. v. 3Com Corp. (E-Pass II), E-Pass argued
that the district court had erred in its interpretation of the previous
607
Federal Circuit opinion, in which the Federal Circuit had vacated
and remanded the case to the district court to address the issue of in608
Efringement under the proper construction of the term “card.”
pass’s argument relied in substantial part on the Federal Circuit’s
statement in E-Pass I that “issues of material fact remain in dispute as
to both literal and doctrine of equivalents infringement under the
609
proper construction” of the term “card.” However, the Federal Circuit stated that the district court’s grant of summary judgment in EPass I was vacated and remanded for further proceedings, and by vacating the Federal Circuit signaled that, “although the district court’s
prior decision rested upon erroneous grounds, a proper claim construction might support a judgment (summary or otherwise) in favor
of either party, depending on the evidence and argument submitted
to the district court on remand and considered by the district court
610
in the first instance.”
In E-Pass I, the Federal Circuit discussed in detail the claim construction of the term “card” and the district court’s error in construing “card” to mean a card with the precise dimensions of a standard
611
credit card. At the conclusion of the discussion, the Federal Circuit
emphasized that “under the correct construction of ‘card’ in this context . . . it may be or may not be that the accused Palm Pilot devices

604. Id., 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1017.
605. Id., 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1017.
606. 473 F.3d 1213, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1385 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
607. E-Pass Techs., Inc. v. 3Com Corp. (E-Pass I), 343 F.3d 1364, 1365, 67
U.S.P.Q.2d 1947, 1948–49 (BNA) (Fed. Cir. 2004).
608. E-Pass II, 473 F.3d at 1218, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1388.
609. E-Pass I, 343 F.3d at 1365, 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1947.
610. E-Pass II, 473 F.3d at 1218, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1388; see id., 81
U.S.P.Q.2d at 1388 (“[W]hen the Supreme Court grants a writ of certiorari, vacates,
and remands, it ‘does not indicate, nor even suggest, that the lower court’s decision
was erroneous.’” (quoting Communities for Equity v. Mich. High Sch. Athletic Ass’n,
459 F.3d 676, 680 (6th Cir. 2006))).
611. E-Pass I, 343 F.3d at 1367–71, 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1948–52.
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612

literally infringe.”
Indeed, in E-Pass II the Federal Circuit stated
that it “could not have intended to foreclose a summary judgment of
noninfringement because the record did not yet contain the evidence
that the parties would put forward in support of their infringement
613
and noninfringement contentions under the proper construction.”
“Accordingly, the district court correctly concluded that it had the
authority to entertain the defendants’ motions for summary judg614
ment on remand.”
3.

Summary judgment
The Federal Circuit reviews a district court’s grant of summary
judgment de novo, “reapplying the standard applicable at the district
615
Summary judgment is appropriate “if the pleadings, the
court.”
discovery and disclosure materials on file, and any affidavits show that
there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the movant
616
is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” In deciding such a motion, “[t]he evidence of the nonmovant is to be believed, and all justi617
fiable inferences are to be drawn in his favor.”
618
In In re Gabapentin Patent Litigation, the Federal Circuit noted that
the district court had previously granted a motion for summary
judgment of noninfringement based on Warner Lambert’s failure to
619
meet its burden of proof. The district court “determined that Warner Lambert failed to adduce sufficient evidence to establish that the
accused products meet the limitation that the anions of a mineral
620
acid do not exceed 20 ppm (‘the 20 ppm limitation’).”
621
The Federal Circuit reversed. The court explained that to prove
infringement, Warner Lambert was required to demonstrate that the
infringing party’s samples contained less than 20 ppm of anions of a
622
mineral acid, as recited in the claims.
Warner Lambert submitted
623
The Federal Circuit
pH tests performed by its analytical expert.
found that the “pH testing can indicate whether a sample contains
612. Id. at 1371, 67 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1951–52.
613. E-Pass II, 473 F.3d at 1218, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1388.
614. Id., 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1388–89.
615. Rodime PLC v. Seagate Tech., Inc., 174 F.3d 1294, 1301, 50 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1429, 1438 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
616. FED. R. CIV. P. 56(c).
617. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255 (1986) (citing Adickes v.
S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 158–59 (1970)).
618. 503 F.3d 1254, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1651 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
619. Id. at 1258, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1654.
620. Id., 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1654.
621. Id. at 1262, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1657.
622. Id., 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1657.
623. Id. at 1260, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1655.
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less than 20 ppm of acidic chloride by measuring the pH, or acidity,
of the solution and comparing it against a sample with a known
624
amount of acid.” The court concluded that the district court erred
in granting summary judgment of noninfringement based on Warner
625
Lambert’s purported failure to meet its burden of proof.
The record showed that “Warner Lambert proffered sufficient evidence to
create a genuine issue of material fact regarding whether the accused
626
products met the 20 ppm claim limitation of the . . . patent.”
I.

United States Patent and Trademark Office Procedures

1.

Reissue and recapture
The recapture rule limits the ability of patentees to broaden their
627
patents after issuance.
Inventors may seek reissuance of their pat628
ent under 35 U.S.C. § 251. If the reissue application is filed within
two years of the patent’s initial issuance and the patentee “through
error without any deceptive intention . . . claim[ed] . . . less than he
had a right to[,]” the reissue patent’s claims may be broader than the
629
original patent’s claims. Section 251 is “remedial in nature, based
on fundamental principles of equity and fairness, and should be con630
strued liberally.”
However, the remedial function of the statute is
limited. Material that was surrendered in order to obtain issuance
cannot be reclaimed via § 251, for “deliberate withdrawal or amendment . . . cannot be said to involve the inadvertence or mistake con631
templated by 35 U.S.C. § 251.” The Federal Circuit has mandated
that “[i]t is critical to avoid allowing surrendered matter to creep
back into the issued patent, since competitors and the public are on
notice of the surrender and may have come to rely on the consequent
624. Id. at 1262, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1657.
625. Id., 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1657.
626. Id., 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1657.
627. See Pannu v. Storz Instruments, Inc., 258 F.3d 1366, 1370–71, 59 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1597, 1600 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (“The recapture rule ‘prevents a patentee from
regaining through reissue the subject matter that he surrendered in an effort to obtain allowance of the original claims.’” (quoting In re Clement, 131 F.3d 1464, 1468,
45 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1161, 1164 (Fed. Cir. 1997))).
628. 35 U.S.C. § 251 (2000).
629. Id.; see In re Handel, 312 F.2d 943, 948, 136 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 460, 464 (Fed.
Cir. 1963) (“[T]he whole purpose of the statute, so far as [reissue] claims are concerned, is to permit limitations . . . to be taken from claims that are too narrow.”).
630. In re Weiler, 790 F.2d 1576, 1579, 229 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 673, 675 (Fed. Cir.
1986) (citing In re Bennett, 766 F.2d 524, 528, 226 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 413, 416 (Fed.
Cir. 1985) (en banc)).
631. Clement, 131 F.3d at 1468, 45 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1164 (alteration in original) (quoting Haliczer v. United States, 356 F.2d 541, 545, 148 U.S.P.Q (BNA) 565,
569 (1966)).
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632

limitations on claim scope.”
The recapture rule thus serves the
same policy as the doctrine of prosecution history estoppel—both
operate, albeit in different ways, to prevent a patentee from reclaim633
ing territory that he had previously committed to the public.
In operation, the recapture rule excludes earlier deliberate withdrawals and amendments from the allowable scope of a reissue patent. “Under [the recapture] rule, claims that are ‘broader than the
original patent claims in a manner directly pertinent to the subject
634
The
matter surrendered during prosecution’ are impermissible.”
Federal Circuit described the required analysis in a recapture case in
635
depth in In re Clement.
First, the original and reissued claims are
construed to ascertain “whether and in what ‘aspect’ the reissue
636
claims are broader than the patent claims.” If the reissue claims are
broader in some way, the court must determine “whether the broader
637
aspects of the reissue claims relate to surrendered subject matter.”
This is accomplished by reviewing the prosecution history to determine what has been surrendered and determining whether the additional coverage of the reissue claim reads on the surrendered mat638
639
ter. If it does, the recapture rule bars the claim.
640
In MBO Laboratories, Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co., the Federal
Circuit determined that MBO clearly sought in reissue to broaden
the scope of its patent coverage by rewriting its claims directed to
“providing a body slidably receiving the needle” to cover all relative
641
movement, not just retraction.
MBO, in fact, had explicitly stated
that such broadening was the purpose behind the reissue applica642
tion. In light of these “clear statements” in the prosecution history
632. MBO Labs., Inc. v. Becton, Dickinson & Co., 474 F.3d 1323, 1331, 81
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1661, 1667 (Fed. Cir. 2007); see id. at 1331–32, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) at 1667 (“[T]he recapture rule . . . ensur[es] the ability of the public to rely
on a patent’s public record.” (quoting Vectra Fitness, Inc. v. TNWK Corp., 162 F.3d
1379, 1384, 49 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1144, 1148 (Fed. Cir. 1998))).
633. See Hester Indus., Inc. v. Stein, Inc., 142 F.3d 1472, 1481, 46 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1641, 1649 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (“The recapture rule is based on principles of
equity and therefore embodies the notion of estoppel . . . which prevents the application of the doctrine of equivalents in a manner contrary to the patent’s prosecution
history.”).
634. Id. at 1480, 46 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1648 (citing Clement, 131 F.3d at 1468, 45
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1164).
635. 131 F.3d at 1468–70, 45 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1164–65.
636. Id. at 1468, 45 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1164.
637. Id. at 1468–69, 45 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1164.
638. Id. at 1469, 45 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1164.
639. Id. at 1469–70, 45 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1164–65.
640. 474 F.3d 1323, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1661 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
641. Id. at 1333, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1668.
642. See id. at 1332, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1667 (noting MBO’s statement in its
Application for Reissue of its patent that the original claims “claim less than we had a
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of the reissue patent, the court was “compelled to give effect to
643
“The
MBO’s stated intent to broaden the coverage of its claims.”
district court [thus] erred in the first instance by applying the recapture rule to rewrite the claims, essentially unmaking the change that
644
the PTO had permitted.”
While determining that the recapture
rule should not be used to rewrite claim language, claim construction
should not, of course, be blind to validity issues: “claims should be so
645
construed, if possible, as to sustain their validity.”
“A claim that is
interpreted too broadly will run into validity issues, providing motivation for the construing court to choose a narrower interpretation if
646
possible.”
However, according to the court, “validity construction
647
should be used as a last resort, not a first principle.” The court explained that it has “limited the maxim [that claims are to be construed to preserve validity] to cases in which the court concludes, after applying all the available tools of claim construction, that the
648
claim is still ambiguous.”
The court stated, “[w]hether those
broadened claims are invalidated by the recapture rule is an issue
649
separate from construction.”
650
In In Re Serenkin, the Federal Circuit affirmed the decision of the
Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences that the error upon which
Serenkin based his reissue application was not a correctable error
651
under 35 U.S.C. § 251. On January 29, 1997, Serenkin filed a U.S.
652
On January 28, 1998,
provisional patent application in the PTO.
one day less than a year after the filing of the provisional application,
Serenkin “submitted an application to the PTO in its capacity as the
United States Receiving Office (‘USRO’) under the Patent Coopera653
tion Treaty (‘the PCT application’).” The PCT application claimed
654
priority from the provisional application.
Although Serenkin’s request form noted that the application contained eight pages of drawright to claim in that they fail to claim clearly that any relative movement . . . will
achieve the desired result of preventing needlestick hazard, whether or not the needle moves toward the body and connected safety device”).
643. Id., 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1667.
644. Id., 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1667.
645. Id., 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1667 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Rhine v. Casio, Inc., 183 F.3d 1342, 1345, 51 U.S.P.Q.2d 1377 (Fed. Cir. 1999)).
646. Id., 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1667.
647. Id., 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1667.
648. Id., 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1667 (alteration in original) (quoting Phillips v.
AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1327, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1321, 1336–37 (Fed. Cir.
2005)).
649. Id., 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1667.
650. 479 F.3d 1359, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 2011 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
651. Id. at 1360, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 2011.
652. Id., 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 2011–12.
653. Id., 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 2012.
654. Id., 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 2012.
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ings, and the PCT application referenced the eight figures, no draw655
ings were actually included with the application. Serenkin later received a postcard from the USRO notifying him of the receipt of the
656
application and the missing drawings.
On March 24, 1998, the USRO issued a Petition Decision stating
that “pursuant to PCT Rule 20.2(a) and PCT Administrative Instructions, sections 309(b) and 310, ‘the filing date of an international application is the date when all the papers completing the international
657
application are received.’” As such, Serenkin’s drawings could not
658
be treated as having been submitted on the original filing date.
Again, the USRO informed Serenkin that he must decide within fifteen days “whether he preferred to retain the original filing date of
January 28, 1998, with the application as filed without drawings, or
incorporate the drawings as part of the application and accept a new
659
filing date of February 17, 1998.” If Serenkin chose to incorporate
his drawings, the USRO specifically stated that the priority date of
660
January 29, 1997, would be lost. On March 31, 1998, Serenkin’s attorney filed a petition to the USRO accepting the later filing date of
661
662
February 17, 1998. A patent issued on August 29, 2000.
On April 30, 2002, through a new attorney, Serenkin sought reissue
of the patent in order to obtain the benefit of the January 29, 1997,
663
filing date for the provisional application.
“While admitting that
the relief he [sought] is not available under PCT procedures, Serenkin argue[d] that such a procedural mistake is remediable under
§ 251, particularly in light of [Federal Circuit] case law authorizing
664
the use of reissue to correct prosecution mistakes.”
The Federal
Circuit affirmed the PTO’s conclusion that it was not “permissible for
Serenkin to claim the benefit of the earlier filing date through the re665
issue process.”
The Federal Circuit reasoned that while § 251 is “‘based on fundamental principles of equity and fairness, and should be construed

655.Id
., 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 2012.
656. Id., 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 2012.
657. Id., 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 2012.
658. Id., 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 2012.
659. Id. at 1360–61, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 2012.
660. Id. at 1361, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 2012.
661. Id., 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 2012.
662. Id., 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 2012.
663. Id., 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 2012.
664. Id. at 1362, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 2013.
665. Id., 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 2013.
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liberally’ . . . the remedial function is not without limits. It went on
to say, “[i]deed, ‘the reissue statute was not enacted as a panacea for
all patent prosecution problems, nor as a grant to the patentee of a
667
second opportunity to prosecute de novo his original application.’”
As such, “not every event or circumstance that might be labeled ‘er668
ror’ is correctable by reissue.”
The court further pointed out that the reissue could be used to
perfect a claim for priority but not in cases in which an applicant
made a deliberate decision to accept a later priority date in exchange
669
for including newly submitted material in the application.
The
Federal Circuit thus affirmed the PTO’s determination that Serenkin’s reissue was an improper attempt to change an error in judgment by the applicant during prosecution of the patent, which is not
670
correctable by reissue under 35 U.S.C. § 251.
671
In Forest Laboratories, Inc. v. Ivax Pharmaceuticals, the question before the court was whether a change effected in the reissue application improperly broadened the scope of claim 11 of Forest’s patent
672
or merely clarified or corrected the original claim. Defendants Ivax
and Cipla argued that claim 11 was invalid because it had been improperly broadened during reissue two years after the original patent
673
had issued. In particular, they argued that the change in the optical rotation sign of the diol intermediate in claim 11 during reissue
broadened the claim because it now covered a process beginning
674
with a different enantiomer. Even if the change had been intended
merely to correct a typographical error, the plaintiffs argued it may
still be an improper broadening and that a “typographical error must
be evident to the general public in order to serve the public notice
675
function of patents.”
The Federal Circuit agreed with Forest that the change in the optical rotation sign for the diol intermediate in claim 11 did not
676
broaden the scope of the claim. The Federal Circuit relied on the
666. Id., 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 2013 (quoting In re Weiler, 790 F.2d 1576, 1579,
229 U.S.P.Q (BNA) 673, 675 (Fed. Cir. 1986)).
667. Id., 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 2013 (internal quotations omitted) (quoting
Weiler, 790 F.2d at 1582, 229 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 677).
668. Id., 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 2013–14 (quoting Weiler, 790 F.2d at 1579, 229
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 675).
669. Id. at 1364, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 2014–15.
670. Id. at 1365, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 2015.
671. 501 F.3d 1263, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1099 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
672. Id. at 1270, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1105.
673. Id., 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1104.
674. Id., 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1105.
675. Id., 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1105.
676. Id., 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1105.

2008]

2007 PATENT LAW DECISIONS

891

plain reading of the patent specification, which “supports, even com677
pels, this conclusion.” The court therefore agreed that “the change
in the optical sign during reissue does not represent a change of
claim scope but merely a correction of the claim to be consistent with
678
the disclosure of the specification.”
2.

Certificate of correction
A typographical error was also at issue in Central Admixture Pharmacy
679
Services, Inc. v. Advanced Cardiac Solutions, in which Advanced Cardiac Solutions and Charles Wall (collectively, “ACS”) appealed from
several summary judgment orders that found ACS liable to plaintiffs
CAPS and Dr. Gerald Buckberg for willful infringement of U.S. Pat680
ent No. 4,988,515 (“the ‘515 patent”).
The Federal Circuit found that the certificate of correction CAPS
obtained from the PTO to alter the asserted claims of the patent was
681
invalid. The court noted:
[T]he asserted patent claims initially required the solution to have
an “osmolarity . . . of between about 400-500 mOsmol,” but after the
certificate issued, the claims required an “osmolality . . . of between
about 400-500 mOsmol.” For the solutions at issue here, the numerical figure for osmolarity will be less than the figure for osmolality by about one or two percent.682

Accordingly, the court vacated the finding of infringement and
remanded for a “redetermination of infringement under the patent’s
683
original, uncorrected claims.”
The court explained that a patentee who has made “a mistake of a
clerical or typographical nature, or of minor character” may apply to
the PTO for a “certificate of correction, if the correction does not involve such changes in the patent as would constitute new matter or
684
would require re-examination.”
“Invalidating a certificate of correction for impermissible broadening therefore requires proof of two elements: (1) the corrected
claims are broader than the original claims; and (2) the presence of
the clerical or typographical error, or how to correct that error, is not

677.
678.
679.
680.
681.
682.
683.
684.

Id., 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1105.
Id. at 1271, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1106.
482 F.3d 1347, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1293 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
Id. at 1349, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1294.
Id., 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1294.
Id. at 1350, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1295 (alterations in original).
Id. at 1349, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1294.
Id. at 1353, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1295 (quoting 35 U.S.C. § 255 (2000)).
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685

clearly evident to one of skill in the art.” Citing Superior Fireplace Co.
686
v. Majestic Products Co., the Federal Circuit stated that there are
687
The first category
three categories into which an error might fall.
involves mistakes that are obvious, thus leaving no doubt as to what
688
the mistake is.
“In contrast, [the] second category includes those
typographical mistakes not apparent to the reader at all; for example,
a mistake resulting in another word that is spelled correctly and that
689
reads logically in the context of the sentence.” The third category
includes those “where it is apparent that a mistake has been made,
690
but it is unclear what the mistake is.”
Since it is not evident to the reader of the public record how to appropriately correct mistakes of the second and third categories, those
categories of error cannot be repaired by a certificate of correction if
691
the effect would be to broaden the claim. The Federal Circuit concluded that “since the error corrected . . . was not clearly evident to
one of skill in the art and the result of its correction was to broaden
the claims, ACS should be granted summary judgment that the cer692
tificate of correction is not valid.”
Thus, the patent should con693
tinue to read as it did before the issuance of the certificate.
3.

Interference
694
In Henkel Corp. v. Procter & Gamble Co., the Federal Circuit held
that “as a matter of law, we do not require that a junior party in an interference demonstrate that it recognized the exact language of the
695
ultimate count—only the subject matter of the invention.”
In this
case, the invention involved dishwashing detergent tablets, which
were divided into a “compressed” region and a “solidified solution or
melt” region, wherein the compressed region dissolves “at a faster
696
rate” than the solidified region. The Board found that Henkel, the
685. Id. at 1353, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1297.
686. 270 F.3d 1358, 60 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1668 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
687. Cent. Admixture Pharmacy Servs., 482 F.3d at 1354, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at
1298.
688. Id., 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1298.
689. Id., 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1298 (quoting Superior Fireplace, 270 F.3d at 1370,
60 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1677).
690. Id., 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1298 (quoting Superior Fireplace, 270 F.3d at 1370,
60 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1677).
691. Id., 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1298.
692. Id. at 1355, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1298.
693. Id., 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1298.
694. 485 F.3d 1370, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1784 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
695. Id. at 1375, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1788 (citing Mycogen Plant Sci., Inc. v.
Monsanto Co., 243 F.3d 1316, 1336, 58 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1030, 1047 (Fed. Cir.
2001)).
696. Id. at 1371, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1785.
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designated junior party, had failed to prove that it had conceived of
the invention and reduced it to practice before Procter & Gamble’s
constructive reduction to practice (filing) date, as Henkel’s inventors
had not “contemporaneously appreciated an embodiment that met
697
all the limitations of the interference count.”
The Federal Circuit vacated and remanded that decision, finding
that the Board had legally erred by requiring Henkel to show that its
inventors and technicians had tested or calculated specific dissolution
698
rates. This “explicit calculation or measurement of quantitative dissolution rates is unnecessary,” the court explained, as the interference count merely required “a showing of an appreciation by the inventors . . . that the dissolution of rate of the compressed region is
greater than the dissolution rate of the other region” but not an “ap699
preciation of specific dissolution rates.”
The court stated that this
was not a case where there was “a significant danger that the inventors unwittingly and accidentally created something new; rather, they
set out to design detergent tablets with a particular structure and did
so, and the only question is whether they appreciated that the tablets
700
met one limitation of the interference count.” Once the count was
properly construed, the court found ample evidence in the record of
Henkel’s appreciation of the different dissolution rates and objective
701
corroboration of the inventors’ testimony.
702
In In re Garner, the applicant Garner appealed the decision of the
PTO’s Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences, awarding judgment against Garner for failure to make a prima facie showing of pri703
ority in an interference. Specifically, Garner appealed the Board’s
704
ruling on sufficiency and the Board’s definition of “new evidence.”
Garner attempted to establish priority by showing that he actually
reduced to practice an invention within the proposed count before
705
the senior party patent’s effective filing date. “To this end, Garner
submitted a declaration he executed on November 28, 2001 in the
706
parent application.”
“The declaration had originally been submitted under 37 C.F.R. § 1.131 in an attempt to overcome a prior art re697.
698.
699.
700.
701.
702.
703.
704.
705.
706.

Id. at 1373–74, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1786–87.
Id. at 1374, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1787.
Id. at 1375, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1787.
Id., 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1788.
Id. at 1375–76, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1788.
508 F.3d 1376, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1310 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
Id. at 1377, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1311.
Id., 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1311.
Id. at 1377–78, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1311.
Id. at 1378, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1311.
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jection in the parent application.”
After receiving a letter sent by
the examiner that his 2001 declaration was “insufficient” to provoke
an interference under 37 C.F.R. § 41.202(d) (Rule 202(d)), Garner
retitled his 2001 Rule 131 declaration to be a “Rule 202(d) declaration” without making any substantive changes, re-executed, and filed
708
it. “The examiner forwarded Garner’s request to provoke an inter709
ference to the Board.”
The Board found Garner’s filing insufficient to establish a prima
710
In accordance with Rule 202(d), the
facie showing of priority.
Board declared an interference and issued an Order to Show Cause
711
why judgment should not be entered against him. In responding to
the Order, Garner relied on three items that he did not submit in his
original Rule 202(d) filing to show priority: “(i) a 37 C.F.R. § 1.131
declaration filed on September 2, 2003 in an attempt to overcome a
prior art rejection (‘2003 Garner declaration’); (ii) the specification
of his provisional application; and (iii) the specification of his utility
712
application.”
The Board found that these three items were “new evidence” that
was not permitted under Rule 202(d) without a showing of good
cause and that Garner had not attempted to show good cause for his
713
belated reliance.
Therefore, the Board issued judgment against
Garner, who then appealed the Board’s ruling on sufficiency and the
714
Board’s definition of “new evidence.”
The Federal Circuit concluded that “the Board’s interpretation of
‘new evidence’ is inconsistent with the regulation, as the Board interpreted Rule 202 in a way that requires it to consider the specification
under [202](a), but not under [202](d), unless the applicant resub715
mits the specification.”
“Since the specifications were already before the Board in the interference proceeding pursuant to Rule
716
There202(a), they cannot be new evidence under Rule 202(d).”
fore, the Federal Circuit concluded the Board erred when it found
that the specifications constitute “new evidence” under Rule
717
202(d). However, the Federal Circuit found that even with the pat707.
708.
709.
710.
711.
712.
713.
714.
715.
716.
717.

Id., 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1311.
Id., 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1311.
Id., 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1311.
Id., 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1311.
Id., 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1312.
Id., 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1312.
Id., 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1312.
Id., 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1312.
Id. at 1380, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1313.
Id., 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1313.
Id., 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1313.
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ent specifications in evidence, Garner failed to establish a prima facie
718
“In order to establish an actual reduction to
showing of priority.
practice, the inventor must prove that: (1) he constructed an embodiment or performed a process that met all the limitations of the
interference count; and (2) he determined that the invention would
719
work for its intended purpose.”
While “the law does not impose an impossible standard of ‘independence’ on corroborative evidence by requiring that every point
of a reduction to practice be corroborated by evidence having a
source totally independent of the inventor[,]” corroboration of the
existence of the device is not sufficient in this case to establish corroboration of reduction to practice.720

The court added that “[i]t is also necessary to corroborate that the
721
device worked for its intended purpose.”
In an interference proceeding, a party may assert that the patentee
722
did not invent the patented invention by showing derivation. The
person challenging the senior party’s priority date bears the burden
723
of proof on derivation and must make two showings. First, he must
724
“establish prior conception of the claimed subject matter.” Second,
he must prove “communication of that conception to the patentee
that is ‘sufficient to enable [him] to construct and successfully oper725
ate the invention.’”
726
This was the issue that arose in Brand v. Miller. The Federal Circuit reversed a decision of the Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences in an interference proceeding related to an invention concern727
ing methods of cutting veneer from logs of wood.
Robert Brand,
the senior party in the interference and the inventor of the application at issue, was the chief engineer for Capital Machine Co. (“Capi718. Id., 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1313.
719. Id., 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1313 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Taskett v. Dentlinger, 344 F.3d 1337, 1340, 68 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1472, 1474
(Fed. Cir. 2003)).
720. Id. at 1381, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1314 (alterations in original) (quoting
Cooper v. Goldfarb, 154 F.3d 1321, 1330, 47 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1896, 1904 (Fed. Cir.
1998)).
721. Id., 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1314 (citing Hahn v. Wong, 892 F.2d 1028, 1032,
13 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1313, 1317 (Fed. Cir. 1989).
722. Price v. Symsek, 988 F.2d 1187, 1190, 26 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1031, 1033 (Fed.
Cir. 1993).
723. Id., 26 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1031.
724. Id., 26 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1031.
725. Int’l Rectifier Corp. v. IXYS Corp., 361 F.3d 1363, 1376, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1209, 1219 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (quoting Gambro Lundia AB v. Baxter Healthcare Corp.,
110 F.3d 1573, 1577, 42 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1378, 1382 (Fed. Cir. 1997)).
726. 487 F.3d 862, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1705 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
727. Id. at 871, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1711.
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728

tal”), which makes machines for cutting veneer. Thomas Miller, the
junior party in the interference and inventor of the patent at issue,
was the production manager of Miller Veneers, a customer of Capi729
tal. The two companies had a close relationship during the relevant
period, often sharing information related to veneer cutting technol730
Brand filed for its patent first, but Miller argued that he was
ogy.
entitled to priority because Brand derived the invention from Mil731
ler. The Board, without citing evidence from the record, ruled that
Miller had established derivation based on certain communications
732
from Miller to Brand’s then company, Capital.
Brand and Capital
733
appealed the Board’s ruling.
This case turned on the communication of the conception between
Miller and Brand, and, more specifically, on whether Miller’s com734
munications to Capital were sufficiently enabling. The Federal Circuit, citing § 706 of the Administrative Procedures Act, noted that
findings of fact by the Board must in all cases be supported by sub735
stantial evidence in the record.
The Federal Circuit held that “in
the context of a contested case, it is impermissible for the Board to
base its factual findings on its expertise, rather than on evidence in
736
the record.”
Turning to the facts of the case, the Federal Circuit
found that Miller’s communications were sufficiently enabling, and
the Board improperly substituted its own opinion for evidence of the
737
knowledge of one or ordinary skill in the art.
The court thus re738
versed the Board’s award to Miller.
4.

Disciplinary action
739
Bender v. Dudas involved a disciplinary action to exclude an attorney from practicing before the PTO, a case the Federal Circuit described as one that “reads like a novel but represents the true story of
hopes dashed, fees wasted, and dreams lost by hundreds of individual
inventors caught up in the world of self-interested promoters who
740
promise the world and deliver very little.”
In a larger sense, this
728.
729.
730.
731.
732.
733.
734.
735.
736.
737.
738.
739.
740.

Id. at 865, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1706.
Id., 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1706.
Id., 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1706.
Id. at 866, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1710.
Id. at 867, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1710.
Id., 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1710.
Id. at 870, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1711.
Id. at 869, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1711.
Id., 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1710.
Id. at 870, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1711.
Id. at 871, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1711.
490 F.3d 1361, 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1065 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
Id. at 1362, 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1067.
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case expressed the Federal Circuit’s concern for “[i]ndividual inventors . . . [who] are often unfamiliar with even the most basic principles of patent law, do not know where to turn for help, and are vul741
nerable to those who seek to take advantage of their experience.”
The real target of the court’s ire were
so-called “invention promoters” who exploit unsophisticated inventors, heap every invention with praise regardless of the merits or
the real prospects of legal protection, and entice inventors into engagement agreements filled with hollow guarantees of patent protection and promises of royalty-bearing licenses that seldom yield
anything of any significant value.742

The prosecuting attorney in this case had worked under contract
with American Inventors Corporation (“AIC”), an invention promoter that solicited inventors for their ideas, offered to pay all legal
fees to procure a patent, and promised to promote the invention to
manufacturers and other potential parties in exchange for a flat fee
743
or fee plus royalty arrangement.
The Federal Circuit found that
substantial evidence supported the PTO’s finding that the attorney
had neglected a legal matter entrusted to him by failing to advise his
744
clients on how best to protect their inventions. Even though the attorney knew that many of his clients wanted a utility patent or did not
understand the difference between design and utility patents, Bender
745
continued to prosecute their applications as design patents.
His
form letter to his clients describing those differences was “an entirely
hollow and formalistic gesture[,]” according to the court, “because it
did not provide any of the . . . applicants with advice that directly related to the particular inventions at issue, the type of patent best
suited to protect these particular inventions and the inventor’s interests therein, or the consequences of pursuing a design patent instead
746
of a utility patent.”
The Federal Circuit found that the PTO had carefully weighed the
public interest, the seriousness of Bender’s violations, the need for
deterrence, the integrity of the legal profession, and other extenuating circumstances in deciding to exclude Bender from practicing be747
fore the PTO. In particular, Bender “refused to recognize the impropriety of his conduct or to express any remorse for his actions[,]”
741.
742.
743.
744.
745.
746.
747.

Id. at 1362–63, 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1067.
Id. at 1363, 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1067.
Id. at 1363–64, 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1067–68.
Id. at 1366, 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1070.
Id. at 1364, 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1068.
Id. at 1366, 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1070.
Id. at 1370, 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1072.
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which “created a likelihood that he would continue to violate the
748
Even the best of intentions, the
same disciplinary rules again.”
court added, “cannot absolve Bender’s complicity with AIC in a
scheme fraught with deception and adversely affecting a large num749
ber of unsuspecting inventors.”
J.

Attorney-Client Privilege and Work Product Protection

The attorney-client privilege belongs to the client, who alone may
750
waive it. “The widely applied standard for determining the scope of
a waiver . . . is that the waiver applies to all other communications re751
lating to the same subject matter.” This broad scope is grounded in
principles of fairness and serves to prevent a party from simultaneously using the privilege as both a sword and a shield; that is, it prevents the inequitable result of a party disclosing favorable communi752
cations while asserting the privilege as to less favorable ones.
Ultimately, however, “[t]here is no bright line test for determining
what constitutes the subject matter of a waiver, rather courts weigh
the circumstances of the disclosure, the nature of the legal advice
sought and the prejudice to the parties of permitting or prohibiting
753
further disclosures.”
The work product doctrine is “designed to balance the needs of
the adversary system: promotion of an attorney’s preparation in representing a client versus society’s general interest in revealing all true
754
and material facts to the resolution of a dispute.” Unlike the attorney-client privilege, which provides absolute protection from disclosure, work product protection is qualified and may be overcome by
755
need and undue hardship.
However, the level of need and hardship required for discovery depends on whether the work product is
748. Id., 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1072.
749. Id., 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1072.
750. See Knorr-Bremse Systeme Fuer Nutzfahrzeuge GmbH v. Dana Corp., 383
F.3d 1337, 1345, 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1560, 1565–66 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (noting that,
to protect the interests of the client, most courts have declined to impose adverse inferences when a party invokes the attorney-client privilege and holding to apply that
rule to the patent realm as well); Am. Standard, Inc. v. Pfizer, Inc., 828 F.2d 734, 745,
3 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1817, 1824 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (stating that the privilege belongs to
the client, not the attorney).
751. Fort James Corp. v. Solo Cup Co., 412 F.3d 1340, 1349, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1257, 1264 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
752. Id., 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1264.
753. Id. at 1349–50, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1264.
754. In re Martin Marietta Corp., 856 F.2d 619, 624 (4th Cir. 1988).
755. See FED. R. CIV. PRO. 26(b)(3) (“Ordinarily, a party may not discover documents and tangible things that are prepared in anticipation of litigation or for trial
by or for another party or its representative (including the other party’s attorney,
consultant, surety, indemnitor, insurer, or agent)[,]” but subject to Rule 26(b)(4)
those materials may be discoverable in certain specified circumstances).
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factual or the result of mental processes such as plans, strategies, tac756
tics, and impressions, whether memorialized in writing or not.
Whereas factual work product can be discovered solely upon a showing of substantial need and undue hardship, mental process work
757
product is afforded even greater, nearly absolute, protection.
758
In Knorr-Bremse Systeme Fuer Nutzfahrzeuge GmbH v. Dana Corp., the
Federal Circuit addressed an outgrowth of its willfulness doctrine.
Over the years, the court had held that an accused infringer’s failure
to produce advice from counsel “would warrant the conclusion that it
either obtained no advice of counsel or did so and was advised that its
759
[activities] . . . would be an infringement of valid U.S. patents.”
Recognizing that this inference can distort the attorney-client relationship, the Federal Circuit held that invoking the attorney-client
privilege or work product protection does not give rise to an adverse
760
inference.
The court further held that an accused infringer’s failure to obtain legal advice does not give rise to an adverse inference
761
with respect to willfulness.
762
More recently, in In re EchoStar Communications Corp., the Federal
Circuit addressed the scope of waiver resulting from the advice of
763
counsel defense.
First, the court concluded that relying on inhouse counsel’s advice to refute a charge of willfulness triggers waiver
764
of the attorney-client privilege. Second, the court held that asserting the advice of counsel defense waives work product protection and
the attorney-client privilege for all communications on the same subject matter, as well as any documents memorializing attorney-client
765
communications.
However, the court held that waiver did not extend to work product that was not communicated to an accused in766
fringer.
The Federal Circuit, meeting en banc, returned to the issues of
willfulness and its functional relationship to attorney-client privilege
756. Id.
757. See, e.g., Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383, 400 (1981) (discussing
courts’ use of Rule 26 to safeguard against the disclosure of lawyers’ mental impressions and legal theories).
758. 383 F.3d 1337, 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1560 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
759. Id. at 1343, 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1564 (quoting Kloster Speedsteel AB v.
Crucible Inc., 793 F.2d 1565, 1580, 23 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 81, 91 (Fed. Cir. 1986)).
760. Id. at 1344–45, 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1565.
761. Id. at 1345–46, 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1566.
762. 448 F.3d 1294, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1676 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
763. Id., 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1676.
764. Id. at 1299, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1679.
765. Id. at 1299, 1302–03, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1679, 1681–82.
766. Id. at 1303–04, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1682.
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and the work-product doctrine in In re Seagate Technology, LLC.
With respect to attorney-client privilege, the court concluded “that
asserting the advice of counsel defense and disclosing opinions of
opinion counsel do not constitute waiver of the attorney-client privi768
lege for communications with trial counsel.”
The court explained
that the rule is not absolute, however, and trial courts have discretion
in extending waiver to trial counsel, such as when the party or coun769
sel engages in chicanery.
With respect to the work product doctrine, the Federal Circuit
similarly held that relying on opinion counsel’s work product does
770
not always waive trial counsel’s work product immunity. The court
stated that it was possible, however, that situations may arise in which
waiver may be extended to trial counsel, again such as when the party
771
or counsel engages in chicanery. The court also noted that its ruling did not affect the general principles of work product protec772
tion. As such, a party may still obtain discovery of work product absent waiver as long as it shows sufficient need and hardship, although
a higher burden must still be met to obtain that pertaining to mental
773
processes.
The court also continued to hold that work product protection
774
Otherwise, atremains available for “nontangible” work product.
torneys’ files would be protected from discovery, but attorneys them775
selves would have no work product objection to depositions.
K. Constitutional Issues
1.

Sovereign immunity and the Eleventh Amendment
The Federal Circuit found that a state university had waived its sovereign immunity as a matter of contract in Baum Research and Devel776
opment Co. v. University of Massachusetts at Lowell. The University had
entered into a license with the patent’s inventor, which stated “all
parties agree to proper venue and hereby submit to the jurisdiction
in the appropriate State or Federal Courts of Record sitting in the
State of Michigan[,]” the laws of which would further govern the con767.
768.
769.
770.
771.
772.
773.
774.
775.
776.

497 F.3d 1360, 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1865 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
Id. at 1374, 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1873.
Id. at 1374–75, 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1873.
Id. at 1376, 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1874.
Id., 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1874.
Id., 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1874.
Id., 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1874.
Id., 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1874.
Id., 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1874.
503 F.3d 1367, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1762 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
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777

struction and application of the license in question.
The Federal
Circuit found this language “unequivocally expressed” the Univer778
sity’s waiver of sovereign immunity, pursuant to the Supreme
Court’s holding in College Savings Bank v. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary
779
Education Expense Board. The court further found that the plaintiff
did not need to prove that the Massachusetts legislature had delegated the waiver of immunity to the University because there was no
dispute that the University had the authority to enter into contracts
of this nature and that the contracts frequently included the provi780
sion at issue.
781
In Vas-Cath, Inc. v. Curators of University of Missouri, the Federal
Circuit found that a state university may also waive its sovereign immunity for purposes of judicial review by bringing an interference
782
proceeding. In this case, the University of Missouri had requested
783
and prevailed in an interference proceeding against Vas-Cath.
When Vas-Cath appealed the PTO’s decision, the district court dis784
missed the appeal on Eleventh Amendment grounds.
The Federal Circuit reversed the decision, finding that the Eleventh Amendment did not shield the University from Vas-Cath’s ap785
peal.
Ordinarily, “a state does not waive its sovereign immunity
simply by engaging in activities normally conducted by private individuals or corporations[,]” such as participating in a routine ex parte
786
patent examination. In this case, however, the University itself had
requested that the PTO conduct a litigation-type activity, participated
in the interference proceeding, and ultimately obtained a favorable
787
ruling in a matter for which the statute authorizes judicial review.
“It has long been recognized that a state’s voluntary entry into federal
court serves to waive state immunity from federal adjudication of that
788
claim.” Thus, the University had waived its constitutional immunity
not only in that proceeding but also in the appeal taken by the losing
777.
778.
779.
780.
781.
782.
783.
784.
785.
786.
787.
788.
(1883)
ure).

Id. at 1368–69, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1764.
Id. at 1370, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1764.
527 U.S. 666, 676 (1999).
Baum, 503 F.3d at 1370, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1764.
473 F.3d 1376, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1524 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
Id. at 1378, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1525.
Id., 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1525.
Id., 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1525.
Id., 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1525.
Id. at 1383, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1528.
Id., 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1528.
Id., 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1528; see Clark v. Barnard, 108 U.S. 436, 447
(noting that a state’s immunity is a privilege and can be waived at its pleas-
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789

party. Principles of fairness and consistency also prohibit the University from selectively asserting immunity, after having won the first
790
round, in order to avoid an appeal by the loser.
Vas-Cath was distinguished in Biomedical Patent Management Corp. v.
791
California, in which the Federal Circuit determined that a state may
be entitled to assert its Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity
even after having waived such immunity in an earlier lawsuit on the
792
same issues. In pertinent part, the California Department of Health
Services (“DHS”) intervened in a lawsuit brought by its subcontractor
for declaratory judgment that two patents owned by Biomedical Patent Management Corporation (“BPMC”) were invalid and not in793
fringed by DHS laboratory screening methods.
BPMC filed compulsory counterclaims for infringement, but DHS successfully moved
794
to dismiss the action for improper venue. Shortly thereafter, BPMC
filed a new infringement action against DHS, which asserted a de795
fense of sovereign immunity. The second action was also dismissed
without prejudice after the Supreme Court granted certiorari of a
case that was expected to impact, and ultimately did impact, the sov796
ereign immunity of states in patent infringement actions.
In particular, the Supreme Court concluded in Florida Prepaid Postsecondary
797
Education Expense Board v. College Savings Bank that states retain their
sovereign immunity in patent infringement suits and that Congress’s
attempt to abrogate state sovereign immunity in such cases was inva798
lid.
In February 2006, BPMC filed the present lawsuit against DHS,
799
which again asserted a defense of sovereign immunity. The district
court granted DHS’s motion to dismiss the action, and BPMC ap800
801
pealed. The Federal Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal.
There was no dispute that DHS, as an arm of the State of California, is entitled to Eleventh Amendment immunity, except in cases
where Congress has validly authorized a lawsuit in exercise of its
power to enforce the Fourteenth Amendment or where the state has
789.
790.
791.
792.
793.
794.
795.
796.
797.
798.
799.
800.
801.

Id., 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1528.
Id. at 1384, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1529.
505 F.3d 1328, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d 1074 (BNA) (Fed. Cir. 2007).
Id. at 1330, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1075.
Id. at 1331, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1076.
Id., 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1076.
Id. at 1332, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1076.
Id., 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1076.
527 U.S. 627, 630 (1999).
Id.
Biomedical Patent Mgmt., 505 F.3d at 1332, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1076.
Id., 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1076.
Id., 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1076.
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802

waived its sovereign immunity by consenting to the lawsuit. It was
further agreed that DHS had waived its sovereign immunity in the
first declaratory judgment action by moving to intervene and asserting claims against BPMC, thereby voluntarily invoking the district
803
court’s jurisdiction.
The Federal Circuit, however, rejected BPMC’s argument that
DHS’s waiver in the first lawsuit extended to the present lawsuit, even
804
though both suits involved the same parties and subject matter. A
waiver of sovereign immunity in an earlier action that was dismissed
does not “carry over” to a new lawsuit, even if the lawsuits involve the
805
same patents.
In so holding, the court distinguished Vas-Cath and
other cases cited by BPMC in which the state’s waiver of sovereign
806
immunity was applied to “one continuous action” or proceeding.
In Vas-Cath, for example, the “continuing proceeding” was an inter807
ference action followed by judicial review.
According to the Federal Circuit, the problems of “unfairness” or
“inconsistency” that had prevented states from invoking sovereign
immunity in Vas-Cath and other cases did not preclude DHS from as808
serting immunity in this case. Private parties would not be forced to
litigate in improper venues to avoid the risk of dismissal and sovereign immunity, as BPMC had argued, because “it is unlikely that
venue considerations alone would govern a State’s decision to assert
809
sovereign immunity from a given lawsuit.” Similarly, there was little
risk that states would gain an unfair advantage by acquiring a private
parties’ Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26 disclosures because “it defies common sense that a State keen on retaining its sovereign immunity would, as BPMC posits, risk subjecting itself to liability merely
to obtain initial disclosures, hoping that the defendant will object to
810
the chosen venue, which is, of course, a waivable defense.”
The
Federal Circuit concluded, “[f]inally, BPMC ignores the fact that
these concerns are not even present in this case, both because DHS
did not choose the forum of the 1997 lawsuit—it intervened in ongo802. Id. at 1332–33, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1077.
803. Id. at 1333, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1077.
804. Id. at 1336, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1079.
805. Id. at 1334, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1078 (citing S. Pasadena v. Mineta, 284
F.3d 1154, 1157–58 (9th Cir. 2002)); Tegic Commc’n Corp. v. Bd. of Regents, 458
F.3d 1335, 1342–43, 80 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1201, 1205 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
806. Biomedical Patent Mgmt., 505 F.3d at 1337, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1080.
807. Id., 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1080.
808. Id. at 1340, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1082.
809. Id., 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1082.
810. Id., 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1082.
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ing litigation—and because the current action was initiated in that
811
same venue.”
The Federal Circuit was careful to note, however, that “we do not
mean to draw a bright-line rule whereby a State’s waiver of sovereign
812
immunity can never extend to a re-filed or separate lawsuit.”
Rather, the court found that the case law cited by BPMC “does not
support its contention that waiver of immunity in one suit should extend to a separate action simply because the action involves the same
813
parties and same subject matter.”
The Federal Circuit thus extracted from the case law “two relevant principles”: (1) “a State’s
waiver of immunity generally does not extend to a separate or re-file
suit”; and (2) “even a waiver by litigation conduct must nonetheless
be ‘clear.’ These principles, of course, are related, as a waiver that
does not ‘clearly’ extend to a separate lawsuit generally would not
814
preclude a State from asserting immunity in that separate action.”
The Federal Circuit also rejected BPMC’s argument that DHS
should be judicially estopped from asserting sovereign immunity because its intervention in the first case had rested on its own assertions
815
that it was subject to the district court’s jurisdiction. Judicial estoppel should not apply, the court stated, because DHS’s positions in the
816
two cases were not clearly inconsistent. Or, as the court explained,
“[p]erhaps it is more precise to say that, although DHS’s positions
were inconsistent, the inconsistency is excused by an intervening
817
change in the law” wrought by Florida Prepaid. Even though Florida
Prepaid did not change the well-established principle that intervention in a lawsuit constitutes waiver of sovereign immunity, it did assure DHS that it could successfully assert a defense of sovereign im818
munity. Since DHS had had no such expectation of success prior to
Florida Prepaid, it had had nothing to lose, and potentially much to
819
gain, by intervening in the original declaratory judgment action.
“Accordingly, we reject BPMC’s argument that Florida Prepaid did not
effect a change in the law relevant to this case,” the court con820
cluded.

811.
812.
813.
814.
815.
816.
817.
818.
819.
820.

Id., 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1082.
Id. at 1339, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1082.
Id., 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1082.
Id. at 1339–40, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1082.
Id. at 1342, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1083.
Id., 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1083.
Id., 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1083.
Id., 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1083–84.
Id., 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1084.
Id., 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1084.
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As for BPMC’s argument that the State of California had generally
waived sovereign immunity for all California State defendants by participating in the patent system and patent suits, the Federal Circuit
found this argument “merits little discussion” and “must be re821
jected.”
“The Supreme Court in [College Savings] Bank expressly
overruled prior case law supporting the notion BPMC urges—i.e.,
that a state can constructively waive its Eleventh Amendment immunity
822
by its participation in a regulatory scheme.”
Finally, the Federal Circuit rejected BPMC’s argument that the Su823
preme Court had implicitly overruled Florida Prepaid in its more re824
“The
cent decision in Central Virginia Community College v. Katz.
holding in Katz was so closely tied to the history of the Bankruptcy
Clause and the unique aspects of bankruptcy jurisdiction that it cannot be read to extend to actions for patent infringement” and thus
“cannot be read to overrule Florida Prepaid, either expressly or implic825
itly.” For all these reasons, the Federal Circuit affirmed the district
court’s dismissal of BPMC’s complaint because DHS had a viable de826
fense of sovereign immunity.
2.

Contracts with the government
827
In Sevenson Environmental Services, Inc. v. Shaw Environmental, Inc.,
the Federal Circuit found that a government contractor was entitled
828
to immunity from a patent infringement suit. Defendant Shaw Environmental, Inc. (“Shaw”), a hazardous waste remediation firm, contracted with the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers in 2002 to provide cer829
tain clean-up and remediation services.
Sevenson Environmental
Services, Inc. (“Sevenson”) sued Shaw for allegedly infringing certain
U.S. patents on methods for treating hazardous waste with phospho830
ric acid. The district court entered summary judgment that Sevenson’s suit against Shaw was barred by government contractor immu831
832
nity under 28 U.S.C. § 1498. The Federal Circuit affirmed.

821.
822.
823.
824.
825.
826.
827.
828.
829.
830.
831.
832.

Id. at 1343, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1084.
Id., 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1084.
Id., 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1084.
546 U.S. 356 (2006).
Biomedical Patent Mgt. Co., 505 F.3d at 1343, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1084.
Id., 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1084.
477 F.3d 1361, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1906 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
Id. at 1363, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1907.
Id. at 1362, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1907.
Id., 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1908.
Id. at 1363, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1907.
Id., 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1907.
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Shaw’s relationship with the government was defined by two separate contracts—the “Total Environmental Restoration Contract”
(“TERC”), and the “Pre-placed Remedial Action Contract” (“PRAC”),
833
which replaced the TERC due to funding issues.
Both the TERC
and PRAC required Shaw to provide hazardous waste remediation
834
Both conservices at a number of government-owned waste sites.
tracts contained the same authorization and consent clause:
in performing this contract or any subcontract at any tier, of any
invention described in and covered by a United States patent . . .
used in machinery, tools, or methods whose use necessarily results
from compliance by the Contractor or subcontractor with (i) specifications or written provisions forming a part of this contract or (ii)
specific written instructions given by the Contracting Officer directing the manner of performance.835

As a result of the government’s authorization and consent to
Shaw’s alleged use of the patented remediation methods, Shaw’s alleged infringement “shall be construed as use or manufacture for the
United States[,]” for which the only recourse would be an action
836
against the United States in the U.S. Court of Federal Claims. Accordingly, the Federal Circuit found that Shaw was entitled to immu837
nity from suit under § 1498(a) as a government contractor.
3.

Supremacy Clause
838
In Biotechnology Industry Organization v. District of Columbia, two industry organizations challenged the constitutionality of a statute by
the District of Columbia to regulate the prices of prescription
839
drugs.
The Federal Circuit concluded that the D.C. statute was
840
preempted by the Copyright and Patent Clause of the Constitution.
Even though the District is technically not a state, Federal supremacy
841
principles still applied.
Congress, the court explained, has determined the extent of rewards to be conferred upon inventors, including setting patent terms and allowing drug manufacturers to obtain
842
extensions of patent terms under certain circumstances.
The District of Columbia was thus improperly trying to rebalance “the statu833. Id., 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1908.
834. Id., 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1908.
835. Id., 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1908.
836. Id. at 1365, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1909 (citing language from 28 U.S.C.
§ 1498(a) (2000)).
837. Id., 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1909.
838. 496 F.3d 1362, 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1639 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
839. Id. at 1366, 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1642.
840. Id. at 1374, 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1648.
841. Id. at 1371–72, 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1646.
842. Id. at 1373, 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1647.
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tory framework of rewards and incentives insofar as it relates to inven843
tive new drugs[,]” the court concluded.
L. Statutory Interpretation
844

In Merck & Co. v. Hi-Tech Pharmacal Co., a generic drug manufacturer was accused of infringing a patent that was subject to both a
terminal disclaimer and a patent term extension under 35 U.S.C.
845
§ 156.
During prosecution of the U.S. Patent No. 4,797,413 (“the
‘413 patent”), assignee Merck filed a terminal disclaimer under 35
U.S.C. § 253 to overcome an obvious-type double patenting rejection
over the claims of U.S. Patent No. 4,677,115 (“the ‘115 patent”), also
846
assigned to Merck. The patent terms of both the ‘413 and ‘115 patents, which coincided as a result of the terminal disclaimer, were extended by over five months as a result of the 1994 Uruguay Round
847
Agreements Act (“URAA”).
The URAA changed the terms of patents then in force to the greater of seventeen years from the date of
848
issue or twenty years from the earliest effective filing date.
In response to a request by Merck pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 156, the PTO
extended the term of the ‘413 patent approximately three and a half
849
years based on the period of FDA review of the patented drug.
Defendant High-Tech moved to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), on
the basis that Merck had disclaimed any extension of the patent term
beyond the term of the ‘115 patent when it filed the terminal dis850
claimer. Merck responded that 35 U.S.C. § 156 is unambiguous in
that it states that the patent term “shall be extended” upon the satisfaction of the enumerated conditions and does not prohibit the ex851
tension of patent terms subject to terminal disclaimers.
The Federal Circuit agreed with Merck that the language of 35
U.S.C. § 156 is unambiguous and not in conflict with the provisions
852
of 35 U.S.C. § 253.
The Federal Circuit agreed with Merck that
both the language and legislative history of the Hatch-Waxman Act

843. Id. at 1374, 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1648.
844. 482 F.3d 1317, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1203 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
845. Id. at 1318–19, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1204–05.
846. Id. at 1319, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1204.
847. Id., 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1204.
848. Id., 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1204.
849. Id., 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1205. 35 U.S.C. § 156 (2000) is a portion of the
Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984 (“Hatch-Waxman Act”).
850. Merck, 482 F.3d at 1320, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1205.
851. Id., 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1206.
852. Id. at 1323, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1206–07.
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are “unambiguous” in allowing the extension and do not conflict with
853
laws regarding disclaimers.
The computation of a Hatch-Waxman patent term extension is
from the expiration date resulting from the terminal disclaimer
and not from the date the patent would have expired in the absence of the terminal disclaimer. Any waiver of the term is thus not
ignored or nullified because the terminal disclaimer provides the
date from which the patent term extension begins.854
855

In Boston Scientific Scimed, Inc. v. Medtronic Vascular, Inc., the Federal Circuit concluded that 35 U.S.C. § 119(a) does not permit an
applicant for a U.S. patent to benefit from the priority of a foreign
application previously filed by an entity that was not acting on behalf
856
of the U.S. applicant at the time of the filing.
Andrew Cragg and Michael Dake (collectively, “Cragg”) filed their
subject U.S. patent application on June 5, 1995, and assigned their
857
rights to Boston Scientific, which later merged with Scimed.
Thomas Fogarty, Timothy Ryan, and Kirsten Freislinger (collectively, “Fogarty”) filed their U.S. patent application on the same date and as858
signed their rights to the company that later became Medtronic.
The PTO’s Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences initially designated Cragg as the senior party in the interference, based on a February 9, 1994, filing date of two related European patent applications,
which had been filed by MinTec SARL (“MinTec”), a French com859
Fogarty successfully attacked this designation on the basis
pany.
that neither Cragg nor Dake had assigned his rights to MinTec until
860
after it had filed the European applications.
The Board reversed
itself, denied Scimed (Cragg) the benefit of the European filing date,
and designated Fogarty the senior party based on the June 8, 1994,
861
filing date of a related U.S. patent application. Scimed sued in the
district court, which affirmed the Board’s ruling, and then appealed
862
to the Federal Circuit.
The Federal Circuit affirmed the rulings of the district court and
the Board, for the following reasons:

853.
854.
855.
856.
857.
858.
859.
860.
861.
862.

Id. at 1322, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1207.
Id. at 1322–23, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1207.
497 F.3d 1293, 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1669 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
Id. at 1296–97, 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1671.
Id. at 1295, 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1670.
Id. at 1296, 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1670.
Id., 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1670.
Id., 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1670.
Id., 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1670.
Id., 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1670.
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[W]hile the foreign application must obviously be for the same invention and may be filed by someone other than the inventor, section 119(a) also requires that a nexus exist between the inventor
and the foreign applicant at the time the foreign application was
filed. Indeed, as a matter of pure logic, an entity could not have
filed a foreign application “on behalf of” an inventor without the
inventor’s knowledge or consent; that the foreign application may
have been filed in accordance with the laws of the country in which
it was filed has no bearing here. Therefore . . . we now explicitly
hold that that a foreign application may only form the basis for priority under section 119(a) if that application was filed by either the
U.S. applicant himself, or by someone acting on his behalf at the
time the foreign application was filed.863

In the instant case, Scimed could not claim priority to the European applications because at the time they were filed, MinTec had no
864
legal relationship to Cragg and was not acting on their behalf. The
Federal Circuit also found that the district court had not erred in
precluding Scimed from presenting new evidence because, although
a party may ordinarily present new evidence in an appeal to a district
court from a Board decision, in this case the submission was improper because Scimed had intended to use it to support new legal
865
theories that it had not previously raised before the Board.
866
In Somerset Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. Dudas, the Federal Circuit denied as moot Somerset’s appeal to compel the PTO to issue his re867
quest for an interim extension of its reissue patent.
Specifically,
Somerset applied for patent term extension under 35 U.S.C.
§ 156(d)(1) on April 27, 2006, followed on February 21, 2007, by a
868
request for interim extension under 35 U.S.C. § 156(e)(2). In May
2007, Somerset filed an action to compel the Director of the PTO to
869
act on its interim request and moved for a preliminary injunction.
The district court denied that motion on June 29, 2007, and Somer870
set appealed.
Not long afterwards, on July 12, 2007, the PTO denied both Somerset’s request for an interim extension and its appli871
cation for an extension on the merits.
Accordingly, Somerset
withdrew that portion of its appeal that sought to compel the Direc863.
864.
865.
866.
867.
868.
869.
870.
871.

Id. at 1297–98, 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1671–72.
Id. at 1296, 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1670.
Id. at 1298, 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1672.
500 F.3d 1344, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 2023 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
Id. at 1345, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 2024.
Id., 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 2023–24.
Id., 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 2024.
Id., 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 2024.
Id., 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 2024.
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tor to act on its request for interim relief but continued its appeal regarding the denial of injunctive relief to compel the Director to grant
872
that request.
The Federal Circuit noted that the Director may grant an interim
patent extension only if the patent would expire before a certificate
873
of extension could be granted. Since the Director had already denied Somerset’s application for an interim extension, the “Director
has no statutory authority to issue the interim extension Somerset
seeks[,]” and Somerset could not exhibit the reasonable likelihood of
874
success needed for a preliminary injunction.
III. PATENTABILITY AND VALIDITY
All patents are presumed valid, and each claim is “presumed valid
875
independently of the validity of other claims.”
This presumption
arises because it is assumed that the PTO examiner located the most
relevant prior art and determined that all the requirements for patentability, including non-obviousness, were met before allowing the
876
patent to issue.
A court, however, is not bound by an examiner’s
877
findings.
The presumption of validity may be overcome by clear
878
and convincing evidence of invalidity.
However, the ease with which the clear and convincing standard is
met is influenced by whether the examiner considered the same evidence or arguments presented in court. In particular, it may be easier to meet the clear and convincing standard if a challenging party
879
can locate evidence more relevant than that before the examiner.
For example,
872. Id. at 1346, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 2024.
873. Id., 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 2024 (discussing 35 U.S.C. § 156(e)(2) (2000)).
874. Id., 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 2024.
875. 35 U.S.C. § 282 (2000); see Union Oil Co. v. Atl. Richfield Co., 208 F.3d 989,
995, 54 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1227, 1231 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (“To prevail on anticipation at
trial, the refiners had to prove their case by clear and convincing evidence. The law
imposes this high burden because Unocal’s patent, like any issued patent, enjoys a
presumption of validity.”) (citation omitted).
876. Smiths Indus. Med. Sys., Inc. v. Vital Signs, Inc., 183 F.3d 1347, 1356, 51
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1415, 1421 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
877. Purdue Pharma L.P. v. Faulding Inc., 230 F.3d 1320, 1329, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1481, 1448 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
878. Ultra-Tex Surfaces, Inc. v. Hill Bros. Chem. Co., 204 F.3d 1360, 1367, 53
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1892, 1898 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
879. Cf. Purdue Pharma, 230 F.3d at 1329, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1448 (noting that “the
correct legal principles [are] that the amended claims define the invention, that the
support for the invention must be found in the specification as filed, and that the
amended claims could not be used to provide that support”); Ultra-Tex Surfaces, 204
F.3d at 1367, 53 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1898 (explaining that “when a party alleges that a
claim is invalid based on the very same references that were before the examiner
when the claim was allowed, that party assumes . . . the added burden of overcoming

2008]

2007 PATENT LAW DECISIONS

911

[w]hen no prior art other than that which was considered by the
PTO examiner is relied on by the attacker, [the attacker] has the
added burden of overcoming the deference that is due to a qualified government agency presumed to have properly done its job,
which includes one or more examiners who are assumed to have
some expertise in interpreting the references . . . .880

A. Patentable Subject Matter
One of the fundamental requirements for patentability of an invention is that the invention comprises patentable subject matter.
The statutory provision governing patentable subject matter is 35
U.S.C. § 101, which provides that “[w]hoever invents or discovers any
new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of
matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof, may obtain a
patent therefore, subject to the conditions and requirements of this
881
title.”
Thus, the validity of a patent may be attacked if the claimed subject
matter is not patentable under the patent law. However, a defense
based upon non-patentable subject matter is seldom employed and
rarely successful. In the words of the U.S. Supreme Court, Congress
chose very expansive language in drafting § 101 such that “anything
882
under the sun that is made by man” is patentable subject matter.
Nonetheless, § 101 does have some limits. For example, laws of nature, physical phenomena, abstract ideas, and mathematical algo883
rithms are not patentable. The Federal Circuit decided two important cases in 2007 which further defined the boundaries on
patentable subject matter.
884
In In re Comiskey, the Federal Circuit revisited the patentability of
business methods. Comiskey had applied for a patent directed to
methods and systems for mandatory arbitration of legal documents,
885
such as wills or contracts.
The claims fell into two general categothe deference that is due to a qualified government agency presumed to have properly done its job”).
880. Ultra-Tex Surfaces, 204 F.3d at 1367, 53 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1898 (citing Am.
Hoist & Derrick Co. v. Sowa & Sons, Inc., 725 F.2d 1350, 1359, 220 U.S.P.Q. (BNA)
763, 770 (Fed. Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 821 (1984)).
881. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (2000).
882. Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309, 206 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 193, 197
(1980) (citation omitted). In Chakrabarty, the Supreme Court held that an oilconsuming bacteria, classified as a life form, was patentable. Id. at 318, 206 U.S.P.Q
(BNA) at 201.
883. Id., 206 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 197.
884. 499 F.3d 1365, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1670 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
885. Id. at 1368, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1671.
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ries: (1) those that did not require the use of a computer or mechanical device (e.g., independent claims 1 and 32), and (2) those
886
The PTO
that did require such a device (e.g., claims 17 and 46).
887
rejected the claims as obvious, and Comiskey appealed.
After oral argument, the Federal Circuit requested additional briefing on the patentability of the subject matter in Comiskey’s applica888
tion under 35 U.S.C. § 101.
Comiskey protested, stating that the
Federal Circuit lacked the power to consider § 101 because it was not
889
a ground for rejection relied upon by the PTO. The PTO, on the
other hand, urged the court to consider § 101 to provide “needed
890
guidance” in this area.
The Federal Circuit sided with the PTO and held that it could consider “a new legal ground for affirmance” that had not been consid891
ered by the PTO.
Under Supreme Court precedent, “a reviewing
court can (and should) affirm an agency decision on a legal ground
not relied on by the agency if there is no issue of fact, policy, or
892
agency expertise.”
Since the patentability of subject matter under
§ 101 is a question of law, the Federal Circuit was not required to
make factual or policy determinations that had not been made by the
893
PTO. Moreover, the court should consider a new legal ground for
affirmance “where, as here, ‘[i]t would be wasteful to send’ the case
back to the agency for a determination as to patentable subject mat894
ter.”
After establishing its authority to consider § 101, the Federal Circuit affirmed the rejection of the claims that did not require the use
895
of a computer or machine. Business methods, the court explained,
are “subject to the same legal requirements for patentability as ap896
plied to any other process or method.”
In particular, “abstract
ideas” and “fundamental truths” are not patentable if they have no
claimed practical application, whereas a claim reciting an algorithm
or abstract concept is patentable “only if, as employed in the process,
886. Id. at 1369–70, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1672.
887. Id. at 1370–71, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1672–73.
888. Id. at 1371, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1673.
889. Id., 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1673.
890. Id., 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1673.
891. Id. at 1373, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1675.
892. Id. at 1372, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1674 (quoting SEC v. Chenery Corp., 318
U.S. 80, 88 (1943)).
893. Id., 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1675.
894. Id., 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1675 (alteration in original) (quoting Chenery
Corp., 318 U.S. at 88).
895. Id. at 1380–81, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1680–81.
896. Id. at 1374, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1676 (quoting State St. Bank & Trust Co.
v. Signature Fin. Group, Inc., 149 F.3d 1368, 1375, 47 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1596, 1602
(Fed. Cir. 1998)).
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it is embodied in, operates on, transforms, or otherwise involves another class of statutory subject matter, i.e., a machine, manufacture,
897
or composition of matter.” The court continued:
Thus, a claim that involves both a mental process and one of the
other categories of statutory subject matter (i.e., a machine, manufacture, or composition) may be patentable under § 101. For example, we have found processes involving mathematical algorithms
used in computer technology patentable because they claimed
practical applications and were tied to specific machines.
However, mental processes—or processes of human thinking—
standing alone are not patentable even if they have practical application.
....
Following the lead of the Supreme Court, this court and our
predecessor court have refused to find processes patentable when
they merely claimed a mental process standing alone and untied to
another category of statutory subject matter even when a practical
application was claimed.898

The Federal Circuit concluded that Comiskey’s first set of claims
was not patentable because they constituted “particular business sys899
tems . . . that depend entirely on the use of mental processes.” The
court explained:
[T]he patent statute does not allow patents on particular systems
that depend for their operation on human intelligence alone, a
field of endeavor that both the framers and Congress intended to
be beyond the reach of patentable subject matter. Thus, it is established that the application of human intelligence to the solution of
practical problems is not in and of itself patentable.900

Comiskey’s second set of claims, in contrast, combined an “unpatentable mental process . . . with a machine [a computer]” and thus
901
claimed patentable subject matter under § 101.
Nonetheless,
“[t]he routine addition of modern electronics to an otherwise unpatentable invention typically creates a prima facie case of obvious902
ness.” The Federal Circuit declined to decide the question of obvi897.
898.
899.
900.
901.
902.

Id. at 1376, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1678.
Id. at 1377–78, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1678.
Id. at 1378, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1679.
Id. at 1378–79, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1679.
Id. at 1379–80, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1680.
Id. at 1380, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1680.
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ousness but remanded those claims to the PTO to determine
“whether the addition of general purpose computers or modern
communication devices to Comiskey’s otherwise unpatentable mental
process would have been non-obvious to a person of ordinary skill in
903
the art.”
904
In In re Nuijten, the issue before the court was whether an elec905
tromagnetic signal is patentable subject matter. Nuijten filed a patent application directed to improved methods for encoding water906
marks in audio or video signals in order to lower distortion levels.
In the context of signal processing, a “watermark” is data embedded
into audio, video, or image signals, or data files to identify a source or
907
copyright status of the signals or data files.
The claims sought to
908
patent any “signal” that has been encoded in a particular manner.
The PTO rejected a claim directed to a storage medium and claims
directed to signals under § 101 on the basis that they were directed to
909
non-statutory subject matter.
On appeal, the Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences upheld the rejection of the signal claims because they did not fall within any of the four categories of patentable
subject matter in § 101, i.e., process, machine, manufacture, or com910
position of matter.
Thus, “[t]he essence of the dispute between the parties [was]
whether a transitory signal is covered by any statutory category[,]” the
911
Federal Circuit explained.
The only § 101 category worth serious
912
consideration was that of a manufacture. “Manufacture,” however,
refers to articles resulting from the process of manufacturing and
913
thus must be “tangible articles or commodities.”
The court reasoned that electromagnetic signals do not qualify as “tangible articles
or commodities” because they are only “fleeting” energies “devoid of
914
any semblance of permanence during transmission.”
Accordingly,
the Federal Circuit found that electromagnetic signals are not patentable subject matter under § 101.

903.
904.
905.
906.
907.
908.
909.
910.
911.
912.
913.
914.

Id. at 1380–81, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1681.
500 F.3d 1346, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1495 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
Id. at 1348, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1496.
Id., 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1496.
Id. at 1348–49, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1497.
Id. at 1351, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1498.
Id., 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1498.
Id. at 1352, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1498–99.
Id. at 1354, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1500.
Id. at 1356–57, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1502.
Id. at 1356, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1502.
Id., 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1502.

2008]

2007 PATENT LAW DECISIONS

915

Judge Linn dissented in part, arguing that the definition of “manu915
facture” should not be limited to “non-transitory, tangible things.”
Instead, Judge Linn advocated a more expansive view of the term
“manufacture” given the “wide scope” of § 101, as noted by the Su916
preme Court in Chakrabarty. Judge Linn concluded that the signal
917
claims should have been eligible for patenting under § 101.
B. Anticipation
Under the doctrine of anticipation, a patent claim is invalid if the
918
claimed invention lacks novelty.
Anticipation, a question of fact,
919
compares the “prior art” to a claim of the patent. “[A] claim is anticipated if each and every limitation is found either expressly or in920
herently in a single prior art reference.” This test is often referred
921
to as the “four corners” doctrine.
Anticipation also requires that
922
the prior art be enabling to one of ordinary skill in the art. Anticipation thus prevents a patentee from obtaining claims that do not
923
contribute to the store of knowledge of those in the field.
Additionally, anticipation “encourages prompt filing of patent applications after inventions have been completed and publicly used, and
924
sets an outer limit to the term of exclusivity.”
The Federal Circuit confronted the question of inherent anticipa925
tion in In re Omeprazole Patent Litigation, a multiphase litigation involving three patents related to Omeprazole, which is sold under the
926
brand name Prilosec. Omeprazole functions by inhibiting the production of gastric acid when administered within an enteric coating
927
and an additional separating layer.
AstraZeneca’s U.S. Patent No.
915. Id. at 1358, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1503.
916. Id., 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1503.
917. Id. at 1369, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1511.
918. Karsten Mfg. Co. v. Cleveland Golf, 242 F.3d 1376, 1383, 58 U.S.P.Q.2d 1286,
1291 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
919. Telemac Cellular Corp. v. Topp Telecomm., Inc., 247 F.3d 1316, 1327–28, 58
U.S.P.Q.2d 1545, 1552 (Fed. Cir. 2001); Celeritas Tech., Ltd. v. Rockwell Int’l Corp.,
150 F.3d 1354, 1361, 47 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1516, 1522 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
920. Celeritas Tech., 150 F.3d at 1361, 47 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1522.
921. Advanced Display Sys., Inc. v. Kent State Univ., 212 F.3d 1272, 1282, 54
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 1673, 1679 (Fed. Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 532 U.S. 904 (2001).
922. See generally Bristol Meyers-Squibb Co. v. Ben Venue Labs., Inc., 246 F.3d
1368, 58 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 1508 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (discussing enablement of an anticipatory reference).
923. Woodland Trust v. Flowertree Nursery, Inc., 148 F.3d 1368, 1370, 47
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1363, 1365 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
924. Allied Colloids, Inc. v. Am. Cyanamid Co., 64 F.3d 1570, 1574, 35 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1840, 1842 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
925. 483 F.3d 1364, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1643 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
926. Id. at 1367, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1645.
927. Id., 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1645–46.
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6,013,281 (“the ‘281 patent”) was directed to a process for forming
the coated pill, specifically, the formation in situ of a water-soluble
separating layer between the acid-sensitive omeprazole core and the
enteric coating due to a reaction between the alkaline reacting com928
pound (“ARC”) in the core and the enteric coating.
Claim 1, for
example, required forming in situ a separating layer as a water soluble
929
salt product between a core and a polymer coating layer. In a twoone decision, the Federal Circuit found that the ‘281 patent was inva930
lid as inherently anticipated.
According to the Federal Circuit, “the ‘281 process produces an
omeprazole formulation with three distinct layers, but starts with only
931
two of the three layers.” Claim 1 recited a minimum ARC concentration in the core required to form the separating layer, and de932
pendent claims recited specific ARC compounds. The Federal Circuit found it noteworthy that the ‘281 patent specification contained
process parameters, such as temperature, that were not recited in the
933
claims.
A prior Korean patent application to Chong Dam Corporation
(“CKD”) recited all of the claim limitations of the asserted ‘281 patent, with the exception of the in situ formation of the separating
934
layer.
The trial court found that the in situ separation necessarily
935
formed when practicing the prior art. AstraZeneca’s own testing in
connection with a lawsuit in Korea with CKD supported the conclu936
sion that the CKD formulation created an in situ separating layer.
The Federal Circuit affirmed, finding no clear error in the factual
937
findings of the district court. Notwithstanding the absence of a disclosure of the process used by CKD to make its formulation, the majority of the panel found that the presence of a separating layer in the
CKD formulation was inherent from the combination of the ingredi938
ents specified in CKD’s Korean patent application.
Judge Newman dissented, however, finding no basis in the CKD
reference from which to conclude that the missing descriptive matter
939
was necessarily present. Judge Newman insisted that the “inherent
928.
929.
930.
931.
932.
933.
934.
935.
936.
937.
938.
939.

Id., 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1646.
Id., 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1647.
Id. at 1376, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1652.
Id. at 1367, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1646.
Id. at 1367–68, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1646.
Id. at 1368, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1646.
Id. at 1371, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1649.
Id. at 1373, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1650.
Id. at 1372, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1650.
Id. at 1373, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1650.
Id., 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1650.
Id. at 1377, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1653 (Newman, J., dissenting).
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information” must “be known to be present in the subject matter of
the reference, when viewed by persons experienced in the field of the
940
The mere possibility that the CKD reference could be
invention.”
used by one of skill in the art to arrive at the claimed process was not
941
enough, she wrote. Judge Newman also emphasized that the CKD
reference did not enable one of ordinary skill in the art to practice
the claimed invention and thus could not anticipate the claims at is942
sue.
943
In In re Buszard, the Federal Circuit reversed the Board of Patent
Appeals’s § 102(b) rejection of claims, focusing particularly on the
PTO’s practice of giving claims their broadest reasonable interpreta944
tion.
The claims at issue were directed to a flame retardant composition
that produces a “flexible polyurethane foam reaction mixture,” which
the Board broadly interpreted to mean “any reaction mixture which
945
produces, at least ultimately, a flexible polyurethane foam.”
The
PTO maintained that when the Buszard claims were given their
946
broadest interpretation, they were anticipated by a patent to Eling.
Buszard, on the other hand, argued that Eling shows only a rigid
947
polyurethane foam that loses its rigidity when crushed.
At oral argument before the Federal Circuit, the PTO solicitor contended, apparently for the first time, that when a rigid foam is
crushed, the chemical bonds are broken, producing a flexible foam
948
reaction mixture.
The court found this contention was not sufficiently credible to warrant further consideration because the theory
was proposed without support or citation, and Buszard had no
949
chance to refute it.
The Federal Circuit concluded that Eling de950
scribed only a rigid foam product that produces a rigid product. As
Judge Newman noted, “[n]o matter how broadly ‘flexible foam’ . . . is
construed, it is not a rigid foam . . . . [I]t is not a reasonable claim interpretation to equate ‘flexible’ with ‘rigid,’ or to equate a crushed
951
rigid polyurethane foam with a flexible polyurethane foam.”
940.
941.
942.
943.
944.
945.
946.
947.
948.
949.
950.
951.

Id. at 1378, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1654.
Id., 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1654.
Id. at 1380, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1656.
504 F.3d 1364, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1749 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
Id. at 1366–67, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1750–51.
Id. at 1367, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1751.
Id. at 1366, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1750.
Id., 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1750.
Id. at 1367, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1751.
Id., 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1751.
Id., 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1751.
Id., 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1751.
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In dissent, Judge Prost argued that the majority did not “apply the
rule that the Board is entitled to give claim language its broadest rea952
sonable interpretation.” He also asserted that Buszard did not adequately define the term “flexible polyurethane foam reaction mix953
ture” in the specification as to prevent anticipation by Eling.
954
In Zenon Environmental, Inc. v. United States Filter Corp., the Federal
Circuit reversed a finding of no anticipation on the basis that the
grandchild patent (“the ‘319 patent”) was not entitled to the priority
date of the grandparent application (“the ‘373 patent”), due to a lack
of continuity of disclosure between the grandparent and parent pat955
ent (“the ‘250 patent”). Although anticipation is a question of fact,
continuity of disclosure is a question of law subject to de novo re956
view.
The ‘250 patent incorporated a description of a “vertical skein”
from its grandparent ‘373 patent using the following language: “Further details relating to the construction and deployment of a most
preferred skein are found in the parent U.S. Pat. No. 5,639,373, and
in Ser. No. 08/690,045, the relevant disclosures of each of which are
957
included by reference thereto as if fully set forth herein.” The Federal Circuit found that the “plain language indicates that the subject
matter that is being incorporated by reference pertains to the details
958
relating to the construction and deployment of a vertical skein.”
The vertical skein, according to the ‘373 patent, “consisted of fibers, a
pair of headers, and a permeate collection means, . . . [but] by defini959
tion, a skein does not include a gas distribution system.”
Accordingly, the court concluded that the ‘250 patent did not incorporate
960
the gas distribution system of the grandparent ‘373 patent. As a result, the chain of continuity was broken between the ‘373 patent and
the grandchild ‘319 patent, which claimed a filtering apparatus com961
prising inter alia a gas distribution system. The panel majority concluded that the grandparent ‘373 patent anticipated the ‘319 pat962
ent.

952.
953.
954.
955.
956.
957.
958.
959.
960.
961.
962.

Id. at 1368, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1751 (Prost, J., dissenting).
Id. at 1369–70, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1752–53.
506 F.3d 1370, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d 1118 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
Id. at 1377–78, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1123.
Id. at 1379, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1124.
Id. at 1376, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1122.
Id. at 1379, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1124.
Id. at 1380, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1125.
Id., 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1125.
Id. at 1380–81, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1124–25.
Id. at 1382, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1126.
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Judge Newman dissented from the majority opinion, arguing that
“[t]he question of what material would be understood as incorporated is a question of fact,” but the findings by the patent examiner
and district court had not been shown to have been clearly errone963
ous.
Judge Newman further wrote that the panel’s decision “casts
doubt on the reliable use of this expedient [of using incorporation by
reference]” and “raise[s] new risks of patent drafting” without adding
anything to public knowledge, the patent’s disclosure requirements,
964
or compliance with § 120. The majority found the dissent “alarming[],” for “[t]he draftsman here made clear what was being incorporated by reference and, by difference, what was not. No doubt or risk
arises from carefully drafted language that is interpreted to mean
965
what it says.”
1.

On-sale and public use bar
Under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b), once an invention is offered for sale or
used in public, the inventor has one year in which to file a patent ap966
plication.
If the invention was in public use or on sale more than
one year prior to the filing date of the patent application, § 102(b)
967
bars the ability to patent the invention.
An on-sale bar under
§ 102(b) requires that two conditions be satisfied: (1) the claimed
invention must have been the subject of a commercial sale or offer
for sale more than one year before the application was filed, and
968
(2) the invention must have been ready for patenting.
An invention can be found to be “ready for patenting” in at least the following
ways: (1) by proof that it was reduced to practice, or (2) by proof that
the inventor had prepared drawings or other descriptions of the invention that were sufficiently specific to enable a person skilled in the
969
art to practice the invention.
In the following Federal Circuit decisions, invalidation frequently
turned on the meaning of “public use” and “on sale.” The Federal
Circuit has described “public use” as including “any use of [the

963. Id. at 1384, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1128 (Newman, J., dissenting).
964. Id. at 1385, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1129.
965. Id. at 1382 n.3, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1126 n.3.
966. 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2000).
967. Id.
968. Sparton Corp. v. United States, 399 F.3d 1321, 1323, 73 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1919, 1921 (Fed. Cir. 2005).
969. Id., 73 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1921.
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claimed] invention by a person other than the inventor who is under
970
no limitation, restriction or obligation of secrecy to the inventor.”
971
In Cargill, Inc. v. Canbra Foods, Ltd., Cargill accused Canbra of in972
fringing four of its patents related to non-hydrogenated canola oil.
The district court found that two of the patents were invalid under
the on-sale bar of 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) because Cargill had sold 400
973
pounds of the claimed composition prior to the critical date. The
Federal Circuit, in a unanimous decision, affirmed the judgment of
the district court that the two patents were invalid under § 102(b)’s
974
on-sale bar rule.
In so holding, the Federal Circuit rejected Cargill’s argument that
the oil, which was the subject of the sale was not ready for patenting,
and thus did not trigger the on-sale bar rule, because “an invention is
only reduced to practice when it is shown to work for its intended
975
purpose.” The Federal Circuit responded that Cargill was aware of
the utility of the claimed invention before its offer to sell the oil and
that awareness of a general utility is sufficient for reduction to prac976
tice.
It is not necessary “to be aware of the specific characteristics
977
that made the oil useful.” The court also found “powerful evidence
of a sales transaction” in a letter, including an amount to be delivered, a unit price and contract language allocating risks and respon978
sibility between Cargill and the buyer. The Federal Circuit further
rejected Cargill’s argument that the sale was for “experimental purposes” by explaining that “even if [Cargill’s predecessor in interest]
offered to sell the oil to [Proctor & Gamble] for the purpose of continued testing, it does not prevent a finding that the oil had already
979
been reduced to practice.”
980
In Honeywell International, Inc. v. Universal Avionics Systems Corp.,
the Federal Circuit upheld the denial of defendant’s remaining coun981
Honeywell sued
terclaims of invalidity under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b).
970. In re Smith, 714 F.2d 1127, 1134, 218 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 976, 983 (Fed. Cir.
1983) (citing Egbert v. Lippmann, 104 U.S. 333, 336 (1881)).
971. 476 F.3d 1359, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1705 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
972. Id. at 1361, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1706–07.
973. Id. at 1363, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1707.
974. Id. at 1372, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1714.
975. Id. at 1370, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1713.
976. See id. at 1371 (citing Abbott Labs. v. Geneva Pharm., Inc., 182 F.3d 1315, 1318,
51 U.S.P.Q.2d 1307, 1309 (Fed. Cir. 1999), in which the court held that “[t]he fact
that the claimed material was sold under circumstances in which no question existed
that it was useful means that it was reduced to practice”).
977. Id., 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1714.
978. Id. at 1369, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1712.
979. Id. at 1371, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1714.
980. 488 F.3d 982, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1886 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
981. Id. at 987, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1890.
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Universal Avionics Systems (“UAS”) for infringing its patents on advanced terrain warning systems, which help prevent pilots from flying
982
into mountains or hillsides. Instead of relying on radio signals, as
in the prior art, the patented invention used a virtual “look ahead”
terrain warning system, which compared the aircraft’s position to onboard digitized maps of the earth’s terrain and man-made obsta983
cles. Two of the five asserted patents were at issue in this appeal—
the ‘080 patent, which covered certain input and output signals in
the look-ahead system, and the ‘009 patent, which covered systems for
984
displaying the contours of the terrain.
In this case, UAS argued that Honeywell’s claims were invalid under § 102(b) because Honeywell had negotiated with Gulfstream and
Canadair prior to the critical date to develop its invention for use in
985
their luxury airplanes. The Federal Circuit rejected this argument
because Honeywell had to test the system’s in-cockpit results to “determine that the invention worked for its intended purpose” and to
986
demonstrate “the workability or utility of the claimed invention.”
Accordingly, Honeywell’s negotiations did not trigger the on-sale bar
987
because the invention was not “ready for patenting” at that time.
The Federal Circuit also rejected UAS’s argument that Honeywell’s
flight demonstrations had a commercial purpose or constituted an
988
invalidating “public use” under § 102(b). In particular, a reporter
was on board one of those flights and later published an article indi989
The court concating the system was still under development.
cluded that this was not a “public use” because it did not disclose “a
completed invention in public, without confidentiality restrictions,
990
and without permitted experimentation.”
991
In contrast, in Motionless Keyboard Co. v. Microsoft Corp., the Federal Circuit, in a unanimous decision, reversed the district court’s
992
summary judgment of invalidity based on public use. The two patents in question were directed to an ergonomic keyboard that re993
quired only slight finger gestures to actuate the keys. In pertinent
982.
983.
984.
985.
986.
987.
988.
989.
990.
991.
992.
993.

Id. at 987–88, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1890–91.
Id., 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1890–91.
Id. at 989, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1891–92.
Id. at 996, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1897.
Id. at 997, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1898.
Id., 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1898.
Id. at 998, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1899.
Id., 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1899.
Id., 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1898.
486 F.3d 1376, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1801 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
Id. at 1378, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1802.
Id., 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1802.
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part, the inventor developed the Cherry Model 5 and other prototypes of his invention, which he demonstrated to numerous potential
994
investors, a friend, a business partner, and a typing tester. None of
those disclosures, save the one to the typing tester, involved connect995
ing the Cherry Model 5 to a computer or using it to transmit data.
Instead, the disclosures were limited to a visual view of the new keyboard design without disclosing its ability to translate finger move996
ments into the keys to transmit data.
The Federal Circuit concluded that since the claims were directed
to a device for transmitting data, the disclosures to the investors,
friend, and business partner were inadequate to constitute an invali997
dating “public use” under § 102(b). As for the disclosure to the typing tester, who had used the prototype to transmit data to a computer, her use had occurred less than a year before the filing date of
the application for the ‘477 patent, and she had signed a non998
disclosure agreement (“NDA”) when she took the test.
For these
999
reasons, her use did not qualify as a “public use” under § 102(b).
1000
In Adenta GmbH v. OrthoArm Inc., the Federal Circuit, in another
unanimous decision, held that the claims for an orthodontic bracket
were invalid due to its public use or sale at a trade show more than
1001
one year prior to filing the application.
The action was brought by
patent licensee Adenta, which sought a declaratory judgment that the
1002
patent was invalid and unenforceable.
OrthoArm argued that
Adenta had failed to meet its burden of proof at trial because
Adenta’s witnesses all had an interest in declaring the patent invalid,
and their testimony was not corroborated by the documentary evi1003
dence.
The Federal Circuit disagreed, finding that corroboration
was not at issue because this was not a case in which the witnesses
1004
were claiming to be the inventors.
Rather, the question was the
1005
The court found there was sufficient
sufficiency of the evidence.
evidence to support the jury’s verdict of invalidity because the different witnesses all corroborated each other, and their testimony was
further supported by the documents in evidence, which included a
994.
995.
996.
997.
998.
999.
1000.
1001.
1002.
1003.
1004.
1005.

Id. at 1385, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1807.
Id., 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1807.
Id., 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1807.
Id., 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1807.
Id., 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1807.
Id., 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1807.
501 F.3d 1364, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1428 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
Id. at 1366–67, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1429–30.
Id. at 1367, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1430.
Id. at 1367–68, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1431.
Id. at 1371–72, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1433–34.
Id., 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1434.
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letter from Adenta’s German patent attorney informing its American
patent attorney that the bracket had been on display and instructing
1006
The Federal Circuit
him to file a patent application within a year.
affirmed the district court’s denial of OrthoArm’s motion for judg1007
ment as a matter of law to overturn the jury’s verdict of invalidity.
C. Obviousness
One cannot discuss the Federal Circuit’s 2007 decisions on obviousness without first mentioning the Supreme Court’s landmark de1008
cision in KSR International Co. v. Teleflex, Inc.
As explained in Part
D.3, KSR reversed the Federal Circuit’s mandatory application of the
TSM test and seemingly broadened the grounds for finding obviousness. Although not as radically transformative as many had predicted, KSR still represents a fundamental change in the concept of
obviousness, a change reflected in the Federal Circuit’s subsequent
obviousness decisions. This section begins with a basic primer on obviousness, including a brief discussion of the Supreme Court’s holding in KSR, followed by a discussion of the Federal Circuit’s applications of KSR and its 2007 decisions either decided before KSR or
involving aspects of obviousness uninfluenced by the Supreme
Court’s pronouncement in KSR.
A patent claim is invalid for obviousness if the differences between
the claimed subject matter and the prior art are such that the claimed
subject matter as a whole would have been obvious at the time of the
1009
invention to a person of ordinary skill in the relevant art.
Obviousness is a question of law that is based on underlying factual considerations:
1. the scope and content of the prior art;
2. the differences between the prior art and the claims at issue;
3. the level of ordinary skill in the pertinent art; and
4. objective evidence of non-obviousness (i.e., secondary considerations).1010

It is against this factual background that the ultimate determination of obviousness is made. The inquiry into obviousness is an “expansive and flexible approach” rather than a “formalistic concep1006. Id. at 1372–73, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1434.
1007. Id. at 1373, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1435.
1008. 127 S. Ct. 1727, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1385 (2007).
1009. 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) (2000).
1010. Graham v. John Deere Co. of Kansas City, 383 U.S. 1, 17, 148 U.S.P.Q. (BNA)
459, 467 (1966); Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. Phillip Morris Inc., 229 F.3d
1120, 1124, 56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1456, 1459 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
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1011

tion.”
A combination of familiar elements according to their established functions is probably obvious if the combination does no more
1012
If the combination is more than a
than yield predictable results.
predictable use of prior art, then the court must determine whether
there was an “apparent reason to combine the known elements,” by
looking, e.g., at “interrelated teachings of multiple patents,; to the effects of demands known to the design community or present in the
marketplace; and to the background knowledge possessed by a per1013
son having ordinary skill in the art.”
The court need not seek out
precise teachings, but can consider the common sense “inferences
and creative steps that a person of ordinary skill in the art would em1014
ploy.”
The fourth factual inquiry, referred to as objective evidence of nonobviousness or secondary considerations, must be resolved before
1015
coming to an obviousness conclusion.
These considerations are
important because they may provide circumstantial evidence of non1016
obviousness.
Secondary considerations may include:
1. the commercial success of the claimed invention;
2. long-standing problems in the art solved by the invention;
3. widespread recognition and copying of the invention in the
industry;
4.
5.
6.
7.

disbelief by experts that the invention would work;
failure of others;
unexpected results; and
praise and industry acceptance of the invention.1017

1011. KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 127 S. Ct. 1727, 1739, 1741, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1385, 1395–96 (2007).
1012. Id. at 1739, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1395.
1013. Id. at 1740–41, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1396.
1014. Id., 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1396.
1015. Tex. Instruments Inc. v. U.S. Int’l Trade Comm’n, 988 F.2d 1165, 1178, 26
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1018, 1028 (Fed. Cir. 1993); Minn. Mining & Mfg. Co. v. Johnson
& Johnson Orthopaedics, Inc., 976 F.2d 1559, 1573, 24 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1321, 1333
(Fed. Cir. 1992); Vandenberg v. Dairy Equip. Co., 740 F.2d 1560, 1566–67, 224
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 195, 198–99 (Fed. Cir. 1984); Standard Mfg. Co., Inc. v. United
States, 25 Cl. Ct. 1, 52 n.40 (1991).
1016. Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 17–18, 148 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 459, 467
(1966).
1017. See Tex. Instruments, 988 F.2d at 1178, 26 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1028 ( stating
that obviousness is based on several factual determinations, including a consideration of “other objective evidence”); Minn. Mining & Mfg. Co., 976 F.2d at 1573, 24
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1333 (examining commercial success, failure of others, longfelt need, and unexpected results when inquiring into secondary considerations);
Vandenberg, 740 F.2d at 1566-67, 224 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 199 (noting that the appellants’ device obtained widespread recognition and that evidence existed showing the
device was copied in the industry); see also Graham, 383 U.S. at 17, 148 U.S.P.Q.
(BNA) at 467 (“Such secondary considerations as commercial success, long felt but
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1018

In KSR International Co. v. Teleflex, Inc., a unanimous Supreme
1019
Court reasserted the primacy of Graham v. John Deere in making an
obviousness determination and warned that a rigid application of the
teaching/suggestion/motivation test in an obviousness inquiry is in1020
consistent with the Graham framework.
In effect, the Court reprimanded the Federal Circuit for its strict adherence to the TSM approach over the years. The Supreme Court did not reject the TSM
test outright, however, but stripped it of its prominence as the deter1021
minative factor in an obviousness inquiry.
The Court noted,
“[t]here is no necessary inconsistency between the idea underlying
the TSM test and the Graham analysis. But when a court transforms
the general principle into a rigid rule that limits the obviousness in1022
quiry, as the court of appeals did here, it errs.”
The Supreme Court also weighed in on the combination of familiar elements in an invention, noting that “[t]he combination of familiar elements according to known methods is likely to be obvious
1023
when it does no more than yield predictable results.”
“If a person
of ordinary skill can implement a predictable variation, § 103 likely
1024
bars its patentability.”
The Federal Circuit also erred when it concluded that “a patent claim cannot be proved obvious merely by
1025
showing that the combination of elements was ‘obvious to try.’”
According to the Supreme Court, in some circumstances “the fact
that a combination was obvious to try might show that it was obvious
1026
under § 103.”
unsolved needs, failure of others, etc., might be utilized to give light to the circumstances surrounding the origin of the subject matter sought to be patented.”); Brown
& Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. Philip Morris Inc., 229 F.3d 1120, 1129, 56
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1456, 1463 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (listing secondary considerations that
other courts have considered, including commercial success, long-felt but unfulfilled
needs, failure of others, skepticism about the invention, copying, praise and acceptance, and unexpected results); Standard Mfg., 25 Cl. Ct. at 51, 52 (tracing the evolution of secondary considerations and suggesting that they now “comprise a fourth
factual inquiry . . . which now must be resolved before coming to a conclusion concerning obviousness”); 2 DONALD S. CHISUM, CHISUM ON PATENTS § 5.05 (1996) (discussing three views on the role of secondary considerations).
1018. KSR, 127 S. Ct. 1727, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1385.
1019. Graham, 383 U.S. 1, 148 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 459.
1020. KSR, 127 S. Ct. at 1741, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1396–97.
1021. Id., 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1396–97.
1022. Id., 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1396–97.
1023. See id. at 1739–40, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1395–96 (discussing the application of this doctrine in United States v. Adams, 383 U.S. 39, 148 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 479
(1966), the companion case to Graham; in Sakraida v. Ag Pro, Inc., 425 U.S. 273, 189
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 449 (1976); and in Anderson’s-Black Rock, Inc. v. Pavement Salvage Co.,
396 U.S. 57, 163 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 673 (1969)).
1024. Id. at 1740, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1396.
1025. Id. at 1742, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1397.
1026. Id., 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1397.
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1027

Leapfrog Enterprises, Inc. v. Fisher-Price, Inc. was one of the Federal
Circuit’s first obviousness cases after the Supreme Court’s KSR ruling.
Leapfrog, a manufacturer of children’s educational products, sued
Fisher-Price for infringing a patent on an interactive learning toy that
makes a sound or says a phoneme when a child properly enters the
1028
The Federal Circuit affirmed the district court’s finding
letters.
1029
that the claims were obvious.
The prior art in question included:
(1) an electro-mechanical learning toy (“Bevan”) in which a motor
and internal record would say a phoneme when a particular letter was
pressed; (2) an electronic reading toy (“SSR”) by Texas Instruments;
1030
and (3) knowledge in the art about electronic “readers.”
The Federal Circuit concluded it would have been obvious to use SSR as a
“roadmap” to update the Bevan device with modern electronic com1031
ponents, and then add a “reader” of the type well-known in the art.
In the words of KSR, the patent was thus an obvious “combination of
familiar elements . . . [and] known methods” that “yield[ed] predict1032
able results.”
The court, in fact, found the prima facie showing of
obviousness to be so strong that it overcame the secondary considera1033
tions of commercial success, praise, and long-felt-need.
1034
Takeda Chemical Industries, Ltd. v. Alphapharm Pty., Ltd. was the
Federal Circuit’s first obviousness case in the chemical arts after
1035
KSR.
Takeda owned a patent directed to compounds that can be
1036
Seeking approval to market its generic
used as antidiabetic agents.
version of the same compounds, Alphapharm filed a Paragraph IV
certification with its Abbreviated New Drug Application (“ANDA”),
1037
asserting that the patent at issue was invalid as obvious.
Takeda
filed suit against Alphapharm and three other generic drug manufac1038
turers, alleging infringement of certain claims in Takeda’s patent.
The critical portion of the claimed compounds was an ethyl substituted pyridyl ring, which had four possible positions on which an al1027. 485 F.3d 1157, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1687 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
1028. Id. at 1158, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1688–89.
1029. Id. at 1163, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1692.
1030. Id. at 1158–59, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1689.
1031. Id. at 1162, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1691–92.
1032. KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 127 S. Ct. 1727, 1739, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1385, 1395 (2007).
1033. Leapfrog, 485 F.3d at 1162, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1692.
1034. 492 F.3d 1350, 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1169 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
1035. See id. at 1355-56, 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1173–74 (noting that obviousness
had only recently been addressed by the Supreme Court and the opinion given by
the district court was rendered before the Supreme Court’s decision in KSR).
1036. Id. at 1352, 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1172–73.
1037. Id. at 1354, 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1172.
1038. Id., 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1172.
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kyl group could be located.
The claimed compounds had an ethyl
1040
Alpharm cited prior art that ingroup attached to the 5-position.
cluded a similar compound (“compound b”), which had a methyl
1041
group attached to the 6-position.
“Relying on KSR, Alphapharm
argue[d] that the claimed compounds would have been obvious because the prior art compound fell within ‘the objective reach of the
claim,’ and the evidence demonstrated that using the techniques of
1042
homologation and ring-walking would have been ‘obvious to try.’”
The district court found “there was no motivation in the prior art to
select compound b as the lead compound for antidiabetic research.”
1043
In fact, “the prior art [actually] taught away from” compound b.
The Federal Circuit affirmed, noting that Alphapharm “failed to
show that there existed a reason, based on what was known at the
time of the invention, to perform the chemical modifications neces1044
sary to achieve the claimed compounds.”
The Federal Circuit stated that the test for prima facie obviousness
in an invention concerning chemical compounds “is consistent with
the legal principles enunciated in KSR[,]” and thus, “in cases involving new chemical compounds, it remains necessary to identify some
reason that would have led a chemist to modify a known compound
in a particular manner to establish prima facie obviousness of a new
1045
claimed compound.”
The Federal Circuit also found that, in contrast with KSR, “the prior art disclosed a broad selection of compounds any one of which could have been selected as a lead compound for further investigation[,]” as opposed to identifying
1046
predictable solutions.
1047
In Aventis Pharma Deutschland GmbH v. Lupin, Ltd., the Federal
Circuit reversed a pre-KSR district court decision in which patent
claims to a certain pharmaceutical compound were found to be non1048
obvious over the prior art.
The patent at issue was directed to a
compound for blood pressure medication that was “substantially free
1049
of other isomers.”
The patent owner had argued that there was no
explicit teaching to purify a stereoisomer from the mixture in which
1039.
1040.
1041.
1042.
1043.
1044.
1045.
1046.
1047.
1048.
1049.

Id. at 1353, 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1172.
Id. at 1354, 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1172.
Id., 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1172.
Id. at 1359, 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1176.
Id. at 1354, 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1172–73.
Id. at 1363, 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1179.
Id. at 1356–57, 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1174.
Id. at 1359, 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1176.
499 F.3d 1293, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1197 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
Id. at 1299, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1202.
Id. at 1296, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1200.
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it was the active ingredient, and that the purified isomer exhibited
1050
the unexpected result of increased potency.
The Federal Circuit, in a unanimous decision, reversed the district
court, holding that the claimed composition was obvious because the
inventors had merely isolated and purified the active ingredient in a
1051
mixture that existed in the prior art.
The district court had erred
in relying on a lack of clear and convincing evidence of any motiva1052
tion in the art to separate active stereoisomer.
The Federal Circuit
stated that “[r]equiring an explicit teaching to purify the . . . [active]
stereoisomer from a mixture in which it is the active ingredient is
precisely the sort of rigid application of the TSM test that was criti1053
cized in KSR.”
[I]f it is known that some desirable property of a mixture derives in
whole or in part from a particular one of its components, or if the
prior art would provide a person of ordinary skill in the art with
reason to believe that this is so, the purified compound is prima facie obvious over the mixture even without an explicit teaching that
the ingredient should be concentrated or purified.1054
1055

In In re Translogic Technology, Inc., the Federal Circuit affirmed
the PTO’s finding on reexamination that the claims of Translogic’s
1056
Accused infringer Hitachi had
‘666 patent were invalid as obvious.
petitioned the PTO to reexamine Translogic’s ‘666 patent during the
1057
course of an infringement suit.
While the appeal from the PTO
was pending, the jury in Translogic’s district court case found the
patent valid and infringed, and awarded Translogic $86.5 million in
1058
damages.
The district court also entered a permanent injunction,
1059
The Federal Circuit consolidated
which it stayed pending appeal.
Translogic’s appeals from the PTO and the district court, although
the present decision addressed only the appeal from the reexamina1060
tion.
In affirming the PTO’s obviousness determination, the Federal
Circuit rejected Translogic’s argument that the PTO had erred in
construing the term “coupled to receive” to include terminals that
1050. Id. at 1302, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1205.
1051. Id. at 1303, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1205.
1052. Id., 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1205.
1053. Id. at 1301, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1204.
1054. Id., 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1204 (citing In re May, 574 F.2d 1082, 1090–94,
197 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 601, 607–610 (C.C.P.A. 1978)).
1055. 504 F.3d 1249, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1929 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
1056. Id. at 1262, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1939.
1057. Id. at 1251, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1930.
1058. Id., 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1930.
1059. Id., 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1930.
1060. Id., 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1930.
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1061

were merely capable of receiving signals.
The Federal Circuit
found the PTO’s construction to be correct because the claims and
specification did not specify any particular structural connection, and
the input variables (signals) were not part of the claimed inven1062
tion.
The Federal Circuit also affirmed the PTO’s finding that the Gorai
reference was relevant prior art to the technical field of the ‘666 pat1063
ent.
Translogic, in contrast, was “making the same error corrected
by the Supreme Court in KSR,” namely, that variants of the circuit
disclosed in the prior art reference were not relevant prior art be1064
cause they did not address the same problem as the ‘666 patent.
“However, this argument overlooks the fundamental proposition that
the series circuits in Gorai are prior art within the public domain and
1065
the common knowledge of a person of ordinary skill in the art.”
The Federal Circuit further rejected Translogic’s argument that,
from the viewpoint of a skilled artisan, the Gorai reference disclosed
only an algorithm to perform certain logic functions but not an ac1066
tual multiplexer.
Finally, the Federal Circuit affirmed the PTO’s finding that the
‘666 patent claims were obvious over a combination of the Gorai and
1067
Weste references.
Translogic’s arguments to the contrary were
based on the absence of a teaching, suggestion, or motivation to
combine the references—a test that is no longer mandatory after the
1068
Supreme Court’s KSR decision.
Instead, the court found that the
PTO had properly taken into account “‘the inferences and creative
steps that a person of ordinary skill in the art would employ,’” pursu1069
ant to KSR.
1070
In In re Icon Health and Fitness, Inc., the Federal Circuit affirmed
the Board of Patent Appeals decision holding the patentee’s claims to
1071
Icon was
a treadmill with a folding base unpatentable as obvious.
the patent holder of the ‘624 patent, which requires that the folding
base have a gas spring “to assist in stably retaining” the treadmill base in
1061. Id. at 1258, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1935.
1062. Id., 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1935–36.
1063. Id. at 1261, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1938.
1064. Id., 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1938.
1065. Id., 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1938.
1066. Id., 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1938.
1067. Id. at 1262, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1938–39.
1068. Id. at 1261–62, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1938–39.
1069. Id. at 1262, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1939 (quoting KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex
Inc., 127 S. Ct. 1727, 1741, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1385, 1396 (2007)).
1070. 496 F.3d 1374, 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1746 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
1071. Id. at 1382, 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1752.
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1072

the upright position.
“On reexamination, the examiner rejected
Icon’s claims as obvious . . . based on the combination of an advertisement [for a folding treadmill] by Damark International, Inc.
(‘Damark’) and U.S. Patent No. 4,370,766 to Teague, Jr. (“Teague”),”
which teaches the use of gas springs in a bed that folds up into a
1073
The Board affirmed the examiner’s determination of obcabinet.
viousness over the combination of Damark and Teague, noting the
breadth of Icon’s claim limitation with respect to the gas spring and
1074
the pertinence of Teague.
On appeal, Icon focused on two major arguments. First, Icon argued that Teague, describing a folding bed, falls outside of the
“treadmill art” and addresses a different problem than the ‘624 pat1075
ent, thus removing it from the relevant prior art.
Second, Icon argued that Teague, which references use of a dual-action spring,
1076
The Federal Circuit rejected
teaches away from Icon’s invention.
both arguments, noting that Teague indeed addresses the same prob1077
1078
lem as Icon’s.
Citing In re Clay, the Federal Circuit noted that
“[a] reference is reasonably pertinent if, even though it may be in a
different field from that of the inventor’s endeavor, it is one which,
because of the matter with which it deals, logically would have commended itself to an inventor’s attention in considering his prob1079
lem.”
Further, the Federal Circuit, citing KSR, noted that “‘familiar
1080
The
items may have obvious uses beyond their primary purposes.’”
Federal Circuit stated that there was “[n]othing about Icon’s folding
mechanism [that] requires any particular focus on treadmills; it generally addresses [the] problems of supporting the weight of such a
1081
mechanism and providing a stable resting position.”
Moreover, the
Federal Circuit found that a variety of sources may have led one
skilled in the art to combine the teachings of Damark and Teague to
produce a device meeting all of the limitations of the ‘624 patent
1082
claims.

1072. Id. at 1377, 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1748.
1073. Id., 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1748.
1074. Id. at 1378, 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1749.
1075. Id. at 1379, 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1750.
1076. Id. at 1381, 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1751.
1077. Id. at 1379–80, 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1751.
1078. 966 F.2d 656, 659, 23 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1058, 1061 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
1079. Icon Health & Fitness, 496 F.3d at 1379–80, 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1750
(quoting Clay, 966 F.2d at 659, 23 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1061).
1080. Id. at 1380, 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1750 (quoting KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex
Inc., 127 S. Ct. 1727, 1742, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1385, 1397 (Fed. Cir. 2007)).
1081. Id., 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1750.
1082. Id., 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1750.
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Regarding Icon’s second argument that Teague teaches away from
Icon’s invention, the Federal Circuit noted that Teague disclosed two
types of gas spring mechanisms, neither of which was undesirable for
1083
Icon’s purpose.
The Federal Circuit further noted that Icon’s
broad claims encompassing anything that assists in stably retaining
1084
Accordingly, the Fedthe tread base undermined their argument.
eral Circuit affirmed the Board’s decision that the claims were obvi1085
ous.
The Federal Circuit also affirmed the PTO’s finding of obviousness
1086
in In re Trans Texas Holdings Corp.
Trans Texas held two related
patents on methods for insulating deposit and loan accounts from inflation and providing stability to financial institutions by matching inflation-adjusted payments to depositors with increased inflation1087
adjusted interest payments from borrowers.
At Trans Texas’s request, the PTO reexamined each of the patents in question, but rejected Trans Texas’s argument that the Office was bound by a district
court’s claim construction in an earlier infringement proceeding on
1088
the same patents.
The PTO eventually rejected all the claims as
1089
obvious, and Trans Texas appealed.
The Federal Circuit found the
claims were obvious either because the limitation in question was disclosed in the prior art or because a combination of the prior art with
1090
a “well-known practice” in the field yielded predictable results.
Accordingly, the Federal Circuit affirmed the PTO’s rejection of all of
1091
the reexamined claims as obvious.
1092
In In re Sullivan, the patent applicants appealed a decision of the
Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences affirming the Examiner’s
1093
The applicants claimed an
rejection of the invention as obvious.
antivenom for treating rattlesnake bites, wherein the composition was
characterized by the use of a fragment of an antibody, rather than an
intact antibody, even though such fragments are not generally used
1094
for antivenoms.
The Board found that the applicants’ composition
1083. Id. at 1381–82, 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1752.
1084. Id., 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1751.
1085. Id. at 1382, 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1752.
1086. 498 F.3d 1290, 1292, 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1835, 1836 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
1087. Id., 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1836.
1088. Id. at 1294, 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1838.
1089. Id. at 1295, 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1838.
1090. Id. at 1299–1301, 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1841–43 (citing KSR Int’l Co. v.
Teleflex Inc., 127 S. Ct. 1727, 1739, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1385, 1394 (2007)).
1091. Id. at 1301, 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1843.
1092. 498 F.3d 1345, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1034 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
1093. Id. at 1347, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1035.
1094. Id. at 1348, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1036.
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was obvious in view of a combination of one of the inventor’s own
references that taught the use of an intact antibody in a rattlesnake
antivenom and another reference that taught the use of an antibody
1095
fragment to detect rattlesnake venom.
The Board found that the
applicant’s intended use of the composition to neutralize, rather
than detect, rattlesnake venom did not render the composition non1096
obvious.
The Federal Circuit held that the Board erroneously failed to consider the applicants’ rebuttal evidence, which included declarations
1097
from the inventors and their experts.
The Board was mistaken in
finding that the declarations related only to the use of the claimed
1098
Rather, the declarations also showed “an unexpected
composition.
result from the use of the claimed composition,” namely, the “unexpected property of neutralizing the lethality of rattlesnake venom
while reducing the occurrence of adverse immune reactions in hu1099
mans.”
In addition, the declarations explained that the prior art
taught away from the composition and that there was a long-felt need
1100
for this new antivenom.
Conversely, the Federal Circuit reversed the district court’s judg1101
ment of non-obviousness in Daiichi Sankyo Co. v. Apotex, Inc.
The
patent in question was directed to a method for treating bacterial ear
1102
infections using antibiotic ofloxacin, which is a gyrase inhibitor.
Daiichi sued Apotex for infringement after Apotex filed an Abbrevi1103
At
ated New Drug Application (“ANDA”) for generic ear drops.
trial, Apotex argued that the patent was invalid as obvious in view of
the Ganz reference, which taught the use of ear drops containing a
1104
certain gyrase inhibitor to treat middle ear infections.
In pertinent
part, Ganz stated that “gyrase inhibitors ‘should be used only in diffi1105
cult cases and exclusively by the otologist.’”
The district court, however, concluded that the person of ordinary skill in the art would
1106
have been “a pediatrician or general practitioner.”
Accordingly, the
district court rejected Apotex’s argument that it would have been ob-

1095.
1096.
1097.
1098.
1099.
1100.
1101.
1102.
1103.
1104.
1105.
1106.

Id. at 1348–49, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1036–37.
Id. at 1349, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1036–37.
Id. at 1352–53, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1039–40.
Id. at 1353, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1040.
Id. at 1352, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1039–40.
Id. at 1353, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1040.
501 F.3d 1254, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1285 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
Id. at 1258, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1288.
Id. at 1256, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1286.
Id. at 1258, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1287–88.
Id., 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1288 (emphasis added).
Id. at 1256, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1286 (emphasis added).
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vious to use ofloxacin, a gyrase inhibitor, to topically treat bacterial
1107
ear infections.
The Federal Circuit, in a rather unusual step, found that the district court had clearly erred in determining that a person skilled in
1108
the art would have been a general practitioner and not a specialist.
The court noted that the inventors of the patent were specialists in
drug treatments for ear infections, and not pediatricians or general
practitioners, who generally would have lacked the training or knowl1109
edge to have developed the claimed compound.
The Federal Circuit concluded that the patent would have been obvious to persons
1110
having that higher skill level, as Apotex had argued.
1111
In Dippin’ Dots, Inc. v. Mosey, a case decided prior to KSR, the
Federal Circuit examined the experimental use exception in the con1112
text of obviousness.
When Dippin’ Dots sued Mosey for infringing
its patented process for making a novelty ice cream product, the jury
found that the claims were invalid in view of sales made more than a
1113
year before the application date.
Dippin’ Dots argued on appeal
that those sales were experimental and did not trigger the on-sale
1114
bar.
The Federal Circuit disagreed, noting that the inventor himself had testified that the sales were made to determine the market1115
A perability of the product, not to improve its technical aspects.
son skilled in the art would have been motivated to combine the
process used to make those products with other relevant prior art, the
1116
court found.
In particular, a skilled artisan would have sought the
appropriate temperature ranges to prepare and serve the product
and thus would have found it obvious to use the higher temperatures
1117
set forth in the claims.
The Federal Circuit thus affirmed the district court’s determination that the claims were obvious, even under
1118
the higher pre-KSR standard.
1119
In PharmaStem Therapeutics, Inc. v. Viacell, Inc., PharmaStem sued
six defendants for infringement of two patents on compositions and
1107.
1108.
1109.
1110.
1111.
1112.
1113.
1114.
1115.
1116.
1117.
1118.
1119.

Id. at 1258, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1288.
Id. at 1257, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1287.
Id., 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1287.
Id. at 1258–59, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1288.
476 F.3d 1337, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1633 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
Id. at 1343–44, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1638.
Id. at 1345, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1639.
Id. at 1344, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1638.
Id., 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1638.
Id., 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1638.
Id. at 1345, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1639.
Id., 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1639.
491 F.3d 1342, 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1289 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
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methods for using cryopreserved umbilical cord stem cells for re1120
The
building a person’s compromised blood and immune systems.
jury returned verdicts for PharmaStem that the patents were infringed and valid, and the court denied defendants’ motion for
1121
JMOL that the claims were invalid.
The Federal Circuit reversed
1122
the JMOL and held the patents were invalid as obvious.
The obviousness issue largely turned on whether the prior art gave
a reasonable expectation of success in using cord blood in transplants
1123
for hematopoietic reconstitution.
The Federal Circuit found that
the inventors had demonstrated only the presence of stem cells in
1124
cord blood, which was also inferred by prior art.
Judge Bryson,
writing for the majority, explained:
While the inventors may have proved conclusively what was strongly
suspected before—that umbilical cord blood is capable of hematopoietic reconstitution—and while their work may have significantly
advanced the state of the science of hematopoietic transplantations
by eliminating any doubt as to the presence of stem cells in cord
blood, the mouse experiments and the conclusions drawn from
them were not inventive in nature. Instead, the inventors merely
used routine research methods to prove what was already believed
to be the case. Scientific confirmation of what was already believed
to be true may be a valuable contribution, but it does not give rise
to a patentable invention.1125

Judge Newman strongly dissented, noting that after a three-week
trial the jury sustained the validity of the patents, the district court
upheld their validity, and their validity was confirmed in several reex1126
aminations by the PTO.
Judge Newman wrote, “[t]he undisputed
evidence at trial was that these long-sought life-saving inventions were
achieved amid general scientific skepticism, despite the extensive research that was being conducted by many scientists in this field,” and
that her colleagues on the panel “reconstruct[ed] these inventions by
1127
selection and inference, with perfect hindsight of the discoveries.”

1120. Id. at 1346–47, 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1291.
1121. Id., 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1291.
1122. Id. at 1347, 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1291.
1123. Id. at 1360, 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1301.
1124. Id. at 1363, 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1304.
1125. Id. at 1363–64, 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1304 (citing KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex
Inc., 127 S. Ct. 1727, 1732, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1385, 1389–90 (Fed. Cir. 2007);
Pfizer, Inc. v. Apotex, Inc., 480 F.3d 1348, 1367–69, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1321,
1334–37 (Fed. Cir. 2007)).
1126. Id. at 1367, 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1307.
1127. Id., 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1307.
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Judge Newman also emphasized that based on the strong secondary
1128
considerations, the patent claims were not obvious.
1129
In Pfizer, Inc. v. Apotex, Inc., one of the last appellate opinions on
obviousness prior to KSR, the Federal Circuit reversed a district court
1130
ruling that Pfizer’s claims were not obvious.
Pfizer’s claims were
directed to the use of a besylate salt form of one of the drug’s key in1131
gredients, amlodipine.
The PTO’s allowance of the claims, as well
as the district court’s ruling of validity, turned largely on a declaration from one of the inventors that the amlodipine besylate salt was a
unique compound with highly desirable yet unpredictable proper1132
ties.
The declaration also attested to the difficulty in selecting that
1133
besylate salt from a number of other options.
The Federal Circuit found clear motivation to combine references,
1134
speaking, of course, from a pre-KSR vantage point.
The Federal
Circuit also found that a skilled artisan would have had a reasonable
expectation of success in making amlodipine besylate because the
prior art “contained a strong suggestion that any and all pharmaceutically-acceptable anions would form non-toxic acid addition salts and
1135
would work for their intended purpose.”
Evidence of secondary
considerations was not sufficient to overcome the strong showing of
1136
The Federal Circuit concluded
obviousness, in the court’s view.
that “[a]t most, then, Pfizer engaged in routine, verification testing to
optimize selection of one of several known and clearly suggested
pharmaceutically-acceptable salts to ease its commercial manufacturing and marketing of the tablet form of the therapeutic amlodip1137
ine.”
Pfizer unsuccessfully petitioned the Federal Circuit for a panel re1138
hearing or rehearing en banc.
Judges Newman, Bryson, and Rader
dissented from the denial of rehearing en banc because they believed
the panel had improperly relied on an “obvious to try” standard and
substituted its own fact-finding for that of the district court, where
1128. Id. at 1375–78, 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1313–16.
1129. 480 F.3d 1348, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1321 (Fed. Cir. 2007), reh’g and reh’g en
banc denied, 488 F.3d 1377, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1852 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
1130. Id. at 1352–53, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1324.
1131. Id. at 1352, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1323.
1132. Id. at 1355, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1326.
1133. Id., 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1326.
1134. Id. at 1361–62, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1331.
1135. Id. at 1364-65, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1333.
1136. Id. at 1372, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1338.
1137. Id. at 1371, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1338.
1138. Pfizer, Inc. v. Apotex, Inc., 488 F.3d 1377, 1378, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1852,
1853 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
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1139

there was no showing of clear error.
The judges also expressed
concern that the panel’s decision would adversely impact the pharmaceutical and chemical industries because it failed to appreciate the
importance of the unexpected benefits of compounds and the diffi1140
culty in identifying and pursuing them.
D. 35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶¶ 1 & 2
1.

Enablement
A patent must contain “the manner and process of making and using [the invention] in such full, clear, concise, and exact terms as to
enable any person skilled in the art to which it pertains, or with which
1141
it is most nearly connected, to make and use the same.”
This is
1142
known as the enablement requirement.
The essence of this requirement is that patent protection is granted
in return for an enabling disclosure of the invention, “not for vague
1143
intimations of general ideas that may or may not be workable.”
Enablement is a question of law, although it may contain subsidiary
1144
Whether a disclosure is enabling is dequestions of law and fact.
1145
termined as of the filing date of the application.
Enablement requires that the specification teach those of ordinary
skill in the art to make and use the full scope of the claimed inven1146
tion without “undue experimentation.”
Undue experimentation is
determined according to a “standard of reasonableness, having due
1147
In
regard for the nature of the invention and the state of the art.”
other words, “a patent specification complies with the statute even if a
‘reasonable’ amount of routine experimentation is required in order
to practice a claimed invention, but that such experimentation must
1139. See id. at 1384, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1857 (noting that the “obvious to try”
standard has a very limited application here, as in all cases that involve the pharmaceutical invention field).
1140. Id. at 1380, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1854.
1141. 35 U.S.C. § 112, para. 1 (2000).
1142. E.g., Enzo Biochem, Inc. v. Calgene, Inc., 188 F.3d 1362, 1371, 52 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1129, 1135 (Fed. Cir. 1999).
1143. Genentech, Inc. v. Novo Nordisk A/S, 108 F.3d 1361, 1366, 42 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1001, 1005 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (citing Brenner v. Manson, 383 U.S. 519, 536, 148
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 689, 696 (1966)).
1144. Johns Hopkins Univ. v. CellPro, Inc., 152 F.3d 1342, 1354, 47 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1705, 1713 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
1145. Enzo, 188 F.3d at 1371, 52 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1135; In re Brana, 51 F.3d
1560, 1567 n.19, 34 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1436, 1441 n.19 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
1146. Genentech, 108 F.3d at 1365, 42 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1004; In re Wands, 858
F.2d 731, 737, 8 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1400, 1404 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
1147. Wands, 858 F.2d at 737, 8 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1404 (citing Ansul Co. v. Uniroyal, Inc., 448 F.2d 872, 878–79, 169 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 759, 762–63 (2d Cir. 1971)).
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1148

not be ‘undue.’”
A specification need not disclose what is well
known in the art but must supply the novel aspects of the inven1149
tions.
1150
In Ormco Corp. v. Align Technology, Inc., the Federal Circuit found
1151
enablement was lacking based on the testimony of the inventors.
One of the inventors of Ormco’s patents on computer-aided design
and manufacture of custom orthodontic appliances testified that
Ormco had never attempted to create a computerized system that
automatically determined tooth positions without human decision
1152
making.
While the goal was to have the software generate final
tooth positions without use of a manual override, in fact “the manual
override had been used on all of the approximately forty cases
treated using the product” because “variations in human anatomy
1153
had prevented the attainment of that goal.”
The Federal Circuit
stated that “[i]f an inventor attempts but fails to enable his invention
in a commercial product that purports to be an embodiment of the
patented invention, that is strong evidence that the patent specifica1154
tion lacks enablement.”
In this case, “[s]ubstantial doubt concern1155
ing the enablement of the invention was cast by the inventors.”
1156
In Liebel-Flarsheim v. Medrad, Inc., the Federal Circuit, in affirming summary judgment of non-enablement, emphasized that the full
1157
scope of the patent claims must be enabled.
During prosecution,
patentee Liebel had removed all references to a pressure jacket in
claims directed to a “method of loading a tubular replacement syringe in a high-pressure power injector for injecting fluid into an
1158
animal.”
Medrad argued, and the district court agreed, that Liebel
had deleted such references in order to encompass Medrad’s jacket1159
less injector system.
The district court concluded that the claims,

1148. Enzo, 188 F.3d at 1371, 52 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1135 (citing Wands, 858 F.2d
at 736–37, 8 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1404).
1149. See Genentech, 108 F.3d at 1366, 42 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1005 (stating that the
specification should facilitate the public in understanding and carrying out the invention).
1150. 498 F.3d 1307, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1146 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
1151. Id. at 1318, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1154.
1152. Id., 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1154–55.
1153. Id., 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1155.
1154. Id. at 1319, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1155.
1155. Id., 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1155.
1156. 481 F.3d 1371, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1113 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
1157. Id. at 1379, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1118.
1158. Id. at 1373, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1115.
1159. Id., 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1115.
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while infringed, were invalid for lack of enablement and insufficient
1160
written description.
On appeal, Liebel argued that since the claims do not require the
absence of a pressure jacket, the district court had erroneously focused its enablement analysis on an embodiment without a pressure
1161
jacket and did not consider an injector with a pressure jacket.
The
Federal Circuit disagreed, finding that the district court had correctly
considered whether the full scope of the construed claims had been
1162
enabled.
Since the specification teaches away from an embodiment without a pressure jacket, the Federal Circuit found, “where the
specification teaches against a purported aspect of an invention, such
a teaching ‘is itself evidence that at least a significant amount of experimentation would have been necessary to practice the claimed in1163
vention.’”
The court also noted that “[t]he irony of this situation is
that Liebel successfully pressed to have its claims include a jacketless
system, but, having won that battle, it then had to show that such a
1164
claim was fully enabled, a challenge it could not meet.”
Liebel-Flarsheim figured prominently in the Federal Circuit’s affirmance of the district court’s summary judgment of non-enablement
in Automotive Technologies International, Inc. v. BMW of North America,
1165
Inc.
Automotive Technologies International (“ATI”) was the as1166
signee of a patent, which was directed to side impact sensors.
Although the patent’s claims covered both mechanical and electronic
sensors, the patent included a detailed description of mechanical
1167
sensors but very little on electronic sensors.
The Federal Circuit,
citing Liebel-Flarsheim, pointed out that there “must be ‘reasonable
1168
In particular, there must
enablement of the scope of the range.’”
be sufficient enablement of electronic sensors because they are “dis1169
tinctly different” from the enabled mechanical sensors.
Although
ATI maintained that a person of ordinary skill in the art would have
been able to construct an electronic side impact sensor based on the
disclosure provided, ATI and the patent’s inventor admitted that they
1160. Id. at 1378, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1118.
1161. Id., 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1118.
1162. Id., 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1118.
1163. Id. at 1379, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1119 (citing AK Steel Corp. v. Sollac &
Ugine, 344 F.3d 1234, 1244, 68 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1280, 1287 (Fed. Cir. 2003)).
1164. Id. at 1380, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1120.
1165. 501 F.3d 1274, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1108 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
1166. Id. at 1277, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1111.
1167. Id. at 1285, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1116.
1168. Id., 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1116 (internal quotation omitted) (quoting Libel-Flarsheim Co. v. Medrad, Inc., 481 F.3d 1371, 1380, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1113,
1120 (Fed. Cir. 2007)).
1169. Id., 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1116.
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had not known of any electronic side impact sensors at the time of fil1170
Moreover, an expert from Delphi (Counterclaimant Defening.
dant-Appellee) testified that a great deal of experimentation would
have been required to make an electronic sensor using only the dis1171
closure in the patent.
Based on this evidence, the Federal Circuit
concluded that the enablement requirement was not satisfied by the
1172
patent’s limited disclosure of electronic sensors.
1173
In Monsanto Co. v. Syngenta Seeds, Inc., the district court held that
certain claims of Monsanto’s patent were invalid under § 112 because
the specification did not “enable the full scope of the broad func1174
tional language in claim 1 without undue experimentation.”
The
1175
According to the
language in question was the term “in plant cells.”
Federal Circuit, “[t]he district court correctly construed claim 1 . . .
to require the claimed gene to function in any plant cell, including
1176
both dicots and monocots.”
The court stated that “those skilled in
the art could not transform a monocot plant cell as of the filing date
1177
of the patent application.”
Further, “[t]he claim requires trans1178
The court went on to state that
formation of the plant cell.”
“[w]ithout the ability to transform a monocot cell, one skilled in the
art could not determine whether the plant gene could carry out the
1179
claimed functions and thus fall within the scope of the claim.”
Monsanto argued that “the disputed claim language merely describes
the operation of the discrete gene components in a plant cell, but
1180
does not operate as a limitation.”
Stated differently, the court
noted, “Monsanto argue[d] that the term ‘plant cell’ should not convert chimeric gene claims into claims directed to plants or plant cells
transformed with the claimed gene, particularly where the patent already contains separate claims directed to such plants and plant
1181
cells.”
The Federal Circuit agreed with the district court, holding
that “Monsanto’s patent recites broad functional language in its

1170.
1171.
1172.
1173.
1174.
1175.
1176.
1177.
1178.
1179.
1180.
1181.

Id. at 1284, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1115.
Id., 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1115.
Id. at 1285, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1115–16.
503 F.3d 1352, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1705 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
Id. at 1360, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1711.
Id. at 1360–61, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1711.
Id. at 1361, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1711.
Id., 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1711.
Id., 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1711.
Id., 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1711.
Id., 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1711.
Id., 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1711.
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claims,” and “the evidence here does not demonstrate that as of the
1182
filing date of the . . . patent . . . the invention was enabled.”
2.

Best mode
In addition to requiring that the specification disclose the invention in sufficient detail as to enable one skilled in the art to make and
use the claimed invention, § 112 further requires that the specification “set forth the best mode contemplated by the inventor of carry1183
Or, as elaborated by the Federal Circuit,
ing out his invention.”
the inventor must disclose the “best mode contemplated by him, as of
the time he executes the application, of carrying out his inven1184
tion.”
This “best mode” requirement prevents inventors from obtaining patent protection while concealing from the public the pre1185
ferred embodiments of their inventions.
“The best mode
requirement creates a statutory bargained-for-exchange by which a
patentee obtains the right to exclude others from practicing the
claimed invention for a certain time period, and the public receives
knowledge of the preferred embodiments for practicing the claimed
1186
invention.”
1187
The best mode analysis, a question of fact, has two components.
“First, a fact-finder must determine whether at the time an applicant
filed an application for a patent, he or she had a best mode of prac1188
ticing the invention; this is a subjective determination.”
Second,
the fact-finder must determine “whether the specification adequately
disclosed what the inventor contemplated as the best mode so that

1182. Id. at 1361–62, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1711.
1183. 35 U.S.C. § 112, para. 1 (2000).
1184. Spectra-Physics, Inc. v. Coherent, Inc., 827 F.2d 1524, 1532, 3 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1737, 1742 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (quoting In re Gay, 309 F.2d 769, 772, 135
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 311, 315 (C.C.P.A. 1962)); see also Glaxo Inc. v. Novopharm Ltd., 52
F.3d 1043, 1050, 34 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1565, 1569 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (noting that an
inquiry into the best mode requirement should focus on the inventor’s state of
mind).
1185. Glaxo, 52 F.3d at 1050, 34 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1569.
1186. Eli Lilly & Co. v. Barr Labs., Inc., 251 F.3d 955, 963, 58 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1869, 1874 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (citing Spectra-Physics, 827 F.2d at 1532, 3 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) at 1742).
1187. N. Telecom Ltd. v. Samsung Elecs. Co., 215 F.3d 1281, 1286, 55 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1065, 1068 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
1188. Fonar Corp. v. Gen. Elec. Co., 107 F.3d 1543, 1548, 41 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1801, 1804 (Fed. Cir. 1997); see also In re Hayes Microcomputer Prod., Inc. Patent
Litig., 982 F.2d 1527, 1536, 25 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1241, 1248 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (stating
that this inquiry focuses on whether the inventor, at the time of filing his patent application, knew of a mode of practicing that he felt was better than any other).
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1189

those having ordinary skill in the art could practice it.”
The second
1190
prong is an objective determination.
1191
the
In Allvoice Computing PLC v. Nuance Communications, Inc.,
Federal Circuit further explained that “[o]nly the claimed invention
1192
is subject to the best mode requirement.”
The claims at issue,
which “cover[ed] an interface between a speech recognition engine
and various end-user application programs on a personal computer[,]” recited an “output means for outputting the recognised
words into at least any one of the plurality of different computerrelated applications to allow processing of the recognised words as
1193
input text.”
The Federal Circuit reversed both determinations, largely on the
basis of the district court’s erroneous construction of the term “output means” to “require[] a system outputting, alternately, to a plurality
1194
of different word processing or other application programs.”
The
“alternately” requirement, the court found, was not suggested or re1195
quired by the claims.
As a result, the alleged undisclosed best
mode fell outside the scope of the claims and thus was “not a best
1196
mode of practicing the claimed invention.”
The Federal Circuit
concluded that the patent did not violate the best mode requirement,
regardless of the lack of disclosure of the subject matter in ques1197
tion.
3.

Written description
A third requirement of 35 U.S.C. § 112, ¶ 1 is that “[t]he specifica1198
tion shall contain a written description of the invention.”
The
Federal Circuit has held that this language gives rise to a requirement
separate and distinct from the enablement and best mode require1189. Young Dental Mfg. Co. v. Q3 Special Prods., Inc., 112 F.3d 1137, 1144, 42
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1589, 1594 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (citing U.S. Gypsum Co. v. Nat’l Gypsum Co., 74 F.3d 1209, 1212, 37 U.S.P.Q.2d 1388, 1390 (Fed. Cir. 1996)).
1190. E.g., Fonar Corp., 107 F.3d at 1548, 41 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1804.
1191. 504 F.3d 1236, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1886 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
1192. Id. at 1246, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1894 (citing Randomex, Inc. v. Scopus
Corp., 849 F.2d 585, 588, 7 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1050, 1053 (Fed. Cir. 1988) (“It is
concealment of the best mode of practicing the claimed invention that section 112 ¶ 1
is designed to prohibit.”); DeGeorge v. Bernier, 768 F.2d 1318, 1325, 226 U.S.P.Q.
(BNA) 758, 763 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (reversing a Patent Appeals Board determination
on the basis that it extended the best mode beyond the proper scope of the claim)).
1193. Id. at 1238, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1888.
1194. Id. at 1241, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1890 (emphasis added) (quoting Allvoice
Computing PLC v. Scansoft, Inc., No. H-02-4471 (S.D. Tex. Oct. 13, 2005)).
1195. Id., 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1890.
1196. Id. at 1246, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1893.
1197. Id. at 1248, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1895.
1198. 35 U.S.C. § 112, para. 1 (2000).
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1199

ments.
In other words, a specification may enable the practice of
an invention and disclose its best mode but still not adequately de1200
The Federal Circuit has stated as follows:
scribe the invention.
Satisfaction of the description requirement insures that subject
matter presented in the form of a claim subsequent to the filing
date of the application was sufficiently disclosed at the time of filing so that the prima facie date of invention can fairly be held to be
the filing date of the application.1201

The written description requirement, an issue of fact, is satisfied if
persons skilled in the art would recognize from the patent specifica1202
Stated another
tion that the inventor invented what is claimed.
way, the disclosure in the patent must reasonably convey to one of
ordinary skill in the art that the inventor “possessed” the claimed subject matter at the time of the invention and described it “with all its
1203
claimed limitations.”
Since satisfaction of the first paragraph of § 112 must be judged as
1204
of the filing date of the patent, the focus of the inquiry is on the
patent’s “original” disclosure, i.e., the disclosure contained in the
originally filed patent application, including the originally filed
1205
claims.
Therefore, when original claims are at issue, disclosure as
of the filing date is ensured, and the written description requirement
1206
is likely satisfied.
1207
In Hyatt v. Dudas, the Federal Circuit examined the written description requirement in the context of an action under 35 U.S.C.
1208
§ 145.
Hyatt was prosecuting five applications that all shared the
same specification when, at one point, it withdrew all of the claims
1209
and proposed over 1,100 new claims.
The Examiner, relying on
1199. In re Alton, 76 F.3d 1168, 1172, 37 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1578, 1581 (Fed. Cir.
1996).
1200. Vas-Cath Inc. v. Mahurkar, 935 F.2d 1555, 1561, 19 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1111,
1115 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
1201. In re Smith, 481 F.2d 910, 914, 178 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 620, 623 (C.C.P.A. 1973).
1202. Gentry Gallery, Inc. v. Berkline Corp., 134 F.3d 1473, 1479, 45 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1498, 1503 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
1203. Id., 45 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1503 (quoting Lockwood v. Am. Airlines, Inc.,
107 F.3d 1565, 1572, 41 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1961, 1966 (Fed. Cir. 1997)); see also
Tronzo v. Biomet, Inc., 156 F.3d 1154, 1158, 47 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1829, 1833 (Fed.
Cir. 1998) (explaining that a disclosure that “merely renders the later-claimed invention obvious is not sufficient to meet the written description requirement”).
1204. U.S. Steel Corp. v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 865 F.2d 1247, 1251, 9 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1461, 1464 (Fed. Cir. 1989).
1205. Hyatt v. Boone, 146 F.3d 1348, 1352, 47 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1128, 1130 (Fed.
Cir. 1998); Gentry, 134 F.3d at 1479, 45 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1503; In re Benno, 768
F.2d 1340, 1346, 226 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 683, 686–87 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
1206. In re Smith, 481 F.2d 910, 914, 178 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 620, 624 (C.C.P.A. 1973).
1207. 492 F.3d 1365, 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
1208. Id. at 1367–68, 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1374.
1209. Id. at 1367, 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1374.
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the Manual of Patent Examining Procedure (“MPEP”)
§ 2163.04(I)(B), analyzed representative claims and rejected them for
1210
Rather than responding to the
failing the written description test.
merits of the rejection, Hyatt argued that the PTO’s prima facie test
was improper and section 2163.04(I)(B) of the MPEP was not good
1211
law.
After failing to persuade the Examiner and the Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences, Hyatt appealed successfully to the U.S.
District Court for the District of Columbia, which found that the examiner had improperly used “vague and unspecific language” in the
1212
1213
rejection.
The PTO appealed to the Federal Circuit.
The Federal Circuit reversed the district court’s judgment that the
PTO had failed to establish a prima facie case of inadequate written
1214
description when it rejected the patent claims.
When the specification lacks any written description to support a claim, “the only thing
the PTO can reasonably be expected to do is to point out its nonexistence” and “specify which claim limitation is lacking adequate sup1215
port in the written description.”
In this case, the examiner had notified Hyatt that support for his
amended claims was missing, which shifted the burden to Hyatt to
show where support for those new claim limitations could be found
1216
in order to overcome the rejection.
Because Hyatt refused to do so
1217
at the appropriate time, the claims were properly rejected.
1218
In Frazer v. Schlegel, the Federal Circuit held that in an interference proceeding, an appellant is entitled to the benefit of a foreign
priority document that is “disclosed in the [same] manner provided
by the first paragraph of section 112,” for the disclosure of a species
1219
of the count.
On that basis, the court reversed the Board of Patent
Appeals and Interferences’ determination of priority in a patent in1220
terference case.
In this case, Frazer and Schlegel both claimed inventions related to
human papillomavirus (“HPV”) vaccines comprising HPV-like parti-

1210. Id., 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1374.
1211. Id., 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1374.
1212. Id. at 1368, 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1374.
1213. Id. at 1367, 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1374.
1214. Id., 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1374.
1215. Id. at 1370, 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1376 (citing MPEP sec. 2163.04(I)).
1216. Id. at 1371, 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1377.
1217. Id., 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1377.
1218. 498 F.3d 1283, 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1850 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
1219. Id. at 1287, 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1853 (quoting 35 U.S.C. § 119(e)(1)
(2000)).
1220. Id. at 1289, 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1851.
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1221

cles.
Schlegel, having the earlier U.S. filing date, was declared the
1222
Frazer’s U.S. application, however, claimed priority to
senior party.
an Australian patent application, which he had filed prior to
1223
Schlegel’s U.S. filing date.
Frazer’s Australian application disclosed a vector “designed to coexpress the L1 and L2 late genes of
human papillomavirus” yielded HPV-like particles, which “could pro1224
vide a safe source of material for the development of a vaccine.”
The interference count recited an HPV-like particle made by “constructing a recombinant DNA molecule that contains a sequence encoding a papillomavirus L1 protein; transfecting a host cell with the
recombinant DNA molecule; [and] expressing papillomavirus virus1225
In view of Schlegel’s
like particles from the transfected host cell.”
priority, however, the Board determined that Frazer was not entitled
to the benefit of the Australian application because at the time he
filed it, “Frazer believed that both the L1 and L2 genes had to be expressed together from the same plasmid,” while Frazer’s “later work
1226
shows that only L1 protein was necessary.”
As a result, the Board
found that Frazer’s Australian application “did not provide a described and enabled anticipation under 35 U.S.C. § 102(g) of the
1227
subject matter of the count.”
The Federal Circuit reversed the Board’s decision with regard to
1228
Schlegel’s priority.
Although the Board analyzed the Australian application in terms of
“conception,” when reliance is on a patent document already filed,
the question is whether the document discloses the invention of
the count by meeting the written description and enablement requirements of 35 U.S.C. § 112[, paragraph 1], for a filed application serves as a constructive reduction to practice of its content.1229

Thus, “[i]n accordance with United States law, when the priority
claim is based on subject matter disclosed in a foreign patent application whose filing date is properly claimed” under 35 U.S.C. § 119(a)
and which complies with § 112(a), “the foreign application has the
1230
same effect as if filed in the United States.”
1221. Id. at 1284, 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1851.
1222. Id. at 1286, 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1853.
1223. Id. at 1283–84, 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1851.
1224. Id. at 1284, 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1851 (quoting Jian Zhou et al., Expression
of Vaccinia Recombinant HPV 16 L1 and L2 ORF Proteins in Epithelial Cells is Sufficient for
Assembly of HPV Virion-Like Particles, 185 VIROLOGY 251, 251 (1991)).
1225. Id. at 1286, 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1853.
1226. Id. at 1287, 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1854.
1227. Id., 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1854.
1228. Id. at 1289, 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1855.
1229. Id. at 1287, 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1854.
1230. Id., 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1853.
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The court then found that Frazer’s “Australian application contained complete details of the method that is the subject of the interference count, and depicts the papillomavirus-like particle of the
1231
count with full disclosure of how to produce it.”
Notwithstanding
Frazer’s disclosure of the expression of both the L1 and L2 genes in
the Australian application, “his later discovery that either the L1 protein or both the L1 and L2 proteins led to capsid formation does not
negate or contradict his disclosure and constructive reduction to
practice of the method of the count that produced the papillomavi1232
rus-like particle of the count.”
Accordingly, “the description [in
Frazer’s Australian application] of the procedures used, and the successful production of the virus-like particles there achieved and re1233
ported, disclose and enable a species within the count.”
4.

Claim definiteness
The second paragraph of 35 U.S.C. § 112 requires that a patent
specification “conclude with one or more claims particularly pointing
out and distinctly claiming the subject matter which the applicant re1234
This is referred to as the “definiteness regards as his invention.”
1235
quirement,” which is a question of law.
“[P]aragraph two of section 112 ‘is essentially a requirement for precision and definiteness of
1236
In other words, “‘the requirement is that lanclaim language.’”
guage of the claims must make it clear what subject matter they en1237
compass.’”
The definiteness requirement serves two primary purposes. First, it
ensures that those skilled in the art can understand and apply the
1238
teachings of the invention.
Second, it encourages enterprise and
experimentation by requiring certainty as to the scope of the inven-

1231. Id. at 1288, 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1854.
1232. Id., 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1854.
1233. Id. at 1289, 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1855.
1234. 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2000).
1235. Gen. Elec. Co. v. Wabash Appliance Corp., 304 U.S. 364, 369, 37 U.S.P.Q.
(BNA) 466, 471 (1938); Stiftung v. Renishaw PLC, 945 F.2d 1173, 1181, 20
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1094, 1095 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
1236. PPG Indus., Inc. v. Guardian Indus. Corp., 75 F.3d 1558, 1562, 37 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1618, 1621 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (quoting In re Borkowski, 422 F.2d 904, 909, 164
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 642, 646 (C.C.P.A. 1970)).
1237. Id., 37 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1621 (quoting In re Hammack, 427 F.2d 1378,
1382, 166 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 204, 208 (C.C.P.A. 1970)).
1238. Ga.-Pac. Corp. v. U.S. Plywood Corp., 258 F.2d 124, 136, 118 U.S.P.Q. (BNA)
122, 136 (2d Cir. 1958).
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tion.
The Supreme Court identified the policy served by the defi1240
niteness requirement in United Carbon Co. v. Binney & Smith Co.:
The statutory requirement of particularity and distinctness in
claims is met only when they clearly distinguish what is claimed
from what went before in the art and clearly circumscribe what is
foreclosed from future enterprise. A zone of uncertainty which enterprise and experimentation may enter only at the risk of infringement claims would discourage invention only a little less than
unequivocal foreclosure of the field. Moreover, the claims must be
reasonably [clear-cut] to enable courts to determine whether novelty and invention are genuine.1241

Claim definiteness depends on whether the inventor’s claim lan1242
guage conveys to those skilled in the art the scope of coverage.
The specification informs the meaning of the claims. Thus, claims
can be held indefinitely if there is a conflict between the claimed subject matter and the specification that would render the scope uncer1243
tain.
Additionally, “‘the amount of detail required to [meet the
definiteness standard] . . . depends on the particular invention and
1244
the prior art,’” for the language of the claim need only be as pre1245
cise as the subject matter permits.
The definiteness of the claims is judged as of the date the applica1246
tion was filed.
It is permissible, however, to use patents and publications appearing after the filing date to construe the claim lan1247
Moreover, it is possible for the claims to fail to adequately
guage.
define the scope of the subject matter of the invention even if the

1239. Id., 118 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 136.
1240. 317 U.S. 228, 55 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 381 (1942).
1241. Id. at 236, 55 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 385–86.
1242. Credle v. Bond, 25 F.3d 1566, 1576, 30 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1911, 1919 (Fed.
Cir. 1994).
1243. See In re Cohn, 438 F.2d 989, 993, 169 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 95, 98 (C.C.P.A. 1971)
(rejecting claims as indefinite upon a finding of an inconsistency between the
claims).
1244. Polymer Indus. Prods. Co. v. Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., 10 F. App’x 812,
817 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (quoting Shatterproof Glass Corp. v. Libbey-Owens Ford Co.,
758 F.2d 613, 624, 225 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 634, 641 (Fed. Cir. 1985)).
1245. N. Am. Vaccine, Inc. v. Am. Cyanamid Co., 7 F.3d 1571, 1579–80, 28
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1333, 1339 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
1246. See U.S. Steel Corp. v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 865 F.2d 1247, 1251, 9
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1461, 1464 (Fed. Cir. 1989) (explaining that specification language is to be construed for what it meant to one with “ordinary skill in the art” at
the time of filing); In re Glass, 492 F.2d 1228, 1232, 181 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 31, 34
(C.C.P.A. 1974) (noting that a specification should be interpreted as of the date of
filing).
1247. U.S. Steel Corp., 865 F.2d at 1251, 9 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1464.
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disclosures in the specification are adequate to satisfy the enablement
1248
and written description requirements.
1249
the Federal Circuit explained that
In Young v. Lumenis, Inc.,
claims are indefinite only when they are “‘not amenable to construc1250
tion or are insolubly ambiguous.’”
The claims in that case were directed to a surgical method for removing a claw from a domesticated
cat, such claims including the step of “forming [an] incision in the
1251
epidermis near the edge of the ungual crest.”
The district court
found the term “near” to be indefinite because it “fails to distinguish
the invention over the prior art and does not permit one of ordinary
1252
skill to know what activity constitutes infringement.”
The Federal
Circuit reversed. Noting that the definiteness of claim terms depends
on whether those terms can be given any reasonable meaning, the
Federal Circuit found that the patent’s drawings and references to
measurements were sufficient to permit persons skilled in the art to
understand what was claimed and to resolve the meaning of the term
1253
“near.”
The Federal Circuit also reversed the district court’s indefiniteness
determination in Allvoice Computing PLC v. Nuance Communications,
1254
1255
Inc. due to a flawed claim construction.
The district court had
held that the claims on “an interface between a speech recognition
engine and various end-user application programs on a personal
computer” were invalid because the means-plus-function elements in
1256
three claims were indefinite.
In particular, the district court construed the claimed “output means for outputting the recognised words
into at least any one of the plurality of different computer related applications to allow processing of the recognised words as input text”
to require “a system outputting, alternately, to a plurality of different
1257
word processing or other application programs.”
The Federal Circuit found that the district court had improperly “added the requirement that the system be able to output ‘alternately’ to different
1248. In re Borkowski, 422 F.2d 904, 909, 16 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 642, 645 (C.C.P.A.
1970).
1249. 492 F.3d 1336, 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1191 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
1250. Id. at 1346, 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1197 (quoting Datamize, LLC v. Plumtree Software, Inc., 417 F.3d 1342, 1347, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1801, 1804 (Fed. Cir.
2005)).
1251. Id. at 1340, 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1193.
1252. Id. at 1343, 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1194.
1253. Id. at 1346–47, 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1197.
1254. 504 F.3d 1236, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1886 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
1255. Id. at 1248, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1895.
1256. Id. at 1238, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1888.
1257. Id. at 1238, 1241, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1888, 1890 (emphasis added).
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programs,” even though “the claim does not suggest the requirement
1258
Once this extraneous limitation
that the means do so alternately.”
was disregarded, “an artisan of ordinary skill would understand the
1259
bounds of the claim when read in light of the specification.”
The
Federal Circuit concluded that the claim at issue satisfied the defi1260
niteness requirement.
1261
In Biomedino, LLC v. Waters Technologies Corp., the Federal Circuit
unanimously confirmed the district court’s determination that certain claims of U.S. Patent No. 6,602,002 (“the ‘002 patent”) were invalid for indefiniteness, “[b]ecause the claim limitation ‘control means’
had no corresponding structure described in the specification as re1262
The district court construed the
quired by 35 U.S.C. § 112(6).”
term “control means” to raise the presumption that § 112(6) ap1263
plied.
The court found that the word “control” did not identify
structure, and thus the presumption that the claim limitation was a
1264
means-plus-function claim was unrebutted.
In reviewing the specifications to determine what structure constitutes the means for performing the specified function, the district court identified a box labeled control in Figure 6 and a statement that “the invention ‘may be
controlled automatically by known differential pressure, valving and
1265
control equipment.’”
The appellant, Biomedino, argued that one of ordinary skill in the
art would identify structure from the written description provided by
1266
the specification.
Appellee argued that no specific structure was
disclosed in the specifications to correspond to the claimed function
of automatically operating the invention, and the proper inquiry was
whether one of ordinary skill in the art would understand the specifi1267
cation itself to disclose the structure.
Citing Medical Instrumentation
1268
& Diagnostics Corp. v. Elekta AB, the Federal Circuit stated that the
proper inquiry is “whether one of [ordinary] skill in the art would
understand the specification itself to disclose a structure, not simply

1258. Id. at 1241, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1890 (emphasis added).
1259. Id. at 1242, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1891; see also KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex
Inc., 127 S. Ct. 1727, 1742, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1385, 1397 (2007) (“A person of
ordinary skill is also a person of ordinary creativity, not an automaton.”).
1260. Allvoice, 504 F.3d at 1240, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1890.
1261. 490 F.3d 946, 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1118 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
1262. Id. at 948, 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1119.
1263. Id. at 949, 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1120.
1264. Id., 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1120.
1265. Id., 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1120.
1266. Id. at 950, 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1120.
1267. Id. at 951, 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1121.
1268. 344 F.3d 1205, 68 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1263 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
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whether that person would be capable of implementing a struc1269
ture.”
The Federal Circuit held that “a bare statement that known tech1270
niques or methods can be used does not disclose structure.”
On
that basis, the Federal Circuit affirmed “the judgment of the district
court holding claims 13–17 and 40 of the ‘502 patent as invalid for
1271
indefiniteness.”
E. Double Patenting
Obviousness-type double patenting is a judicially created doctrine
designed to prevent a patentee from claiming essentially the same invention in two patents to effectively extend the lifetime of patent pro1272
tection.
The analysis has two steps—the claims of the two patents
are first construed, and then they are compared to determine if they
1273
are patentably distinct.
If they are not, the later claims are inva1274
lid.
1275
In In re Metoprolol Succinate Patent Litigation, the Federal Circuit
affirmed the district court’s summary judgment that the patent at is1276
Plaintiffs
sue was invalid for obviousness-type double patenting.
(collectively, “Astra”) sued for infringement of its patent on pharmaceutical compositions containing metoprolol succinate, a pharmaceutical used to treat angina, hypertension, and congestive heart fail1277
ure.
(Astra’s second patent was not at issue in this portion of the
1278
appeal. ) Construction of the ‘154 patent’s single claim was not
disputed, so the district court proceeded to compare the ‘154 patent
to claim 8 of Astra’s earlier ‘318 patent (U.S. Patent No. 4,780,318),
which claimed an oral composition having a core of metoprolol suc1279
cinate surrounded by two controlled-release layers.
The district
court concluded that the ‘154 patent claimed a patentably indistinct

1269. Biomedino, 490 F.3d at 953, 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1123 (citing Med. Instrumentation, 344 F.3d at 1212, 68 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1269).
1270. Id., 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1123.
1271. Id., 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1123.
1272. In re Metoprolol Succinate Patent Litig., 494 F.3d 1011, 1016, 83 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1545, 1548 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
1273. Id., 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1548.
1274. Id., 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1548.
1275. Metoprolol, 494 F.3d 1011, 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1545.
1276. Id. at 1016, 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1548.
1277. Id. at 1013, 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1545.
1278. Id. at 1014, 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1546–47. The district court also found
both patents unenforceable due to inequitable conduct. Id. at 1015, 83 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) at 1547. Astra appealed that decision as well, which is discussed infra Part V.
1279. Id. at 1016, 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1548.
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genus of the species claimed by the earlier-issued ‘318 patent and en1280
Astra appealed.
tered summary judgment of invalidity.
The majority of the Federal Circuit panel, over Judge Schall’s dissent, affirmed the district court’s summary judgment of obviousness1281
type double patenting.
The court rejected as irrelevant Astra’s
“semantic distinction” that the ‘154 and ‘318 patents were not in a
genus/species relationship but an element/combination relation1282
ship.
The Federal Circuit then affirmed that it would have been
obvious to omit the outer layers in claim 8 of the ‘318 patent and
produce the metoprolol succinate compound claimed in the ‘154
patent because “the omission of the known elements from the composition . . . is ‘the product not of innovation but of ordinary skill and
1283
common sense.’”
Allowing the inventors to patent the drug itself
after having patented a combination of the drug with a carrier would
unlawfully extend the first patent and deprive the public of the use of
1284
the drug beyond the allowed term of the earlier patent.
Accordingly, the Federal Circuit affirmed the district court’s holding that the
1285
‘154 patent was invalid for obviousness-type double patenting.
In so holding, the Federal Circuit agreed with Astra that a patent
cited in support of a double-patenting rejection cannot be used as
“prior art” for a § 102 or § 103 rejection, but stated the “critical” focus
of a double-patenting analysis is on “what is claimed, as opposed to
1286
what is disclosed to one skilled in the art.”
Moreover, the scope of
double-patenting is not limited to § 101’s statutory prohibition
1287
against claims to the same invention.
That prohibition, the court
explained, could be easily circumvented by drafting claims that varied
1288
only slightly from the earlier patent.
Judge Schall dissented, finding that the ‘154 patent was “patentably
distinct” because it “lack[ed] any semblance to the second two elements [(the inner and outer layers)] in the three-element composi1289
tion of claim 8” of the ‘318 patent.
Also, since metoprolol succinate was only one of the eleven possible compounds recited in claim
1280. Id. at 1013, 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1546.
1281. Id., 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1546.
1282. Id. at 1016-17, 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1548–49.
1283. Id. at 1017 n.2, 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1549 n.2 (quoting KSR Int’l Co. v.
Teleflex Inc., 127 S. Ct. 1727, 1742, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1385, 1397 (2007)).
1284. Id. at 1017–18, 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1549.
1285. Id. at 1020, 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1551.
1286. Id. at 1018, 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1548 (citing Gen. Foods Corp. v. Studiengesellschaft Kohle mbH, 972 F.2d 1272, 1281-82, 23 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1839,
1846–47 (Fed. Cir. 1992)).
1287. Id., 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1550.
1288. Id. at 1018–19, 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1550.
1289. Id. at 1023, 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1553 (Shall, J., dissenting).
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8, Judge Schall did not believe that claim 8 was equivalent to the
claim for metoprolol succinate in the ‘154 patent or rendered that
1290
The law of double patenting, he wrote, does not inclaim obvious.
validate a claim “simply because a later claimed element is set forth in
1291
an earlier claim to a combination.”
IV. INFRINGEMENT
“[W]hoever without authority makes, uses, offers to sell, or sells any
patented invention, within the United States or imports into the
United States any patented invention during the term of the patent
1292
therefor, infringes the patent.”
Determining patent infringement
“entails two steps: (1) the claims must be construed; and (2) the
properly construed claims must be compared to the allegedly infring1293
ing device.”
A. Claim Construction
“It is a ‘bedrock principle’ of patent law that ‘the claims of a patent
define the invention to which the patentee is entitled the right to ex1294
clude.’”
Because the claims are the language the patentee chose to
define the invention, claim construction must begin and remain cen1295
tered on the language of the claims themselves.
The evidentiary
review is hierarchical, focusing first on the claims, then on the patent
specification, next on the file history, and finally on the “extrinsic”
1296
evidence if appropriate.
In determining the proper meaning of
claim terms, the patent specification “is always highly relevant to the

1290. Id. at 1021, 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1552.
1291. Id. at 1023, 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1553.
1292. 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2000).
1293. Loral Fairchild Corp. v. Sony Corp., 181 F.3d 1313, 1321, 50 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1865, 1869 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (citing Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc.,
52 F.3d 967, 976, 34 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 1321, 1326 (Fed. Cir. 1995), aff’d, 517 U.S. 370,
38 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1461 (1996)).
1294. Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1312, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1321, 1325
(Fed. Cir. 2005) (en banc) (quoting Innova/Pure Water, Inc. v. Safari Water Filtration Sys., Inc., 381 F.3d 1111, 1115, 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1001, 1004 (Fed. Cir.
2004)); see also Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc., 90 F.3d 1576, 1582, 39
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1573, 1576 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (noting that the words of the claim
itself are used to define the scope of the patent, and that the patentee “may choose
to be his own lexicographer and use terms in a manner other than their ordinary
meaning”).
1295. Innova/Pure Water, 381 F.3d at 1116, 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1004; see also
Brookhill-Wilk 1, LLC v. Intuitive Surgical, Inc., 334 F.3d 1294, 1298, 67 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1132, 1136 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (beginning its analysis of claim construction with
the claim language).
1296. E.g., Vitronics, 90 F.3d at 1582–83, 39 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1576–77.
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1297

claim construction analysis.”
It is typically dispositive; “it is the sin1298
The imporgle best guide to the meaning of a disputed term.”
tance of the specification in claim construction “derives from its statutory role. The close kinship between the written description and
the claims is enforced by the statutory requirement that the specification describe the claimed invention in ‘full, clear, concise, and exact
1299
terms.’”
It is therefore “entirely appropriate for a court, when
conducting claim construction, to rely heavily on the written descrip1300
tion for guidance as to the meaning of the claims.”
While the Federal Circuit has acknowledged the maxim that claims
should be construed to preserve their validity, the court has not applied that principle broadly and has not endorsed a regime in which
a validity analysis is conducted as a regular component of claim con1301
struction.
Instead, the Federal Circuit has limited the maxim to
cases in which “‘the court concludes, after applying all the available
1302
tools of claim construction, that the claim is still ambiguous.’”
1303
In Saunders Group, Inc. v. Comfortrac, Inc., the Federal Circuit rejected an interpretation of the claims that would preserve their valid1304
ity.
In pertinent part, the appeal focused on Saunders’ ‘690 patent
(U.S. Patent Number 6,899,690), which was a continuation of the
1305
The ‘174 patent
‘174 patent (U.S. Patent Number 6,506,174).
claimed a lumbar traction system having a pneumatic cylinder with at
least one pressure activated seal; claims 1 and 16 of the ‘690 patent
1306
had no such limitation.
The district court found that “‘[a]t the very least, the specification
and prosecution history . . . make claims 1 and 16 of the ‘690 patent
ambiguous as to whether the pneumatic cylinder must utilize at least
1297. Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1315, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1327.
1298. Id., 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1327.
1299. Id. at 1316, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1328 (quoting 35 U.S.C. § 112, para. 1
(2000)).
1300. Id. at 1317, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1329.
1301. Id. at 1327, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1336 (citing Nazomi Commc’ns, Inc. v.
Arm Holdings, PLC, 403 F.3d 1364, 1368–69, 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1458, 1461–62
(Fed. Cir. 2005)).
1302. Id., 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1337 (quoting Liebel-Flarsheim v. Medrad, Inc.,
358 F.3d 898, 911, 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1801, 1811 (Fed. Cir. 2004)); see also Generation II Orthotics Inc. v. Med. Tech. Inc., 263 F.3d 1356, 1365, 59 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1919, 1927 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (citing Rhine v. Casio, Inc., 183 F.3d 1342, 1345,
51 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1377, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 1999)) (“[C]laims can only be construed
to preserve their validity where the proposed claim construction is ‘practicable,’ is
based on sound claim construction principles, and does not revise or ignore the explicit language of the claims.”).
1303. 492 F.3d 1326, 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1225 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
1304. Id. at 1329, 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1226.
1305. Id., 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1226.
1306. Id. at 1329–30, 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1226–27.
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1307

one pressure activated seal.’”
The only pneumatic cylinder described in the specification had at least one pressure-activated seal,
according to the court, while “the inventors made clear that they did
not believe an ordinary O-ring seal would work in a device of the sort
1308
they claimed.”
Accordingly, the district court construed the claims
narrowly to preserve their validity because a broader construction
1309
would have rendered the claims invalid for lack of enablement.
The Federal Circuit reversed and found that it was error for the district court to consider the possible invalidity of the broader claims as
1310
a basis for construing them narrowly.
In particular, the Federal
Circuit stated, “[t]hat is not to say that we reject the district court’s
validity analysis; we hold only that the court’s validity analysis cannot
1311
be used as basis for adopting a narrow construction of the claims.”
Instead, any invalidity defenses “the defendants [may] have preserved
1312
and wish[ed] to press [could] be addressed on remand.”
When construing a patent’s claims, a court must begin by
“look[ing] to the words of the claims themselves . . . to define the
1313
scope of the patented invention.”
“In some cases, the ordinary
meaning of claim language as understood by a person of skill in the
art may be readily apparent even to lay judges, and claim construction in such cases involves little more than the application of the
1314
widely accepted meaning of commonly understood words.”
1315
Acumed sued Stryker for inIn Acumed LLC v. Stryker Corp.,
fringement of a patent on “an orthopedic nail for treatment of frac1316
tures in the humerus.”
Stryker argued on appeal that the district
court had erred in construing the term “curved shank” to mean a
shank having “a bend or deviation from a straight line without sharp
1317
corners or sharp angles.”
Stryker argued that the term “curved”

1307. Id. at 1335, 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1231.
1308. Id., 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1231.
1309. Id., 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1231 (citing Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d
1303, 1326, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1321, 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2005)).
1310. Id., 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1231.
1311. Id., 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1231.
1312. Id., 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1231 (citing Liebel-Flarsheim Co. v. Medrad,
Inc., 481 F.3d 1371, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1113 (Fed. Cir. 2007)).
1313. Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc., 90 F.3d 1576, 1582, 39 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1573, 1576 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
1314. Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1314, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1321, 1327
(Fed. Cir. 2005) (citing Brown v. 3M, 265 F.3d 1349, 1352, 60 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1375, 1377 (Fed. Cir. 2001)).
1315. 483 F.3d 800, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1481 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
1316. Id. at 802–03, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1482.
1317. Id. at 804, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1483–84.
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1318

should not be afforded its ordinary meaning.
Instead, Stryker asserted that the patent specification implicitly assigned the term a
more narrow meaning as “a nonangular continuous bend,” which
covered only embodiments having a curvature that allowed them to
be inserted into a broached hole without bends or small radius
1319
The majority disagreed, stating that Stryker’s “assertion is
curves.
flawed: it is an attempt to import a feature from a preferred em1320
bodiment into the claims.”
The Federal Circuit similarly rejected Stryker’s argument that the
term “transverse holes” should be limited to holes that are perpendicular to the nail shaft, and exclude holes that are tilted so that one
1321
end of the hole is vertically offset from the other end.
According
to the majority, once again Stryker was improperly trying to read into
the claims a limitation from the preferred embodiments, all of which
featured the transverse holes as going perpendicularly through the
1322
shaft.
Quoting Phillips v. AWH Corp., the Federal Circuit stated
“‘[a]lthough the specification often describes very specific embodiments of the invention, we have repeatedly warned against confining
1323
the claims to those embodiments.’”
The majority concluded that
the district court had properly defined “transverse holes” to mean
1324
“holes across the butt portion of the nail.”
Judge Moore disagreed with the majority’s construction of the term
1325
“transverse holes.”
Judge Moore believed the district court had
improperly begun its construction with the dictionary and construed
the claim term in accord with the broader of “two definitions for the
term ‘transverse’: ‘(1) acting, lying, or being across: set crosswise;
(2) made at right angles to the anterior-posterior axis of the
1326
body.’”
According to Judge Moore, “the patentee used the two
words to clearly specify which of the definitions of transverse applied
to his invention; the purpose of using the word ‘perpendicular’ was
to further describe what the inventor meant by the term ‘transverse,’
1327
not to distinguish it as the majority suggests.”

1318. Id. at 805, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1484.
1319. Id. at 804, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1484.
1320. Id. at 805, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1485.
1321. Id. at 803, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1483.
1322. Id. at 807, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1486.
1323. Id., 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1486 (quoting Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d
1303, 1323, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1321, 1334 (Fed. Cir. 2005)).
1324. Id., 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1486.
1325. Id. at 812–18, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1490-95 (Moore, J., dissenting).
1326. Id. at 813, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1490.
1327. Id., 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1491.
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In Foremost in Packaging Systems, Inc. v. Cold Chain Technologies,
1328
Inc., the Federal Circuit relied on the claims themselves to affirm
the district court’s claim construction and non-infringement find1329
ing.
Specifically, in a patent directed to insulated containers, the
claims required that an “insulated block,” which extended from the
container cover, “slidably engage the coolant cavity, thereby the coolant and the insulated block together substantially filling the coolant
1330
cavity.”
The district court construed this term to require that the
container cover extend into the coolant cavities on the sides of the
device and concluded that the accused products did not infringe because their insulated blocks merely covered the coolant cavities but
1331
did not extend into them.
On appeal, the Federal Circuit rejected appellant Foremost’s argument that the term “slidably engage” did not require that the insu1332
lated block extend into the coolant cavities.
The court explained,
if the insulated block did not extend into the cavity then the block
and coolant “together” did not fill the cavity or “minimiz[e] air
1333
spaces within the cavities,” as required by the claims.
The court indicated that since “[o]ur interpretation of these claims rests upon
their language,” it did not need to analyze the specification or file
1334
history to any degree in its opinion.
The Federal Circuit thus affirmed the district court’s claim construction and summary judgment
1335
of non-infringement.
1336
Similarly, in In re Gabapentin Patent Litigation, the Federal Circuit
was not persuaded by the Appellees’ extensive reliance on the prosecution history to support their construction, particularly since the
claim language and specification provided a clear definition of the
1337
disputed claim term.
According to the court, “the plain language
of the claim supports the construction that the anion specifically is
1338
Accordingly, the court found the
derived from a mineral acid.”
“assertion that the claimed anion refer[ed] to total chloride ions or
anions from any source that is ‘capable of’ forming a mineral acid
1328.
1329.
1330.
1331.
1332.
1333.
1334.
1335.
1336.
1337.
1338.

485 F.3d 1153, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1606 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
Id. at 1154, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1607.
Id., 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1607.
Id., 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1607.
Id. at 1155–56, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1607–08.
Id. at 1156, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1608.
Id., 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1608.
Id., 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1608.
503 F.3d 1254, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1651 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
Id. at 1264, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1658.
Id. at 1263, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1658.
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[wa]s unsupported by the claim language.”
Moreover, if the patentees had “intended the anion to refer to any anion, regardless of its
source, the patentees could have simply claimed ‘anions’ and omitted
1340
the phrase ‘of a mineral acid.’”
The Federal Circuit further explained that “the construction adopted by the district court g[ave]
1341
Thus, in light
full meaning to every word of the entire claim term.”
of the Federal Circuit’s “review of the prosecution history, [it found]
no basis for reversing the district court’s construction,
1342
which . . . comport[ed] with the claim language and specification.”
In explaining the importance of referring to the specification in
determining and understanding the meaning and scope of a patent
claim, the Federal Circuit has stated that “the specification ‘is always
highly relevant to the claim construction analysis. Usually, it is dispositive; it is the single best guide to the meaning of a disputed
1343
term.’”
1344
In SafeTCare Manufacturing, Inc. v. Tele-Made, Inc.,
the Federal
Circuit found the specification dispositive in determining the inven1345
In particular, the Federal Circuit considered
tor’s intention.
whether a claimed motor that “exert[ed] a pushing force on said . . .
deck section” of a hospital bed included a motor that exerted a pulling force against a lift dog, or bracket, which caused the deck section
1346
to rotate upward.
The Federal Circuit rejected this broad construction of the claim because the patentee had repeatedly emphasized in the specification that its invention applied pushing forces,
not pulling forces, to the lift dogs and distinguished prior art beds
that exerted pulling forces on the structural members of the bed
1347
Based on the patentee’s clear disavowal of the use of pullframe.
ing forces, the appeals court affirmed the district court’s summary
judgment of non-infringement, both literally and under the doctrine
1348
of equivalents.
The court again focused on the importance of the specification in
1349
In re Buszard.
In this case, applicants attempting to patent “a flame
1339. Id., 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1657.
1340. Id., 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1657.
1341. Id., 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1658.
1342. Id. at 1264, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1658.
1343. Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1315, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1321, 1327
(Fed. Cir. 2005) (quoting Vitronics Corp. v. Conceptronic, Inc., 90 F.3d 1576, 1582,
39 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1573, 1577 (Fed. Cir. 1996)).
1344. 497 F.3d 1262, 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1618 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
1345. Id. at 1269, 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1623.
1346. Id., 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1622 (emphasis added).
1347. Id., 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1623.
1348. Id. at 1270–71, 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1624.
1349. 504 F.3d 1364, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1749 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
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retardant composition that produces a flexible polyurethane foam”
sought “review of the decision of the Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences holding all of the claims in the[ir] patent application un1350
patentable on the ground of anticipation.”
Particularly, “[t]he
Board held Buszard’s claims to be anticipated because the appellants
claimed reaction mixture includes any reaction mixture which pro1351
duces, at least ultimately, a flexible polyurethane foam.”
Buszard
argued “that his claims explicitly state[d] the requirement of a flexible polyurethane foam reaction mixture, and that this claim element
is not shown in the [cited] reference, thereby negating anticipa1352
tion.”
The Board interpreted the claim term “‘flexible polyurethane foam reaction mixture’ to mean ‘any reaction mixture which
1353
produces, at least ultimately, a flexible polyurethane foam.’”
Buszard argued that those “persons experienced in the field of polyurethane foams know that a flexible polyurethane foam reaction mixture is different from a rigid polyurethane foam reaction mixture,
and that this process limitation cannot be found in [the reference],
1354
no matter how broadly that reference is read.”
The Federal Circuit determined that Buszard’s specification and
claims specifically require a flexible polyurethane foam reaction mix1355
ture.
The court explained that “[n]o matter how broadly ‘flexible
foam reaction mixture’ is construed, it is not a rigid foam reaction
1356
mixture.”
Here, the reference “describes only a rigid foam reac1357
In dissent, Judge
tion mixture that produces a rigid product.”
Prost took a more stringent approach, stating “[i]t is the applicant[‘s]
1358
burden to precisely define the invention, not the PTO’s.”
According to Judge Prost, “courts examine the claims, the specification, the
prosecution history, and possibly extrinsic evidence—all in an effort
1359
to determine what the applicant regards as his invention.”
There is
no need to “engage in a guessing game during patent prosecution. If
a claim term is ambiguous or confusing, the applicant can (and
1350. Id. at 1365, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1749 (internal footnote omitted).
1351. Id. at 1366, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1750 (internal quotations omitted).
1352. Id., 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1750 (internal quotations omitted).
1353. Id. at 1367, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1751.
1354. Id., 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1751.
1355. Id., 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1751.
1356. Id., 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1751.
1357. Id., 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1751.
1358. Id. at 1369, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1753 (Prost, J., dissenting) (quoting In re
Morris, 127 F.3d 1048, 1056, 44 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1023, 1029 (Fed. Cir. 1997)).
1359. Id. at 1368, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1752 (internal quotations omitted) (citing Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1312, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1321, 1325
(Fed. Cir. 2005)).
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should) clarify it.”
Judge Prost continued, explaining that “if an
applicant wants a claim term to have a specific meaning, the applicant can either amend the claim to expressly convey the applicant’s
intended meaning or provide an express definition for the claim
1361
term in the specification.”
1362
In E-Pass Technologies, Inc. v. 3Com Corp., the Federal Circuit ultimately agreed with the district court that the specification made clear
1363
the construction of the term at issue.
The Federal Circuit affirmed
an order granting summary judgment that none of the multiple defendants (including Palm, Handspring, and Visa) infringed, either
literally or by equivalents, E-Pass’s patents on a method and device
1364
for simplifying the use of credit cards.
1365
This was the second appeal in this litigation.
In the earlier case,
which involved two of the defendants, the Federal Circuit had held
that the district court erred in its claim construction by limiting the
1366
term “card” to the “dimensions of a standard credit card.”
On remand, the district court again granted summary judgment of noninfringement as to all defendants, based on two independent
1367
grounds:
First, it held that even under a broader construction of “card,”
none of the accused devices could infringe the “electronic multifunction card” limitation. Second, it held that E-Pass had failed to
adduce sufficient evidence to support a finding that any of the defendants or their customers had practiced all of the steps of the
claimed method.1368
1369

E-Pass again appealed to the Federal Circuit.
On the second appeal, the Federal Circuit agreed with the district court, explaining as
follows: “By vacating, we signaled that, although the district court’s
prior decision rested upon erroneous grounds, a proper claim construction might support a judgment (summary or otherwise) in favor
1370
of either party . . . .”
The Federal Circuit agreed with the district
court that “the specification . . . ma[de] it clear that a ‘card,’ as used
1360. Id., 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1752.
1361. Id., 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1752 (citing In re Morris, 127 F.3d at 1054, 44
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1027-28; In re Yamamoto, 740 F.2d 1569, 1571–72, 222 U.S.P.Q.
(BNA) 934, 936–37 (Fed. Cir. 1984)).
1362. 473 F.3d 1213, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1385 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
1363. Id. at 1215, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1386.
1364. Id., 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1386.
1365. Id. at 1216, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1386–87.
1366. Id., 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1387 (internal quotation marks omitted).
1367. Id. at 1216–17, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1387.
1368. Id., 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1387 (internal citations omitted).
1369. Id., 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1387.
1370. Id. at 1218, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1388.
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1371

in the patent’s claims, is something a user will ‘carry about.’”
The
accused devices, however, had buttons, joysticks and keyboards,
1372
“Although not a precise restricwhich projected above the surface.
tion on size or portability, the attributes of being able to be ‘carried
about’ and of not having protruding buttons, keyboards, antennae,
indented display screens, or hinged covers are characteristics that a
complete claim construction of ‘card’ can be expected to em1373
brace.”
Accordingly, the Federal Circuit affirmed the district
1374
court’s ruling of no literal infringement.
The Federal Circuit also stated that it need not decide whether the
district court’s judgment as to the doctrine of equivalents could be
1375
sustained on other grounds.
To survive the defendants’ motions
for summary judgment, E-Pass had to “make a showing sufficient to
1376
establish the existence of [each] element essential to [its] case.”
Because most of the steps of the “method claim refer[red] to the
completed results of the prior step, E-Pass [had to] show that all of
1377
those steps were performed in order.”
E-Pass failed to meet its
burden because its evidence showed, at best, that the defendants
taught their customers to perform each step of the claimed method
1378
in isolation.
“Nowhere do the manual excerpts teach all of the
steps of the claimed method together, much less in the required or1379
der.”
1380
Verizon Services Corp. v. Vonage Holdings Corp. also turned on issues
1381
Vonage appealed from a jury verdict that
of claim construction.
1382
found that Vonage had infringed three of Verizon’s patents.
The
majority agreed with Verizon with respect to two patents and found
that Vonage was improperly attempting to read limitations from the

1371. Id. at 1219, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1389.
1372. Id. at 1220, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1390.
1373. Id. at 1219, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1389.
1374. Id. at 1220, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1390.
1375. Id. at 1220–21, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1390–91.
1376. Id. at 1222, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1391 (quoting Celotex Corp. v. Catrett,
477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986)).
1377. See id., 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1391 (citing Mantech Envtl. Corp. v. Hudson
Envtl. Servs., Inc., 152 F.3d 1368, 1376, 47 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1732, 1739 (Fed. Cir.
1998)) (holding that “the sequential nature of the claim steps is apparent from the
plain meaning of the claim language and nothing in the written description suggests
otherwise”).
1378. Id. at 1222–23, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1392.
1379. Id., 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1391.
1380. 503 F.3d 1295, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1609 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
1381. Id. at 1301, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1614.
1382. Id. at 1298, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1611.
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specification into the claims of two patents, when there was no valid
1383
basis to depart from the ordinary meanings of those terms.
With respect to a third patent, the majority agreed with Vonage
that the district court had construed the term “localized wireless
gateway system” too broadly by not limiting it to systems that operated
1384
within a “range of a few feet.”
The majority found that the patentees had limited their invention to short-range systems by unambiguously disavowing longer-range systems during prosecution of a related
1385
patent to overcome the prior art.
Interestingly, this disclaimer was
effective against the third patent even though it had been made after
1386
that patent had already issued.
Relying on Microsoft Corp. v. Multi1387
the court reiterated “that a statement made by the
Tech Systems,
patentee during prosecution history of a patent in the same family as
1388
the patent-in-suit can operate as a disclaimer.”
The majority also
found that the district court had erred in not limiting the claimed
“localized wireless gateway system” to systems that compress, decompress, and packetize voice signals because the “Disclosure of the Invention” portion of the specification described the “present inven1389
tion” as including that limitation.
“When a patent thus describes
the features of the ‘present invention’ as a whole, this description
1390
limits the scope of the invention,” the majority held.
In other cases, the Federal Circuit also examined the doctrine of
claim differentiation, which presumes that there is a difference in
claim meaning and scope when different words or phrases are used
1391
in separate claims.
To the extent that the absence of such difference in meaning and scope would make a claim superfluous, the doctrine of claim differentiation states the presumption that the differ1392
ence between claims is significant.
1383. Id., 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1611.
1384. Id. at 1306, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1617.
1385. Id., 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1617–18.
1386. Id., 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1617.
1387. 357 F.3d 1340, 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1815 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
1388. Verizon, 503 F.3d at 1306, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1617 (citing Microsoft Corp.,
357 F.3d at 1356–57, 69 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1828) (“To operate as a disclaimer, the
statement in the prosecution history must be clear and unambiguous, and constitute
a clear disavowal of scope.”).
1389. Id. at 1308, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1618.
1390. Id., 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1618 (citing Honeywell Int’l, Inc. v. ITT Indus.,
Inc., 452 F.3d 1312, 1318–19, 79 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1294, 1300-01 (Fed. Cir. 2006);
SciMed Life Sys., Inc. v. Advanced Cardiovascular Sys., Inc., 242 F.3d 1337, 1343, 58
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1059, 1064 (Fed. Cir. 2001)).
1391. E.g., D.M.I., Inc. v. Deere & Co., 755 F.2d 1570, 1574, 225 U.S.P.Q. (BNA)
236, 239 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
1392. Id., 225 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 239.

2008]

2007 PATENT LAW DECISIONS

961

1393

In Intamin, Ltd. v. Magnetar Technologies Corp., the Federal Circuit
vacated and remanded the district court’s summary judgment that
Magnetar did not infringe a patent directed to a magnetic braking
1394
system for amusement park rides.
Specifically, Intamin sued Magnetar for infringement of a patent that required, inter alia, “an intermediary disposed between adjacent pairs of [a] plurality of magnet
1395
elements.”
Magnetar moved for summary judgment of noninfringement on the basis that its brakes did not include the claimed
1396
The district court granted
“intermediary” or “conductive rail.”
Magnetar’s motion, based on its construction of the term “intermedi1397
ary” to require a non-magnetic structure.
The district court did
not rule, however, on whether there was infringement under the doc1398
1399
trine of equivalents.
The Federal Circuit, citing Phillips, reversed
1400
the district court claim construction of the term “intermediary.”
The Federal Circuit found that “the term ‘intermediary’ can embrace
magnetic substances, albeit only if the additional term requirement
1401
of ‘alternating polarity’ allows for it.”
The court also concluded
that, pursuant to the doctrine of claim differentiation, claim 1 impliedly embraced non-magnetic intermediaries because dependent
1402
claim 2 required the intermediary to be magnetic.
Accordingly,
the Federal Circuit directed the district court to determine on remand “whether the patent limit[ed] the term ‘adjacent magnets of
alternating polarity’ to magnet’s of opposite polarity” and thus
whether Magnetar’s brakes infringed literally or under the doctrine
1403
of equivalents.
In contrast to the doctrine of claim differentiation, which assumes
that different words in different claims describe a separate invention,
the Federal Circuit will apply a “presumption that the same terms appearing in different portions of the claims should be given the same
meaning unless it is clear from the specification and prosecution history that the terms have different meanings at different portions of

1393.
1394.
1395.
1396.
1397.
1398.
1399.
2005).
1400.
1401.
1402.
1403.

483 F.3d 1328, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1545 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
Id. at 1339, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1552.
Id. at 1332, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1547.
Id., 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1547.
Id., 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1547–48.
Id. at 1337, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1551.
Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1321 (Fed. Cir.
Intamin, 483 F.3d at 1335, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1549.
Id., 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1550.
Id. at 1334-35, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1549.
Id. at 1335, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1550.
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1405

the claims.”
In PODS, Inc. v. Porta Stor, Inc., “Porta Stor argue[d]
that the district court erred in not construing the phrases ‘carrier
frame’ and ‘around’ in claim 29 to have the same meaning as they
undisputedly have in claim 1, namely a four-sided rectangular shaped
1406
frame that completely surrounds the container on all four sides.”
The Federal Circuit determined that because the parties agreed that
the structure described as a “carrier frame” in claim 1 is “a four-sided
or rectangular-shaped carrier frame” that surrounds the container on
1407
all sides, and PODS failed to provide evidence in the specification
or the prosecution history that the term “carrier frame” in claim 29
had a meaning different from the uncontested meaning in claim 1;
the term “carrier frame” in claim 29, as in claim 1, required “a four1408
sided or rectangular shape.”
Moreover, PODS had noted in its
brief that a claim that “recites a four-sided ‘carrier frame’ . . . placing
that four-sided carrier frame ‘around the container’ would result in
1409
‘all four sides’ of the carrier frame being ‘around’ the container.”
Based on that representation, the court construed the term “around”
1410
The court
to require the frame to be on all sides of the container.
found that under that claim construction, there was no infringe1411
ment.
In determining the breadth of a claim’s scope, the term “compris1412
ing” raises a presumption that the list of elements is nonexclusive.
However, the Federal Circuit has stated “‘[c]omprising’ is not a wea1413
In two cases,
sel word with which to abrogate claim limitations.”
the Federal Circuit reviewed the breadth of the term “comprising”
and in a third clarified the scope of the term “comprised of.”
1414
In Dippin’ Dots, Inc. v. Mosey,
the Federal Circuit limited the
1415
scope of the term “comprising.”
The claims at issue were directed
1404. Fin Control Sys. Pty, Ltd. v. OAM, Inc., 265 F.3d 1311, 1318, 60 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1203, 1208 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (citing Phonometrics, Inc. v. N. Telecom, Inc.,
133 F.3d 1459, 1465, 45 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1421, 1426 (Fed. Cir. 1998)); see also Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1314, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1327 (explaining that the usage of a
term in one claim can elucidate the meaning of the same term in other sections).
1405. 484 F.3d 1359, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1553 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
1406. Id. at 1366, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1558.
1407. Id., 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1558.
1408. Id. at 1367, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1558.
1409. Id., 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1558.
1410. Id., 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1558.
1411. Id., 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1558.
1412. Genentech, Inc. v. Chiron Corp., 112 F.3d 495, 501, 42 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1608, 1613 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
1413. Spectrum Int’l, Inc. v. Sterilite Corp., 164 F.3d 1372, 1380, 49 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1065, 1070 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
1414. Dippin’ Dots, Inc. v. Mosey, 476 F.3d 1337, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1633 (Fed.
Cir. 2007).
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to “[a] method of preparing and storing a free-flowing, frozen alimentary dairy product, comprising the steps of . . . freezing said drip1416
The Federal Circuit
ping alimentary composition into beads.”
found that the district court had properly interpreted the term
“beads” to mean “small frozen droplets . . . which have a smooth,
spherical (round or ball shaped) appearance” and rejected Dippin’
Dots’ argument that it could also include “irregular or odd shaped
1417
particles such as ‘popcorn.’”
Having failed on this issue, Dippin’
Dots tried to reach the same result by arguing that the claim should
be broadly construed to cover processes that produce some irregularly shaped particles because “comprising the steps of” in the pre1418
amble is a non-exclusive term.
The Federal Circuit was not persuaded, stating that although “comprising” does indicate that an
infringing process could practice other steps in addition to those recited in the claim, nonetheless those enumerated steps must all be
1419
practiced as recited in order for an accused process to infringe.
“The presumption raised by the term ‘comprising’ does not reach
into each of the six steps to render every word and phrase therein
open-ended—especially where, as here, the patentee has narrowly de1420
fined the claim term it now seeks to have broadened.”
The Federal
Circuit concluded that the district court had properly excluded from
1421
the claim processes that produce some irregularly shaped particles.
1422
In Bass Pro Trademarks, L.L.C. v. Cabela’s, Inc., Bass Pro tried to
use the term “comprising” to overcome limitations imputed on the
1423
claim by the prosecution.
In particular, Bass Pro stressed that the
use of “comprising” in claim 1 allowed the claim’s “combination vest
and pivotable seat member,” which phrase was added in response to a
rejection, to encompass “Cabela’s device that contain[ed] only a dorsal member and shoulder supports, and that it [wa]s incorrect to read
the claim as also requiring a vest, a term that appears in what Bass Pro
1424
designate[d] as a preamble.”
Cabela’s argued that “vest” is a sub1425
Castantive claim limitation, not merely a word of “preamble.”
1415. Id. at 1343, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1637 (citing Spectrum Int’l, 164 F.3d at
1380, 49 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1070).
1416. Id. at 1340, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1635.
1417. Id. at 1342–43, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1637.
1418. Id. at 1343, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1637.
1419. Id., 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1637.
1420. Id., 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1637.
1421. Id., 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1637.
1422. 485 F.3d 1364, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
1423. Id. at 1366–67, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1366.
1424. Id. at 1368–69, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1367–68.
1425. Id. at 1369, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1367.

964

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 57:821

bela’s also argued that the district court erred in ruling that the claim
did not require a full vest because the specification and claim described the invention as a “combination of a vest and a folding seat,
and that the prosecution history reinforces that the invention is more
than a ‘dorsal’ panel of fabric on the wearer’s back with shoulder
1426
The Federal Circuit agreed, and further found
support means.”
that the applicants had amended the claims during prosecution to
include a vest, and had “relied on the vest to distinguish the combina1427
tion from the [prior art].”
Therefore, Bass Pro’s argument that the
vest “adds nothing” to the claim was contrary to the claims, specifica1428
tion, and prosecution history.
Because the vest was a material part
of the claim, the Federal Circuit found the garment produced by Cabela’s did not infringe the claim and vacated the district court’s rul1429
ing.
1430
In CIAS, Inc. v. Alliance Gaming Corp., “[t]he district court found
that the meaning of ‘comprised of’ ha[d] not been clearly resolved in
patent-specific precedent, and therefore the court held that the ‘or1431
dinary and customary meaning’ should be used.”
In so ruling, the
court found that “‘comprised of’ does not have the same open-ended
meaning as ‘comprising,’ which also appears in [the claim at is1432
sue].”
Additionally, the court stated that
“comprised of” should be construed as a closed-end term that excludes the presence of all elements beyond those presented in the
“comprised of” clause. Thus the court defined “comprised of” as “a
limiting description of composition,” reasoning that “[t]his construction preserves the distinction between ‘comprised of’ and
‘comprising,’ the latter of which in fact is a patent term of art when
used in a transitional phrase . . . .”1433

The Federal Circuit reversed this ruling, stating that “[a]lthough
‘comprised of’ is not used as regularly as ‘comprising,’ and ‘comprised of’ is sometimes used other than as a ‘transition phrase,’ nonetheless it partakes of long-standing recognition as an open-ended
1434
According to the court, “[t]he usual and generally consisterm.”
tent meaning of ‘comprised of,’ when it is used as a transition phrase,
is, like ‘comprising,’ that the ensuing elements or steps are not limit1426.
1427.
1428.
1429.
1430.
1431.
1432.
1433.
1434.

Id., 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1367.
Id., 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1367.
Id., 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1367.
Id., 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1367.
504 F.3d 1356, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1737 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
Id. at 1359, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1740.
Id., 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1740.
Id. at 1359–60, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1740 (alteration in original).
Id. at 1360, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1740.
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ing. The conventional usage of ‘comprising’ generally also applies to
1435
‘comprised of.’”
The Federal Circuit turned to the precision of claimed logarithmic
1436
ranges in U.S. Philips Corp. v. Iwasaki Electric Co.
Philips argued on
appeal that the district court had erred in construing the term “be-6
-4
3
-6
-4
tween 10 and 10 µmol/mm ” to mean “between 1 x 10 and 1 x 10
3
µmol/mm ” because the term expresses a range of orders of magni1437
tude, not a range of more-precise numbers.
According to U.S. Philips, one of ordinary skill in the art of lamp
chemistry would understand ‘10-4’ to mean something different and
less precise than ‘1 x 10-4’; i.e., the absence of the coefficient (‘1’)
means that the term encompasses all values that are closer on a
logarithmic scale to 10-4 than to 10-5 or 10-3.1438

The Federal Circuit disagreed and affirmed the district court’s con1439
struction.
Even though the “upper and lower bounds of the
claimed range [were] expressed as powers of ten,” the Federal Circuit
found “no reason for treating them as anything other than the ordi1440
nary numbers they [were].”
As the district court had noted, the
phrase “‘a quantity between —— and ——’ . . . ‘implies a specific
range . . . . It does not imply a range between two values which are
1441
themselves ranges.”
Nonetheless, the court emphasized that the
endpoints of the claimed ranges “should not be read . . . with greater
1442
The court explained
precision than the claim language warrants.”
that, “in some specific contexts, [the number] ‘1’ represents a less
precise quantity than ‘1.0,’ and ‘1’ may encompass values such as 1.1
1443
-6
-4
that ‘1.0’ may not.”
As “‘10 ’ and ‘10 ’ are simply the numbers
0.000001 and 0.0001 expressed as powers of ten, the claim language
provide[d] no basis for inferring any level of precision beyond the
1444
single digit ‘1.’”
The use of power-of-ten quantities in the specification confirmed that the claims were not intended to express precise
1445
-x
quantities.
Thus, appellee’s assertion that “10 ” should be inter-

1435. Id., 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1740.
1436. 505 F.3d 1371, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1097 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
1437. Id. at 1376, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1100.
1438. Id., 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1100.
1439. Id., 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1101.
1440. Id., 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1101.
1441. Id., 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1101.
1442. Id., 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1102.
1443. Id., 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1102 (citing Viskase Corp. v. Am. Nat’l Can Co.,
261 F.3d 1316, 1320–21, 59 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1823, 1825 (Fed. Cir. 2001)).
1444. Id. at 1377, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1102.
1445. Id., 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1101.

966

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
-x

[Vol. 57:821
1446

preted to mean “1.0 x 10 ” was technically incorrect.
Rather, the
-x
claim simply referred to “1 x 10 ,” which is less precise than “1.0 x
x 1447
10 .”
Ortho-McNeil Pharmaceutical, Inc. v. Caraco Pharmaceutical Laboratories,
1448
Ltd. focused on the proper construction of the term “about 1:5” in
Ortho’s claim “to a pharmaceutical composition comprising certain
1449
weight ratios of two known drugs, tramadol and acetaminophen.”
The patent taught that the pharmacological effects of these compo1450
While
nents are synergistic when they are used in certain ratios.
Ortho found that the preferred ratios of tramadol to acetaminophen
are from about 1:19 to about 1:50, it also disclosed and claimed com1451
positions wherein the ratio is from about 1:1 to 1:5.
In claim 6 in
particular, Ortho recited a pharmaceutical composition with a ratio
1452
of tramodol to acetaminophen of about 1:5.
Ortho sued Caraco
for infringement of claim 6 after Caraco filed an ANDA for regulatory
approval to market a pharmaceutical composition containing these
1453
ingredients in a ratio of no less than 1:7.5.
On Caraco’s motion for summary judgment of non-infringement,
the district court interpreted “about 1:5” to mean “approximately 1:5,
encompassing a range of ratios no greater than 1:3.6 to 1:7.1,” based
on both intrinsic and extrinsic evidence, including opinions from Or1454
tho’s experts.
The district court held that Caraco’s product, which
had an average weight ratio of 1:8.67, did not infringe the claim at is1455
sue literally or by equivalents.
The Federal Circuit affirmed the district court’s grant of summary
judgment of non-infringement, agreeing with the district court that
the term “about 1:5” should be construed to mean “approximately
1:5, encompassing a range of ratios no greater than about 1:3.6 to
1456
1:7.1.”
The Federal Circuit focused on the fact that in some of the
claims, Ortho recited a single weight ratio, while in other claims it re1457
cited ranges of weight ratios.
Accordingly, the Federal Circuit
noted, “one of ordinary skill in the art would understand the inven1446. Id. at 1377–78, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1101–02.
1447. Id. at 1378, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1102.
1448. 476 F.3d 1321, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1427 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
1449. Id. at 1322–23, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1428 (“Both of these drugs are pain
relievers, i.e., analgesics.”).
1450. Id. at 1323, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1428.
1451. Id., 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1428.
1452. Id., 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1428.
1453. Id., 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1428.
1454. Id. at 1324, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1429.
1455. Id. at 1325, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1430.
1456. Id. at 1328, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1432 (internal quotations omitted).
1457. Id. at 1327–28, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1432.
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tors intended a range when they claimed one and something more
1458
Moreover, the court noted that the
precise when they did not.”
patentees, despite disclosing data points for ratios of 1:1, 1:3, 1:5,
1:5.7, and 1:15, chose to specifically claim ratios of 1:1 and 1:5 instead
of ratios in the “range of ‘about 1:1 to about 1:5’ or even a ratio range
1459
of ‘about 1:3 to about 1:5.’”
The Federal Circuit concluded that
the “dichotomy between the specific ratio of 1:5 and the broader ratio ranges of the other claims points to a narrow scope for the ‘about
1460
1:5’ limitation.”
In view of this construction, the Federal Circuit
agreed with the district court that there was no literal infringe1461
ment.
The court also agreed that there was no infringement under
the doctrine of equivalents, for to expand the weight ratio of “about
1.5” to encompass a composition having an average weight ratio of
1462
1:8.76 “would eviscerate the limitation.”
The Federal Circuit has further held that in addition to consulting
the specification, “a court should also consider the patent’s prosecu1463
tion history, if it is in evidence.”
The prosecution history, which is
“designated as part of the ‘intrinsic evidence,’ consists of the complete record of the proceedings before the PTO and includes the
1464
prior art cited during the examination of the patent.”
Much
“[l]ike the specification, the prosecution history provides evidence of
1465
how the PTO and the inventor understood the patent.”
1466
In Gillespie v. Dywidag Systems International, USA, the Federal Cir1467
In
cuit found that prosecution arguments limited the claim scope.
particular, the Federal Circuit held that a patentee was bound by limiting remarks made during prosecution, even if the distinction drawn
between the invention and the prior art was not material to the grant

1458. Id. at 1327, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1432.
1459. Id. at 1327–28, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1432.
1460. Id. at 1328, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1432.
1461. Id., 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1432.
1462. Id. at 1329–30, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1432.
1463. Phillips v. AWH Corp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1317, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1321, 1329
(Fed. Cir. 2005) (quoting Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d 967, 980,
34 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1321, 1330 (Fed. Cir. 1995)); see also Graham v. John Deere
Co., 383 U.S. 1, 33, 148 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 459, 473 (1966) (“[A]n invention is construed not only in the light of the claims, but also with reference to the file wrapper
or prosecution history in the Patent Office.”).
1464. Phillips, 415 F.3d at 1317, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1329.
1465. Id., 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1329 (citing Lemelson v. Gen. Mills, Inc., 968
F.2d 1202, 1206, 23 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1284, 1287 (Fed. Cir. 1992)) (determining
the meaning of a claim by closely examining claim language and prosecution history) (internal citation omitted).
1466. 501 F.3d 1285, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1051 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
1467. Id. at 1290, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1055.
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of the patent.
The patents at issue were directed to a mine roof
bolt having a drive collar with a hexagonal outer shape to engage the
1469
The examiner
driving mechanism of a mine roof bolting machine.
had rejected the original claims as obvious over a bolt-like rock an1470
chor that had a recessed head for accepting a rotational tool.
The
patentee distinguished his invention by arguing that the outer surface
of the prior art bolt was cylindrical and thus incapable of being
1471
driven by a mine roof bolting machine.
Nonetheless, Gillespie argued on appeal that its claims did not exclude the prior art structure
“because the [examiner’s] Reasons for Allowance did not depend on
1472
how the drive collar is rotated.”
1473
During prosecution,
The Federal Circuit rejected this argument.
Gillespie had clearly argued that the cylindrical outside surface of the
prior art “bolt head rendered it incapable of being driven by a mine
1474
roof bolting machine.”
The fact that the examiner had not mentioned this distinction in the Reasons for Allowance was not mate1475
rial.
A patentee is bound by what he declares during prosecution,
and thus Gillespie had disclaimed coverage of roof bolts having a cy1476
lindrical outer surface that could not be grasped by a drive tool.
Based on this construction, the Federal Circuit reversed the district
1477
court’s summary judgment of literal infringement.
1478
In contrast, in Elbex Video, Ltd. v. Sensormatic Electronics Corp., the
Federal Circuit majority found that the district court had erred in determining that the inventor’s remarks during prosecution limited the
claimed “receiving means for receiving said video signals and said 1st
code signals” to “a structure through which a video monitor receives
1479
According to the majority, the
the 1st code signal from a camera.”
statement in question was not a clear disavowal of other structures
because the applicants also referred to the receipt of the first code
signals by other receiving devices, statements that were “fully sup1480
ported” by the specification.
In contrast, the court found the
statement relied upon by the district court to be “unsupported by
1468.
1469.
1470.
1471.
1472.
1473.
1474.
1475.
1476.
1477.
1478.
1479.
1480.

Id. at 1291, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1055.
Id. at 1287, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1053–55.
Id. at 1290, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1054.
Id., 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1055.
Id., 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1054.
Id. at 1291, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1054.
Id., 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1055.
Id., 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1055.
Id., 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1055.
Id., 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1055.
508 F.3d 1366, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1137 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
Id. at 1369, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1138.
Id. at 1372, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1142.
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even a shred of evidence from the specification[,]” which “never suggests that the monitor of the receiving means receives the first code
1481
The court further noted that the accused infringer’s own
signals.”
expert had attested that if the statement in question were taken liter1482
ally, the claimed system would be “inoperable.”
The Federal Circuit concluded that the district court had based its summary judgment of non-infringement on this unduly narrow construction of
1483
“receiving means.”
Nonetheless, the court found independent
bases to affirm that two of the three accused systems did not infringe
1484
the claims.
District Judge Cote, sitting by designation, dissented,
finding “clear and unambiguous evidence” in the intrinsic record
that Elbex had made a strategic choice and unmistakably surren1485
dered receiving devices other than a “monitor.”
In her view, Elbex
was improperly attempting to recapture that which it had chosen to
1486
abandon during prosecution.
1487
In Andersen Corp. v. Fiber Composites, LLC, Anderson had four patents on composite materials made from polymers and wood fibers
(the “Group I” patents) and two patents on extruded members made
1488
from polymers and wood fibers (the “Group II” patents).
On
summary judgment, the district court found that Fiber Composites’s
products did not infringe the Group I products because the “‘composite compositions’ claimed in the Group I patents [were] limited to
materials . . . extruded to make pellets or the linear extrudate from
1489
However, the district court found that
which pellets can be cut.”
some Fiber Composite products infringed the Group II patents because the composite structural members of Group II were not limited
1490
to items made of the Group I composite compositions.
The Federal Circuit agreed with the district court’s construction of
the Group I claims, noting that “[t]he portions of the specification
that describe how the physical properties of the claimed composite
composition are obtained make clear that the formation of linear extrudates or pellets is not merely a preferred embodiment, but is a
1491
critical element in the process that produces those properties.”
1481.
1482.
1483.
1484.
1485.
1486.
1487.
1488.
1489.
1490.
1491.

Id., 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1141.
Id. at 1373, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1142.
Id. at 1375, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1144.
Id. at 1373–75, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1142–44.
Id. at 1376, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1144 (Cote, J., dissenting).
Id. at 1375, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1144.
474 F.3d 1361, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1545 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
Id. at 1364, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1547–48.
Id., 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1548.
Id., 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1548.
Id. at 1367, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1550.
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The Federal Circuit thus affirmed that Fiber Composite’s products
did not infringe the Group I patents because Fiber Composite did
1492
not use pellets or a linear extrudate introducing its products.
However, the Federal Circuit reversed with respect to the Group II
claims, finding that the claims were limited to structural members
made from pellets claimed in the Group I patents because Andersen
had distinguished the structural members from the prior art by relying heavily on the role of pelletization in fabricating the structural
1493
members.
In addition, the Federal Circuit found that the specifications of both groups of patents use language of “requirement”
rather than preference insofar as they stated that the composition of
the structural members required a pelletizing step and attributed the
desirable properties of the structural members to the nature of the
1494
pellets.
As a result, the court reversed the district court’s determi1495
nation of infringement with respect to the Group II claims.
B. Infringement
1.

Literal infringement
The determination of whether a claim of a patent is infringed requires a two-step analysis: first, the claims are construed to determine
their scope and meaning; second, the claims are compared to the ac1496
cused device or process.
Each element is considered to be material
and essential to the claim; thus, a finding of infringement requires
that each or every element or its equivalent be present in the accused
1497
device.
Dependent claims can be found infringed, literally or under the doctrine of equivalents, only if the claims from which they
1498
depend are infringed.
“It is axiomatic that dependent claims cannot be found infringed unless the claims from which they depend
1499
have been found to have been infringed.”

1492. Id. at 1376, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1558.
1493. Id. at 1372–74, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1557–58.
1494. Id. at 1373–74, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1557.
1495. Id. at 1374, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1557.
1496. E.g., Lockwood v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 107 F.3d 1565, 1573, 41 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1961, 1966 (Fed. Cir. 1997); Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 52 F.3d
967, 976, 34 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1321, 1326 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
1497. See, e.g., Laitram Corp. v. Rexnord, Inc., 939 F.2d 1533, 1535, 19 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1367, 1369–70 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (articulating how to establish infringement).
1498. See, e.g., Wahpeton Canvas Co. v. Frontier, Inc., 870 F.2d 1546, 1553, 10
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1201, 1207–08 (Fed. Cir. 1989) (reviewing the state of the law for
dependent claim infringement).
1499. Wahpeton Canvas, 870 F.2d at 1553 n.9, 10 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1208 n.9.
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In Z4 Technologies, Inc. v. Microsoft Corp., the Federal Circuit rejected Microsoft’s arguments that the district court had erred in de1501
The patent was directed to prenying JMOL of non-infringement.
venting software piracy by requiring users to submit registration
information in order to control the number of authorized copies that
1502
could be made.
The parties disputed the level of user interaction
1503
in the registration process required to infringe the claims.
Both
the district court and Federal Circuit found that even though the
specification and claims “clearly contemplate[] a user choice as to
whether registration will be automatic or manual,” the claims them1504
selves were silent as to the initiation of a registration process.
The
court found that “the claims require at least a minimal level of user
1505
interaction to select [‘automatic’] registration mode.”
Even
though the specification teaches that automatic registration is performed “without user intervention,” nothing in the claims or specification precludes user interaction in the selection or initialization of
1506
the automatic registration.
Thus, the Federal Circuit found that
“the district court correctly rejected Microsoft’s attempt to exclude
any user interaction from the claims” and affirmed its construction of
1507
this term.
The Federal Circuit elaborated that “even under Microsoft’s proposed construction, its sole non-infringement argument [was] artifi1508
cial at best.”
More precisely, Microsoft argued that “although the
accused products allow users to choose between [activation by]
Internet (i.e., automatic or electronic) or phone (i.e., manual),” selection of the Internet option means “nothing happens after that
manual choice until the user additionally manually presses the ‘next’
1509
button.”
Therefore, even under Microsoft’s construction, a reasonable juror could conclude that “manually press[ing] the ‘next’
1510
Therefore, the
button’ is merely part of the selection process.”
Federal Circuit affirmed the judgment of infringement with respect
1511
to those limitations.
1500.
1501.
1502.
1503.
1504.
1505.
1506.
1507.
1508.
1509.
1510.
1511.

507 F.3d 1340, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1340 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
Id. at 1351, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1348.
Id. at 1347, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1342.
Id. at 1350–51, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1347.
Id. at 1351, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1348 (alteration in original).
Id., 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1348.
Id., 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1348.
Id., 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1348 (emphasis removed).
Id., 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1348.
Id., 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1348.
Id., 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1348.
Id., 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1348.
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1512

In Monsanto Co. v. Syngenta Seeds, Inc., Monsanto appealed the
district court’s summary judgment ruling of non-infringement arguing that Syngenta infringed the asserted patents under 35 U.S.C.
1513
§ 271(a) or, in the alternative, under § 271(g).
The lower court
determined that “because Syngenta did not infringe the methods of
the independent claims, it could not infringe the methods of the as1514
serted dependent claims.”
Monsanto contended that, even if the
asserted claims of the patents were dependent, Syngenta should still
be liable for infringing them because it had performed each limita1515
tion of the independent claims.
Alternatively, Monsanto also contended that, even if the asserted claims of the patents were dependent claims, “Syngenta should still be liable for infringing them,
because Syngenta infringes any ‘four-step’ claimed process by completing the last step of ‘obtaining progeny’ during the patent
1516
term.”
The Federal Circuit was not persuaded. Relying on Wahpeton Can1517
vas Co. v. Frontier, Inc., the court stated Monsanto’s argument “can1518
The Federal Circuit quoted Wahpeton as follows:
not prevail.”
“One may infringe an independent claim and not infringe a claim
dependent on that claim. The reverse is not true. One who does not
infringe an independent claim cannot infringe a claim dependent on
1519
(and thus containing all the limitations of) that claim.”
1520
addressed “the proper
BMC Resources, Inc. v. Paymentech, L.P.
standard for [determining] joint infringement by multiple parties of
1512. 503 F.3d 1352, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1705 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
1513. Id. at 1354, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1706. For the text of § 271(a), see infra
text accompanying note 1527. Section 271(g) states:
Whoever without authority imports into the United States or offers to sell,
sells, or uses within the United States a product which is made by a process
patented in the United States shall be liable as an infringer, if the importation, offer to sell, sale, or use of the product occurs during the term of such
process patent. In an action for infringement of a process patent, no remedy
may be granted for infringement on account of the noncommercial use or
retail sale of a product unless there is no adequate remedy under this title
for infringement on account of the importation or other use, offer to sell, or
sale of that product. A product which is made by a patented process will, for
purposes of this title, not be considered to be so made after—
(1) it is materially changed by subsequent processes; or
(2) it becomes a trivial and nonessential component of another product.
35 U.S.C. § 274(g) (2000).
1514. Monsanto, 503 F.3d at 1359, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1709.
1515. Id., 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1709.
1516. Id., 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1709.
1517. 870 F.2d 1546, 10 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1201 (Fed. Cir. 1989).
1518. Monsanto, 503 F.3d at 1359, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1709–10.
1519. Id., 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1710 (quoting Wahpeton Canvas, 870 F.2d at 1552
n.9, 10 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1211 n.9).
1520. 498 F.3d 1373, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1545 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
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1521

a single claim.”
BMC Resources (“BMC”) appealed the district
court’s summary judgment that Paymentech did not infringe two
BMC patents because it did not perform all of the steps of the as1522
serted method claims.
Interestingly, the parties did not dispute
that Paymentech did not perform every step of the claimed method,
and that certain third-party financial institutions performed the other
1523
steps.
Paymentech could not be held liable for indirect infringement, the court explained, because there was no showing that “some
party amongst the accused actors has committed the entire act of di1524
rect infringement.”
Paymentech and the third parties collectively
practiced all of the claimed steps, but none of them practiced all the
1525
steps individually.
The Federal Circuit also examined whether Paymentech may be li1526
able for direct infringement under 35 U.S.C. § 271(a).
Section
271(a) states: “Except as otherwise provided in this title, whoever
without authority makes, uses, offers to sell, or sells any patented invention, within the United States or imports into the United States
any patented invention during the term of the patent therefor, in1527
fringes the patent.”
The court determined Paymentech could not
be held liable as a direct infringer because it did not perform all the
1528
Consequently, Paymentech could be held liable for
claimed steps.
infringement only if it were vicariously liable for the acts of the third
1529
parties if Paymentech “controlled the conduct of the acting party.”
The Federal Circuit explained that “[i]n the context of patent infringement, a defendant cannot thus avoid liability for direct infringement by having someone else carry out one or more of the
1530
claimed steps on its behalf.”
The Federal Circuit, however, found no evidence of a contractual
or other relationship between Paymentech and the third-party finan-

1521. Id. at 1378, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1548.
1522. Id. at 1375–78, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1546–48.
1523. Id. at 1378, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1548.
1524. Id. at 1379–80, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1548 (citing Dynacore Holdings
Corp. v. U.S. Philips Corp., 363 F.3d 1263, 1272, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1369, 1376
(Fed. Cir. 2004)).
1525. Id. at 1375–78, 1381, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1545–47, 1550–51.
1526. Id. at 1378, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1548.
1527. 35 U.S.C. § 271(a) (2000).
1528. BMC Resources, 498 F.3d at 1379, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1549 (citing Cross
Med. Prods., Inc. v. Medtronic Sofamor Danek, Inc., 424 F.3d 1293, 1311, 76
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1662, 1676 (Fed. Cir. 2005); Fromson v. Advance Offset Plate,
Inc., 720 F.2d 1565, 1568, 219 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 1137, 1139 (Fed. Cir. 1983)).
1529. Id., 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1548.
1530. Id., 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1548.
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1531

cial institutions.
“Without this direction or control of both the
debit networks and the financial institutions, Paymentech did not
perform or cause to be performed each and every element of the
1532
claims.”
None of the financial institutions, debit networks, payment services provider, or Paymentech, bore responsibility for any
1533
“Because the record contain[ed]
the actions of the other parties.
no basis to hold Paymentech vicariously responsible for the actions of
the unrelated parties who carried out the other steps, [the Federal
1534
Circuit] affirm[ed] the finding of non-infringement.”
2.

Induced infringement
In order to prevail on an inducement claim, the patentee must establish “first that there has been direct infringement, and second that
the alleged infringer knowingly induced infringement and possessed
1535
specific intent to encourage another’s infringement.”
Specific intent requires a “showing that the alleged infringer’s actions induced
infringing acts and that he knew or should have known his actions
1536
would induce actual infringements.”
1537
In ACCO Brands, Inc. v. ABA Locks Manufacturer Co., Belkin Components (“Belkin”) appealed from the judgment of the district court
1538
following a jury verdict that Belkin willfully induced infringement.
Belkin also appealed from the court’s denial of JMOL that the patent
was invalid and unenforceable, its grant of enhanced damages and
1539
attorney fees, and its claim construction order.
The Federal Circuit determined that the verdict of direct infringement was not sup1540
ported by “substantial evidence.”
The court reversed the district
court’s judgment of infringement and inducement and vacated the
court’s judgment with respect to willfulness, enhanced damages, and
1541
attorney fees.
The parties did not dispute that the accused device could “be operated in either of two modes—the infringing Dornfeld method or
1531. Id. at 1381–82, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1550.
1532. Id. at 1382, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1550.
1533. Id. at 1381–82, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1550.
1534. Id. at 1375, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1545.
1535. Minn. Mining & Mfg. Co. v. Chemque, Inc., 303 F.3d 1294, 1304–05, 64
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1270, 1276–77 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (internal citation omitted).
1536. DSU Med. Corp. v. JMS Co., 471 F.3d 1293, 1304, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1238,
1246 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (en banc in relevant part) (internal quotations omitted) (quoting Manville Sales Corp. v. Paramount Sys., Inc., 917 F.2d 544, 554, 16 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1587, 1594 (Fed. Cir. 1990)).
1537. 501 F.3d 1307, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1267 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
1538. Id. at 1309, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1268.
1539. Id., 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1268.
1540. Id., 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1268.
1541. Id., 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1268.
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1542

the non-infringing press-to-lock method.”
The Federal Circuit
stated that in order to prove direct infringement, ACCO “must either
point to specific instances of direct infringement or show that the ac1543
cused device necessarily infringes the patent in suit.”
ACCO contended that the jury was entitled to accept its expert’s testimony that
all users of the key lock would use it in an infringing manner at least
1544
some of the time.
The Federal Circuit was not persuaded, explaining that “[b]ecause the accused device can be used at any given time
in a noninfringing manner,” it did not necessarily infringe the pat1545
ent.
Moreover, the Federal Circuit was not convinced by ACCO’s reli1546
ance on Hilgraeve Corp. v. Symantec Corp., which held “that an accused device may be found to infringe a product claim ‘if it is reasonably capable of satisfying the claim limitations, even though it may
1547
also be capable of non-infringing modes of operation.’”
According
to the court, that broad legal statement did not alter ACCO’s need to
prove specific instances of direct infringement or that the accused
1548
device necessarily infringes the patent in suit.
“Hypothetical instances of direct infringement are insufficient to establish vicarious
1549
liability or indirect infringement.”
Quoting Dynacore Holdings Corp.
1550
v. U.S. Phillips Corp., the court stated “[t]he mere sale of a product
capable of substantial non-infringing uses does not constitute indirect
1551
infringement of a patent.”
1552
In Wechsler v. Macke International Trade, Inc., the Federal Circuit
examined when the sole shareholder of an inducing corporation can
1553
be held personally liable for infringement.
The defendant in this
case was the founder, president, sole stockholder, and sole employee
of Macke International Trade, Inc. (“Macke”), which developed,

1542. Id. at 1313, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1270.
1543. Id., 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1270 (citing Dynacore Holdings Corp. v. U.S.
Phillips Corp., 363 F.3d 1263, 1275–76, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1369, 1378 (Fed. Cir.
2004)).
1544. Id. at 1312, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1270.
1545. Id. at 1313, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1270.
1546. 265 F.3d 1336, 60 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1291 (Fed. Cir. 2001).
1547. Id. at 1343, 60 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1296, quoted in ACCO Brands, 501 F.3d at
1313, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1271.
1548. ACCO Brands, 501 F.3d at 1313, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1271.
1549. Id., 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1271.
1550. 363 F.3d 1263, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
1551. ACCO Brands, 501 F.3d at 1313–14, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1271 (quoting
Dynacore, 363 F.3d at 1275, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1378) (alteration in original).
1552. 486 F.3d 1286, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1742 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
1553. Id. at 1289, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1743.
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1554

manufactured, and marketed pet products.
While prosecuting a
patent application for a portable water dispensing device for pets
(called “Handi-Drink”), the owner learned of another patent (the
1555
“‘592 patent”) on a similar device.
After negotiations for a license
proved unsuccessful, the patentee, Wechsler, sued Macke and its
1556
Defendants subsequently redesigned the
owner for infringement.
Handi-Drink device but kept the original Handi-Drink on the market
1557
for another year.
The jury found that the defendants had willfully infringed the ‘592
1558
patent but the owner was not personally liable for inducement.
The district court found these verdicts “inconsistent and unreasonable” because the company could not act independently of its
1559
owner.
In an attempt to reconcile these two verdicts, the district
court essentially discarded the verdict finding the owner not person1560
The owner appealed and the Federal Circuit really liable.
1561
versed.
The Federal Circuit explained that “[u]nless the corporate structure is a sham, . . . personal liability for inducement must be sup1562
ported by evidence of personal culpability.”
This requires a showing that the officer possessed “a specific intent to ‘aid and abet’ the
1563
Willful infringement, however, considers “whether
infringement.”
the infringer had a good faith belief that the patent was invalid
1564
and/or not infringed.”
The two standards are different, the court
1565
For example, if a corporate officer negligently believed a
stated.
patent was invalid or not infringed, the corporation may be liable for
1566
willful infringement but not the officer.
The Federal Circuit con-

1554. Id., 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1743.
1555. Id., 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1743–44.
1556. Id. at 1289–90, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1744.
1557. Id. at 1290, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1744.
1558. Id., 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1744.
1559. Id. at 1292, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1746.
1560. Id. at 1291, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1745.
1561. Id. at 1289, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1743.
1562. Id. at 1292, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1745 (citing Hoover Group, Inc. v. Custom Metalcraft, Inc., 84 F.3d 1408, 1412, 38 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1860, 1862 (Fed. Cir.
1996)).
1563. Id., 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1745 (citing Water Techs. Corp. v. Calco, Ltd.,
850 F.2d 660, 668, 7 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1097, 1103 (Fed. Cir. 1988)).
1564. Id., 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1745 (citing SRI Int’l, Inc. v. Advanced Tech.
Labs., Inc., 127 F.3d 1462, 1464, 44 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1422, 1423–24 (Fed. Cir.
1997)).
1565. Id., 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1745.
1566. Id., 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1745 (citing Biotec Biologische Naturverpackungen GmbH & Co. KG v. Biocorp, Inc., 249 F.3d 1341, 1356, 58 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1737, 1747 (Fed. Cir. 2001)).
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cluded that the district court had erred in finding the two verdicts in1567
consistent and reinstated the jury’s original verdicts.
3.

Contributory infringement
Section 271(c) of the Patent Act provides, in pertinent part, that a
contributory infringer is one who “offers to sell or sells within the
United States . . . a patented machine, manufacture, combination or
composition, or a material or apparatus for use in practicing a pat1568
Although that language describes various ways of
ented process.”
creating liability for contributory infringement, all of those descriptions refer to the sale of a product, not the sale or provision of a ser1569
vice.
Under the plain language of the statute, a service provider
that assists another in committing patent infringement may be subject to liability under § 271(b), for active inducement of infringe1570
ment, but not under § 271(c), for contributory infringement.
The legislative background of § 271(c) makes it clear that this interpretation is correct. Prior to the 1952 Patent Act, there was no
statute that defined contributory infringement. Instead, courts had
divided infringement into two categories: “‘direct infringement,’
which was the unauthorized making, using or selling of the patented
invention and ‘contributory infringement,’ which was any other activity where, although not technically making, using or selling, the defendant displayed sufficient culpability to be held liable as an in1571
fringer.”
The 1952 Act did not make a substantive change in the
law of contributory infringement, but it divided the judicially created
category of contributory infringement into two statutory subsections:
§ 271(b) (inducement of infringement) and § 271(c) (contributory
infringement). Section 271(c) in particular codified the most common type of pre-1952 contributory infringement cases, namely, those
in which a seller would sell a component that was not covered by the

1567. Id., 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1745.
1568. 35 U.S.C. § 271(c) (2000).
1569. In two recent decisions, the Federal Circuit restated that claims not tied to a
tangible medium are not patentable under 35 U.S.C. See generally In re Comiskey, 499
F.3d 1365, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1670 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (human-implemented arbitration process for legal documents); In re Nuijten, 500 F.3d 1346, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1495 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (electrical and electromagnetic signals containing digital watermarks).
1570. Compare § 271(b) (“Whoever actively induces infringement of a patent shall be
liable as an infringer.”) (emphasis added), with § 271(c) (“Whoever offers to sell or
sells . . . shall be liable as a contributory infringer.”).
1571. Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Bausch & Lomb, Inc., 909 F.2d 1464, 1469, 15
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1525, 1528 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
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claims of a patent but which did not have any other use except the
1572
claimed product or process.
1573
In PharmaStem Therapeutics, Inc. v. ViaCell, Inc., Pharmastem argued that defendants had contributorily infringed the patented
method because they did not themselves practice all of the claimed
1574
1575
steps.
The jury returned verdicts in favor of the patentee.
The
district court, however, entered JMOL reversing the jury’s verdict
with respect to contributory infringement because the defendants
could not be found liable under § 271(c) merely for providing a ser1576
vice to their customers.
The Federal Circuit affirmed the district court’s JMOL and rejected
PharmaStem’s argument that the defendants could still be held liable
1577
under § 271(c) for selling a service.
Not only are sales of services
excluded under § 271(c), but the Federal Circuit concluded that
there was no evidence that any of the defendants actually sold any
1578
products or services.
To the contrary, the evidence showed that
the defendants provided a service to donor families, for which the
families paid a fee, but “there was no sale of any sort by the defendants to transplanters or any fee paid by the transplanters to the de1579
fendants.”
“The defendants simply transferred the cord blood
units to designated transplanters upon direction from the fami1580
lies.”
Thus, the Federal Circuit determined, “such a transaction
did not constitute a ‘sale’ to a transplanter under any definition of
1581
Accordingly, the Federal Circuit upheld that porthe term ‘sale.’”
tion of the district court’s JMOL finding no contributory infringe1582
ment of the patent.
4.

Infringement under the doctrine of equivalents
The doctrine of equivalents was judicially created to “prevent[] the
pirating of the patentee’s invention in the absence of literal in1583
If a device
fringement when liability is nevertheless warranted.”
1572. Id. at 1469, 15 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1529.
1573. 491 F.3d 1342, 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1289 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
1574. Id. at 1346, 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1291.
1575. Id. at 1347, 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1291.
1576. Id., 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1291.
1577. Id. at 1347, 1355, 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1291, 1297.
1578. Id. at 1355, 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1297.
1579. Id. at 1359, 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1301.
1580. Id., 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1301.
1581. Id., 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1301.
1582. Id., 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1301.
1583. Miles Labs., Inc. v. Shandon, Inc., 997 F.2d 870, 876, 27 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1123, 1127 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (citing Hormone Research Found., Inc. v. Genentech,
Inc., 904 F.2d 1558, 1564, 15 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1039, 1044 (Fed. Cir. 1990)).
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does not literally infringe a patent, it may still be found to infringe
1584
Under this doctrine, a product
under the doctrine of equivalents.
that is not literally covered by the express terms of a patent claim may
nevertheless infringe if there is “equivalence” (i.e., an insubstantial
change) between the accused product and each and every element of
1585
the claimed invention.
Equivalency is determined by whether each limitation of a claim is
present literally or by equivalence in the accused product, and not by
1586
looking at the invention as a whole.
The context of the patent, the
prior art, and the particular circumstance of the case must all be con1587
sidered in determining equivalence.
If the accused device escapes
literal infringement solely because of some inconsequential or insubstantial change from the patented device, the doctrine of equivalents
1588
may be applied to find the accused device infringing.
To be a
“substantial equivalent,” the element substituted in the accused device for the element set forth in the claim must not be such as would
substantially change the way in which the function of the claimed in1589
vention is performed.
An objective standard is used to assess the substantiality of the dif1590
ferences between the claimed and accused products or processes.
For example, the tripartite “function-way-result” test may be applied,
which considers whether the accused product or process “performs
substantially the same function in substantially the same way to obtain
1591
[substantially] the same result.”
The “essential inquiry” of equivalence may also be determined by considering whether there are “insubstantial differences” between the claimed element and the ele-

1584. Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 21, 41
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1865, 1869 (1997).
1585. See Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Prods. Co., 339 U.S. 605, 609, 85
U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 328, 331 (1950) (“An important factor is whether persons reasonably
skilled in the art would have known of the interchangeability of an ingredient not
contained in the patent with one that was.”).
1586. See Warner-Jenkinson, 520 U.S. at 29, 41 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1871 (“Where a
claim to an invention is expressed as a combination of elements, as here, ‘equivalents’ in the sobriquet ‘Doctrine of Equivalents’ refers to the equivalency of an element or part of the invention with one that is substituted in the accused product or
process.”) (citation omitted).
1587. Graver Tank, 339 U.S. at 609, 85 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 330.
1588. Id. at 608, 85 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 330.
1589. See id., 85 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 330 (recognizing that “if two devices do the
same work in substantially the same way, and accomplish substantially the same result, they are the same”).
1590. Id., 85 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 330.
1591. Id., 85 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 330 (quoting Sanitary Refrigerator Co. v. Winters,
280 U.S. 30, 3 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 40 (1929)).
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1592

ment of the accused product.
“[A]nalysis of the role played by
each element in the context of the specific patent claim . . . inform[s]
the inquiry as to whether a substitute element matches the function,
way, and result of the claimed element, or whether the substitute
element plays a role substantially different from the claimed ele1593
Important factors include whether a person skilled in the
ment.”
1594
art would recognize the interchangeability of two elements.
Evidence of independent experimentation by the alleged infringer may
1595
be probative of such knowledge.
The doctrine of equivalents does not permit claim limitations to be
1596
ignored.
“It is . . . well settled that each element of a claim is material and essential, and that in order for a court to find infringement,
the plaintiff must show the presence of every element or its substan1597
tial equivalent in the accused device.”
For example, there can be
no infringement if the theory of equivalence would vitiate a claim
1598
1599
term.
This doctrine is known as the “all-elements rule.”
The issue of equivalents must therefore be tested on an element-by-element
1600
Thus, infringement
basis for each and every element of the claim.
by equivalents may only be found if each limitation in the claim is
found somewhere in the accused device, either literally or by equiva1601
lents.
Although the doctrine of equivalents must be applied to
every limitation in the claim, a one-to-one correspondence of claim
1602
limitations and components is not required.
So, for example, infringement may be found if two components of an accused device
perform the function of a single claim limitation, or if separate claim
limitations are combined into a single component of an accused de1603
vice.
1592. Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 19, 41
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1865, 1867 (1997).
1593. Id. at 40, 41 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1875.
1594. Id., 41 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1875.
1595. Id., 41 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1875.
1596. Pennwalt Corp. v. Durand-Wayland, Inc., 833 F.2d 931, 935, 4 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1737, 1740 (Fed. Cir. 1987).
1597. Id., 4 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1740 (alteration in original) (quoting Lemelson v.
United States, 752 F.2d 1538, 1551, 224 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 526, 533 (Fed. Cir. 1985)).
1598. See Wilson Sporting Goods Co. v. David Geoffrey & Assocs., 904 F.2d 677, 683,
14 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1942, 1948 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (examining alleged infringement
of a golf ball).
1599. Pennwalt, 833 F.2d at 949, 4 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1751–52.
1600. Id., 4 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1751.
1601. Athletic Alternatives v. Prince Mfg., Inc., 73 F.3d 1573, 1581–82, 37
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1365, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 1996); Pennwalt, 833 F.2d at 934–35, 4
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1739–40.
1602. Pennwalt, 833 F.2d at 946, 4 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1749.
1603. Dolly, Inc. v. Spalding & Evenflo Cos., 16 F.3d 394, 398, 29 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1767, 1770 (Fed. Cir. 1994).
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1604

Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co. came before the
Federal Circuit again in 2007. This time, the Federal Circuit examined the question of whether an equivalent was foreseeable within the
1605
meaning of Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co. and
thus subject to surrender under the doctrine of prosecution history
1606
The court concluded that “foreseeability does not reestoppel.
quire the applicant to be aware that a particular equivalent would satisfy the insubstantial differences test or the function/way/result test
1607
with respect to the claim as amended.”
According to the Federal
Circuit, Festo proffered no persuasive explanation as to why the function-way-result test applied to the claims, as amended, should be used
1608
to determine foreseeability.
The insubstantial differences test or
function-way-result test is devised “to determine whether the alternative is sufficiently close to the claimed feature that the patentee
should be able to capture the equivalent and bar its use by a competi1609
tor.”
It “is not designed to determine whether prosecution history
1610
estoppel applies as a result of a limiting amendment.”
The court warned that accepting Festo’s understanding of foreseeability would likely dispose of prosecution history estoppel as a con1611
straint on the doctrine of equivalents in most cases.
The Federal
Circuit determined that the issue is “not whether after the narrowing
amendment the alternative was a known equivalent, but rather
whether it was a known equivalent before the narrowing amend1612
ment.”
If the equivalent was known at the time of the amendment
in the pertinent prior art, “the applicant should not be able to recapture it simply by establishing that a property of the equivalent—
irrelevant to the broader claim before amendment—was relevant but
unknown with respect to the objectives of the narrower amended
1613
claim.”
Stated differently, “an equivalent that is foreseeable as an
alternative to the broader claimed feature does not become unfore1614
seeable simply because the claimed feature is narrowed.”
The
court stated the following as an example:
1604.
1605.
1606.
1607.
1608.
1609.
1610.
1611.
1612.
1613.
1614.

493 F.3d 1368, 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1385 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
535 U.S. 722, 740, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1705, 1713 (2002).
Festo, 493 F.3d at 1370, 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1386.
Id., 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1386.
Id. at 1380, 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1393.
Id., 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1393.
Id., 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1393.
Id., 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1393.
Id. at 1381, 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1394 (emphasis removed).
Id., 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1394.
Id., 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1394.
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[I]f a claim before amendment broadly claimed a metal filament
for a light bulb but was later amended to avoid prior art and to
specify metal A because of its longevity, the equivalent metal B,
known in the prior art to function as a bulb filament, is not unforeseeable even though its longevity was unknown at the time of
amendment.1615

Judge Newman dissented because “[f]oreseeability is determined as
1616
of the time of the application,” not at the time of the amendment.
Judge Newman stated that the majority had departed from precedent:
[T]his court has confounded the issue by creating a new and incorrect criterion for the measurement of “foreseeability,” the court
now holding that an existing structure need not be recognized, or
even recognizable, as an equivalent at the time of the patent application or amendment, in order to be “foreseeable” if it is later used
as an equivalent.1617

Judge Newman went on to express that “[t]he unforeseen does not
become foreseeable after someone later discovers it. If the prior art
does not support a finding of equivalency, the applicant cannot be
1618
charged with foreseeability of the equivalent.”
A patentee’s evidentiary burden under the doctrine of equivalents
1619
must be addressed on a limitation-by-limitation basis.
A fundamental principal in establishing infringement under the doctrine of
equivalents requires that a patentee must “provide particularized testimony and linking argument as to the ‘insubstantiality of the differences’ between the claimed invention and the accused device or
1620
process.”
Or, with respect to the function-way-result test, the patentee must meet the same burden when such evidence is presented
to support a finding of infringement under the doctrine of equiva1621
lents.
Since evidence must be presented on a limitation-bylimitation basis, “[g]eneralized testimony as to the overall similarity
between the claims and the accused infringer’s product or process
1622
will not suffice.”
1623
the Federal CirIn Aquatex Industries, Inc. v. Techniche Solutions,
cuit affirmed the district court’s summary judgment of no infringe1615. Id., 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1394.
1616. Id. at 1383, 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1396 (Newman, J., dissenting).
1617. Id., 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1395.
1618. Id. at 1385, 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1397.
1619. Tex. Instruments, Inc. v. Cypress Semiconductor Corp., 90 F.3d 1558, 1567,
39 U.S.Q.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1492, 1499 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
1620. Id., 39 U.S.Q.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1499.
1621. Id., 39 U.S.Q.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1499.
1622. Id., 39 U.S.Q.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1499.
1623. 479 F.3d 1320, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1865 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
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ment by equivalents due to the patentee’s failure to present evidence
1624
In particular,
sufficient to create a genuine issue of material fact.
the court found that AquaTex, in response to Techniche’s summary
judgment motion: (1) “provided no particularized testimony from an
expert or person skilled in the art that specifically addressed equivalents ‘on a limitation-by-limitation basis;’” (2) did not explain the “insubstantiality of the differences between the patented method and
the accused product;” and (3) did not address the function-way-result
1625
test.
The only evidence presented by AquaTex on the issue of
equivalents was the deposition testimony of Techniche’s Chief Execu1626
tive Officer, which was found to be inadequate on these points.
1627
Similarly, in Motionless Keyboard Co. v. Microsoft Corp., the Federal
Circuit found that “the accused . . . Sidewinder joysticks” did “not literally infringe” the Motionless patent because they “lack[ed] a con1628
cavity in the housing and a keyboard within the cavity.”
Neither
was there sufficient evidence of infringement under the doctrine of
equivalents, as Motionless had presented only conclusory statements
about equivalents, and not particularized evidence that connected
the accused products to the patent on a limitation-by-limitation ba1629
sis.
The Federal Circuit found Motionless’s conclusory statements
were inadequate to defeat a motion for summary judgment of noninfringement, which demands that the patentee present “particularized evidence and linking argument as to the ‘insubstantiality of the
differences’ between the claimed invention and the accused device,
1630
or with respect to the ‘function/way/result’ test.”
In contrast, the Federal Circuit found that expert testimony offered
1631
by Paice in Paice LLC v. Toyota Motor Corp. plainly satisfied the requirement that “a patentee . . . provide particularized testimony and linking argument . . . with respect to the function, way, result test when
such evidence is presented to support a finding of infringement un1632
der the doctrine of equivalents.”
In this case, the expert gave sub1624. Id. at 1323, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1866.
1625. Id. at 1329, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1871.
1626. Id., 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1871.
1627. 486 F.3d 1376, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1801 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
1628. Id. at 1381, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1804.
1629. See id. at 1382–83, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1805 (explaining that absent particularized evidence, a court cannot find infringement under the doctrine of equivalents).
1630. Id. at 1882, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1805 (citation omitted).
1631. 504 F.3d 1293, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1001 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
1632. Id. at 1304–05, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1009 (quoting Tex. Instruments Inc.
v. Cypress Semiconductor Corp., 90 F.3d 1558, 1567, 39 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1492,
1499 (Fed. Cir. 1996)).
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stantial testimony, which covered over seventy pages of transcript pertaining to the technology of the patents and the inner workings of
the vehicles’ transaxle units at issue before he began to discuss the
1633
topic of infringement.
“Prosecution history estoppel continues to be available as a defense
1634
Under this theory, statements, claim amendto infringement.”
ments, and arguments made during prosecution of a patent application can create an estoppel that prevents the patentee from recapturing subject matter through equivalents that was surrendered during
1635
prosecution.
In addition, concessions or positions taken to demonstrate patentability in view of the prior art may also create an es1636
Thus, estoppel can arise from arguments made by an aptoppel.
plicant to distinguish a prior art reference regardless of whether they
1637
are associated with claim amendments.
In addition, “the limits imposed by prosecution history estoppel on the permissible range of
1638
equivalents can be broader than those imposed by the prior art.”
Moreover, “[c]lear assertions made during prosecution in support of
patentability, whether or not actually required to secure allowance of
1639
the claim, may also create an estoppel.”
The Supreme Court has affirmed that “a narrowing amendment
made to satisfy any requirement of the Patent Act may give rise to an
1640
estoppel.”
The statutory requirements for patentability include
novelty (§ 102), nonobviousness (§ 103), patentable subject matter
(§§ 101, 102, 103, 112), utility (§ 101), written description (§ 112(1)),
1633. Id. at 1305, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1009–10.
1634. Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S. 17, 40, 41
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1865, 1876 (1997).
1635. See Loctite Corp. v. Ultraseal, Ltd., 781 F.2d 861, 870, 228 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 90,
96 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (explaining that prosecution history estoppel is judicially created
to provide liability when there is no actual infringement); see also Warner-Jenkinson,
520 U.S. at 30, 41 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1871 (noting that any surrender of material
precludes the patentee from using the doctrine of equivalents to recapture the subject matter); Southwall Techs., Inc. v. Cardinal IG Co., 54 F.3d 1570, 1580, 34
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1673, 1680 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (stating that the court must look into
the reason for a surrender of materials when applying prosecution history estoppel).
1636. Pall Corp. v. Micron Separations, Inc., 66 F.3d 1211, 1220, 36 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1225, 1231 (Fed. Cir. 1995).
1637. See Ekchian v. Home Depot, Inc., 104 F.3d 1299, 1304, 41 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1364, 1368–69 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (determining that prosecution history estoppel was
present from an argument that distinguished prior art presented in an information
disclosure statement); Hoganas AB v. Dresser Indus., Inc., 9 F.3d 948, 952–53, 28
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1936, 1939–40 (Fed. Cir. 1993) (finding prosecution history estoppel from an argument without an accompanying amendment made to distinguish
prior art).
1638. Southwall, 54 F.3d at 1581, 34 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1681.
1639. Id. at 1583, 34 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1682.
1640. Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co. (Festo VIII), 535 U.S.
722, 736, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1705, 1711–12 (2002).
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enablement (§ 112(1)), best mode disclosure (§ 112(1)) and defi1641
If the patentee is unable to explain the reason
niteness (§ 112(2)).
for amendment, the court should presume that the “patentee surrendered all subject matter between the broader and the narrower
1642
language” and find an estoppel.
Nonetheless, prosecution estoppel is not necessarily a complete
bar, for its effect requires a close examination of the subject matter
1643
surrendered.
An amendment is considered to disclaim “the terri1644
The Sutory between the original claim and the amended claim.”
preme Court has further clarified that because “language remains an
imperfect fit for invention . . . [t]here is no reason why a narrowing
amendment should be deemed to relinquish equivalents unforeseeable at the time of the amendment and beyond a fair interpretation
1645
of what was surrendered.”
The Supreme Court has indicated that
there are some cases where a particular equivalent has not been surrendered by the amendment, such as when the equivalent is “unforeseeable at the time of the application,” or when the rationale underlying the amendment bears “no more than a tangential relation to the
equivalent in question,” or if there is another “reason suggesting that
the patentee could not reasonably be expected to have described the
1646
insubstantial substitute in question.”
1647
In Hutchins v. Zoll Medical Corp., the Federal Circuit found that
the patentee was estopped from reading the term “general purpose
computer” to cover a RISC microprocessor because he had disclaimed that subject matter scope during prosecution in order to distinguish his invention from the prior art, which disclosed similar de1648
In particular, the
vices with dedicated microprocessor units.
patentee, representing himself pro se, had charged Zoll Medical
Corporation with infringing his ‘685 patent (United States Patent No.
1649
5,913,685) on “CPR Computer Aiding.”
All of the ‘685 claims required a “general purpose computer system,” which the parties
agreed should be defined as “a computer capable of running multiple unrelated programs, which are selected by the user and loaded
1641. Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 234 F.3d 558, 566–67,
56 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1865, 1870–71 (Fed. Cir. 2000), rev’d on other grounds, 535 U.S.
722, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1705 (2002).
1642. Festo VIII, 535 U.S. at 740, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1713.
1643. Id. at 741, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1714.
1644. Id. at 740, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1713.
1645. Id. at 738, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1712.
1646. Id. at 740–41, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1714.
1647. 492 F.3d 1377, 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1264 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
1648. Id. at 1381–82, 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1266–67.
1649. Id. at 1380, 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1266.
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1650

into the device.”
Zoll’s accused device contained a dedicated Hitachi SuperH RISC (Reduced Instruction Set Computer) microproc1651
The Federal Circuit agreed with the district court in finding
essor.
the term “general purpose computer” was added to Hutchins’ claims
during prosecution in order to differentiate the invention from prior
art that displayed similar devices with dedicated microprocessor
1652
units.
According to the court, “[t]his produced an estoppel against
reading the term ‘general purpose computer’ to include a dedicated
microprocessor such as a RISC, for the claims had been amended in
response to the PTO rejection, thereby estopping recovery of the
same subject matter that the claims had been amended to ex1653
The court also noted that the term “general purpose comclude.”
puter” was incorporated into every dependent claim because it was
1654
recited in each independent claim.
1655
In Ormco Corp. v. Align Technology, Inc., the Federal Circuit found
that although statements in the specification did not conclusively
limit the claims for forming “ideal dental archforms” to automatic
methods for determining final tooth positions, certain statements
made by the inventors during prosecution made that limitation
1656
clear.
Statements made during prosecution of a “parent” applica1657
In addition, the
tion can be binding on the “child” application.
Federal Circuit held that before a disclaimer can narrow claim scope,
there must be some relationship between the disclaimer and the af1658
fected claim.
Thus, the Federal Circuit proceeded to affirm the
1659
summary judgment of non-infringement.
District Judge Kathleen O’Malley, sitting by designation, chastised
the majority because “[p]rosecution disclaimer requires a patentee to
clearly and unmistakably disavow certain interpretations, and I find no
1660
such disavowal here.”
She continued:
Importantly, while the quotations lifted from the . . . patent history
do appear to support the majority’s conclusion that the process
contemplated in that potential invention was a highly automated
1650. Id. at 1381, 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1267.
1651. Id., 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1267.
1652. Id., 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1267.
1653. Id. at 1381–1382, 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1267.
1654. Id. at 1382, 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1267.
1655. 498 F.3d 1307, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1146 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
1656. Id. at 1314–15, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1151–52.
1657. Id. at 1315, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1151.
1658. Id. at 1313, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1150.
1659. Id. at 1317, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1154.
1660. Id. at 1325, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1159 (O’ Malley, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part) (citing SanDisk Corp. v. Memorex Prods., Inc., 415 F.3d 1278,
1287, 75 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1475, 1482 (Fed. Cir. 2005)).
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one, that language was proffered to the examiner in connection
with claims in that patent which do not share claim language with
the majority of the claims at issue in this suit.1661

Judge O’Malley thus dissented, finding that the patent claims did
1662
require a fully automated process.
1663
In Schwarz Pharma, Inc. v. Paddock Laboratories, Inc., the district
court determined that an estoppel was created when the applicants
amended their claims by replacing a “metal containing solubilizer”
and “an alkali or alkaline earth-metal salt” in the original claims with
“an alkali or alkaline earth metal carbonate” in order to overcome an
1664
Schwarz argued on appeal that a person
obviousness rejection.
skilled in the art would construe “metal containing stabilizer” and
“alkali or alkaline earth metal salt” in the original claims to include
only alkali or alkaline earth metal cations and carbonate, borate, or
1665
silicate anions, and not MgO.
Since MgO had never fallen within
the scope of the claims, there had been no disclaimer of composi1666
The
tions and processes involving MgO, according to Schwarz.
Federal Circuit disagreed.
The Federal Circuit determined that the alleged equivalent was
“clearly . . . within the territory between the language of the original
and the amended claims,” which gave rise to the presumption of sur1667
render.
Schwarz, however, had failed to rebut the presumption
that MgO was surrendered during prosecution as a foreseeable
equivalent of an alkali or alkaline earth metal carbonate because it
1668
was known in the art to use the alleged equivalent as a stabilizer.
The Federal Circuit explained that “‘an alternative is foreseeable if it
is known in the field of the invention as reflected in the claim scope
before amendment’ and that it would be inappropriate to apply an
insubstantial differences or function/way/result test in order to de1669
termine foreseeability.”
Since prosecution history estoppel barred
Schwarz from claiming the MgO as an equivalent, the Federal Circuit

1661. Id., 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1159–60.
1662. Id., 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1159–60.
1663. 504 F.3d 1371, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1900 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
1664. Id. at 1373, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1902.
1665. Id. at 1375, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1904.
1666. Id., 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1904.
1667. Id. at 1376–77, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1905.
1668. Id. at 1377, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1905.
1669. Id. at 1377, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1905 (quoting Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu
Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 493 F.3d 1368, 1379, 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1385, 1392
(Fed. Cir. 2007)).
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affirmed the district court’s summary judgment of non1670
infringement.
1671
Cross Medical Products, Inc. v. Medtronic Sofamor Danek, Inc. similarly involved Festo’s presumption that a patentee is estopped from recapturing subject matter surrendered during prosecution to obtain a
1672
patent.
Accused infringer Medtronic had replaced the threading
below the diameter of a rod with an undercut that did not engage any
1673
surface on the corresponding set screw.
The district court rejected
Medtronic’s argument that that limitation had been the subject of a
narrowing amendment by Cross Medical during prosecution of its
patent, and found instead that Cross Medical had successfully rebutted the Festo presumption by showing that the amendment bore no
1674
more than a tangential relationship to the equivalent structure.
The Federal Circuit disagreed, finding that Cross Medical did not satisfy its burden of overcoming the Festo presumption by showing either
that the amendment was only tangentially related to the limitation or
1675
that it was unforeseeable.
In particular, a patentee can rebut the
presumption of prosecution history estoppel only
by showing that the alleged equivalent was unforeseeable at the
time the amendment was made, that the alleged equivalent was
tangential to the purpose of the amendment, or that there was
some other reason suggesting that the patentee could not reasonably be expected to have described the insubstantial substitute in
question.1676

Judge Rader, in a concurrence, explained that the tangential relation criterion for overcoming the Festo presumption is very narrow:
In my view, the tangential rebuttal principle exacerbates the policy
deficiencies of the doctrine of equivalents. Upon invoking tangentiality, the patentee has already admitted that the equivalent falls
within the scope of surrendered subject matter. Further, if the case
permitted, any patentee would invoke the primary “foreseeability”
rebuttal factor. Thus, an invocation of “tangentiality” often admits
that the equivalent was both within the scope of the surrender and
foreseeable at the time of prosecution. In other words, the patent
drafter could have claimed the surrendered and foreseeable technology, but declined to do so.1677
1670. Id. at 1378, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1906.
1671. 480 F.3d 1335, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1065 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (per curiam).
1672. Id. at 1341, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1070.
1673. Id., 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1069.
1674. Id. at 1341–42, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1070.
1675. Id. at 1344, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1072.
1676. Id. at 1341, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1070 (quoting Chimie v. PPG Indus. Inc.,
402 F.3d 1371, 1382, 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1321, 1329 (Fed. Cir. 2005)).
1677. Id. at 1347, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1074 (Rader, J., concurring).
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Judge Rader further asserted that “[t]his ‘tangential’ rebuttal principle becomes even more difficult in practice. What neutral standard
makes some surrendered and unclaimed technologies infringing
equivalents while others enjoy no protection? This tangential concept has no analogue in patent law. How tangential does it have to
1678
be?”
Prosecution history estoppel can also arise in the context of continuation applications, as shown in Hakim v. Cannon Avent Group,
1679
PLC.
Hakim had re-filed his patent application with broader
claims in order to avoid any unnecessary restrictions that may have
1680
crept in during prosecution of the original application.
The Federal Circuit “recognized that an applicant can broaden as well as restrict his claims during the procedures of patent examination, and
that continuing applications may present broader claims than were
1681
allowed in the parent.”
The court noted, however, that an applicant cannot ordinarily recapture claim scope that he has surrendered
1682
or disclaimed.
Although an applicant may attempt to rescind a
disclaimer made during prosecution in order to recapture disclaimed
subject matter, “the prosecution history must be sufficiently clear to
inform the examiner that the previous disclaimer, and the prior art
1683
that it was made to avoid, may need to be re-visited.”
In this case,
Hakim’s attempted rescission was not sufficiently clear as to preclude
the examiner from allowing the continuation claims without further
prosecution based on limiting arguments made during prosecution
1684
of the parent application.
Accordingly, the Federal Circuit af1685
firmed the district court’s summary judgment of non-infringement.
It is well-established that “when a specification excludes certain
prior art alternatives from the literal scope of the claims and criticizes
those prior art alternatives, the patentee cannot then use the doc1686
trine of equivalents to capture those alternatives.”
The Federal
Circuit has also established that the doctrine of equivalents is unavailable to recapture subject matter that was “specifically identified,
1678. Id. at 1348, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1075.
1679. 479 F.3d. 1313, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1900 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
1680. Id. at 1317, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1903.
1681. Id., 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1903 (citing Symbol Techs., Inc. v. Lemelson
Med., Educ. & Research Found., 422 F.3d 1378, 1385, 76 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1354,
1360 (Fed. Cir. 2005)).
1682. Id., 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1904.
1683. Id. at 1318, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1904.
1684. Id. at 1317, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1904.
1685. Id. at 1318, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1904.
1686. L.B. Plastics, Inc. v. Amerimax Home Prods., Inc., 499 F.3d 1303, 1309, 84
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1341, 1345 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
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criticized, and disclaimed;” thus, a “patentee cannot . . . invoke the
doctrine of equivalents ‘to embrace a structure that was specifically
1687
excluded from the claims.’”
1688
In L.B. Plastics, Inc. v. Amerimax Home Products, Inc., the Federal
Circuit found that the patentee could not invoke the doctrine of
equivalents to capture certain alternatives to the claimed attachment
means, when the specification specifically criticized those alternatives
1689
in the prior art.
In particular, the specification stated:
Unlike some prior art gutter guards which have a relatively finemesh metal layer overlying a perforated polymer guard panel, the
gutter guard of the present invention includes a coated mesh layer
and perforated guard panel formed of like polymer materials, such
as PVC. This novel construction facilitates an effective and secure
attachment of the composite by ultrasonic or heat welding along
the entire length of the gutter guard. The attachment means used
in other prior art gutter guards incorporating multiple layers is
generally less effective, and more costly, time consuming, and labor
intensive.1690

L.B. Plastics contended “that the prior art referenced in the specification did not specifically disclose a continuous attachment using
1691
adhesives.”
The Federal Circuit disagreed, finding that adhesives
were among the prior art attachment means criticized in the specification as “generally less effective, and more costly, time consuming,
1692
and labor intensive.”
Furthermore, the patentee had limited its
1693
As a result, the court
claims to continuous welded attachments.
found that persons skilled in the art who read the specification would
“conclude that the inventor thought that adhesive attachments gen1694
erally were undesirable.”
Under these circumstances L.B. Plastics
could not use the doctrine of equivalents to include adhesive attach1695
ments in the scope of the claims.
1687. SciMed Life Sys., Inc. v. Advanced Cardiovascular Sys., Inc., 242 F.3d 1337,
1345, 58 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1059, 1066 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (quoting Dolly, Inc. v. Spalding & Evenflo Cos., 16 F.3d 394, 400, 29 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1767, 1771 (Fed. Cir.
1994)).
1688. L.B. Plastics, 499 F.3d 1303, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1341.
1689. Id. at 1309, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1345 (citing Schwing GmbH v. Putzmeister Aktiengesellschaft, 305 F.3d 1318, 1329, 64 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1641, 1649 (Fed.
Cir. 2002); SciMed Life Sys., 242 F.3d at 1345, 58 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1066; Dawn
Equip. Co. v. Ky. Farms, Inc., 140 F.3d 1009, 1015, 46 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1109, 1113
(Fed. Cir. 1998)).
1690. Id. at 1309 n.3, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1345 n.3.
1691. Id. at 1310, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1345.
1692. Id. at 1309, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1345.
1693. Id. at 1310, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1345.
1694. Id., 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1345.
1695. Id., 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1345.
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Furthermore, the Federal Circuit has held that:
A holding that the doctrine of equivalents cannot be applied to an
accused device because it “vitiates” a claim limitation is nothing
more than a conclusion that the evidence is such that no reasonable jury could conclude that an element of an accused device is
equivalent to an element called for in the claim, or that the theory
of equivalence to support the conclusion of infringement otherwise
lacks legal sufficiency.1696

The Federal Circuit rejected the accused infringer’s theory of claim
1697
The
vitiation in Abbott Laboratories v. Andrx Pharmaceuticals, Inc.
patent claims in question recited a “pharmaceutically acceptable
polymer,” but the accused products used a glyceryl monostearate
1698
(“GMS”) material.
Andrx asserted that GMS, a hydrophobic, water
insoluble non-polymer was the opposite of the hydrophilic, water
1699
soluble polymer required by the claims.
Andrx thus argued that
equivalency would vitiate the claim limitation in its entirety, regardless of any insubstantial differences between the claimed and accused
1700
devices.
The Federal Circuit disagreed. The Federal Circuit found that the
district court had erred in limiting the claimed “pharmaceutically ac1701
ceptable polymer” to hydrophilic, water-soluble substances.
Nonetheless, the court concluded that despite the district court’s erroneous claim construction and equivalence analysis, its finding of
equivalence would apply even under a claim construction that was
1702
not erroneously narrowed.
The Federal Circuit thus affirmed the
district court’s grant of a preliminary injunction against the accused
1703
infringer, albeit on different grounds.
In contrast to the above case, the Federal Circuit accepted the accused infringer’s theory of claim vitiation in Ortho-McNeil Pharmaceuti1704
cal, Inc. v. Caraco Pharmaceutical, Ltd.
The case turned primarily on
the proper construction of the term “about 1:5” in Ortho’s claim to
“a pharmaceutical composition comprising certain weight ratios of
1705
the two known [analgesics], tramadol and acetaminophen.”
The
1696. DePuy Spine, Inc. v. Medtronic Sofamor Danek, Inc., 469 F.3d 1005, 1018–
19, 80 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1865, 1874 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
1697. 473 F.3d 1196, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1289 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
1698. Id. at 1207–08, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1297.
1699. Id. at 1211, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1300–01.
1700. Id. at 1211–12, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1300–01.
1701. Id. at 1212–13, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1301.
1702. Id. at 1213, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1301–02.
1703. Id., 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1302.
1704. 476 F.3d 1321, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1427 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
1705. Id. at 1323–24, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1428–29.
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Federal Circuit affirmed the district court’s interpretation of the term
“‘about 1:5’ to mean approximately 1:5, encompassing a range of ra1706
In accordance with this contios no greater than 1:3.6 to 1:7.1”
struction, the Federal Circuit agreed that there was no infringement
under the doctrine of equivalents, for to expand the weight ratio of
“about 1.5” to encompass a composition having an average weight ra1707
tio of 1:8.76 “would eviscerate the limitation.”
Claim precision and vitiation were also issues in U.S. Philips Corp. v.
1708
In particular, the district court held that the
Iwasaki Electric Co.
numerical ranges in the claim were expressed with “the type of precision that is closely analogous to the metes and bounds of a deed of
1709
real property.”
Accordingly, the district court concluded that a determination of infringement would vitiate the claim limitation and
foreclose an application of the doctrine of equivalents as a matter of
1710
law.
The Federal Circuit disagreed, “conclud[ing] that resort to the
doctrine of equivalents [was] not foreclosed with respect to the
1711
claimed concentration range.”
In this respect, the court found this
case indistinguishable from Warner-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chemi1712
1713
cal Co. or Abbott Laboratories v. Dey, L.P., wherein the Federal Circuit permitted consideration of proposed equivalents to a claimed
numerical range because “the fact that a claim recites numeric ranges
does not, by itself, preclude . . . [reliance] on the doctrine of equiva1714
lents.”
The court continued:
Here, as in Abbott Labs and Warner-Jenkinson, a numeric range is
claimed. The language “between x and y” of the present case has
the same meaning as the phrase “x-y” of Abbott Labs. Likewise, the
phrase is also essentially the same as that used in Warner-Jenkinson,
with the exception of the absence of the qualifier “approximately.”
However, terms like “approximately” serve only to expand the
scope of literal infringement, not to enable application of the doctrine of equivalents. Notably, the Supreme Court in Warner1706. Id. at 1328, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1432.
1707. Id. at 1329, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1433.
1708. 505 F.3d 1371, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1097 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
1709. Id. at 1378, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1102.
1710. Id., 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1102.
1711. Id., 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1102.
1712. 520 U.S. 17, 32–33, 41 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1865, 1872 (1997) (allowing the
court to consider the doctrine of equivalents with respect to a claim to a pH range
from approximately 6.0 to 9.0).
1713. 287 F.3d 1097, 1107–08, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1545, 1552 (Fed. Cir. 2002)
(allowing consideration of a claim with a range of phospholipids content of 68.6% to
90.7%).
1714. U.S. Phillips, 505 F.3d at 1378, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1102 (alteration in
original) (quoting Abbott Labs., 287 F.3d at 1107–08, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1552).
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Jenkinson did not even mention the qualifier in allowing consideration of the doctrine of equivalents.1715

The Federal Circuit further rejected Iwasaki’s argument that the
doctrine of equivalents was unavailable to the patentee because Philips had included the upper concentration limit to avoid a prior art
1716
patent.
The court found instead that Philips had not “surrendered” anything with respect to the claims at issue because there had
been no narrowing amendment to the claim at issue and thus no
1717
prosecution history estoppel.
The only relevant inquiry, according
to the court, was “whether ‘a hypothetical claim that literally recites
the range of equivalents asserted to infringe . . . could have been al1718
lowed by the PTO over the prior art.’”
The Federal Circuit concluded that such a claim could have issued because the allegedly
equivalent halogen concentrations were below the ranges disclosed in
the prior art; none of the prior art lamps in question met all of the
limitations of the claims; and Iwasaki had not established that the
prior art reference, alone or in combination with others, would have
1719
obviated the claimed lamps.
The court thus vacated the district
court’s summary judgment of non-infringement under the doctrine
1720
of equivalents.
5.

Section 271(e)(1)—Research exemption to infringement
1721
In Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd. v. Merck KGaA, the Federal Circuit
explored the scope of the safe harbor created by 35 U.S.C.
§ 271(e)(1), which exempts from infringement all uses of patented
compounds “reasonably related to the development and submission
of information under a Federal law which regulates the manufacture,
1722
use, or sale of drugs or veterinary biological products.”
The Federal Circuit had originally found that the statute’s safe harbor did not
1723
apply to the accused infringer’s research activities, but that deci1724
In particusion was vacated and remanded by the Supreme Court.
1715. Id. at 1379, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1103.
1716. Id. at 1379–80, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1103–04.
1717. Id. at 1380, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1104.
1718. Id., 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1104 (alteration in original) (quoting Abbott
Labs., 287 F.3d at 1105, 62 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1551).
1719. Id., 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1104.
1720. Id., 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1104.
1721. 496 F.3d 1334, 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1673 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
1722. Id. at 1337, 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1676 (quoting 35 U.S.C. 274(e)(1)
(2000)).
1723. Merck KGaA v. Integra Lifesciences I, Ltd., 545 U.S. 193, 201, 74 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1801, 1805 (2005).
1724. Id. at 208, 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1808.
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lar, the Supreme Court held that § 271(e)(1) “exempted from infringement all uses of patented compounds ‘reasonably related’ to
1725
the process of developing information for submission” to the FDA.
“Reasonably related” may include “research . . . conducted after the
biological mechanism and physiological effect of a candidate drug
have been recognized, such that if the research is successful it would
1726
appropriately be included in a submission to the FDA.”
The FDA
Exemption may also apply to experimentation on drug candidates or
the use of patented compounds even if they are not ultimately submitted to the FDA, for “§ 271(e)(1)’s safe harbor leaves adequate
space for experimentation and failure on the road to regulatory ap1727
The FDA Exemption does not apply, however, “to basic
proval.”
scientific research unrelated to the development of a particular
1728
drug.”
On remand, the Federal Circuit found that all of the challenged
experiments were performed after the discovery that a cyclic RGD
peptide inhibited angiogenesis, and that “[a]ll of the experiments
charged with infringement were conducted for the purposes of determining the optimum candidate angiogenesis inhibitor and proceeding with commercial development of the selected candidate in
compliance with regulatory procedures, initially using three structur1729
ally related RGD peptides.”
The court added “[t]hat the experiments contributed to scientific knowledge does not deprive them of
the safe-harbor benefit of § 271(e)(1) when the requirements there1730
for are met.”
The court further rejected Integra’s argument that Scripps’s experiments were “not within the FDA Exemption because the other
1731
peptides were not the subject of an IND application.”
The FDA
Exemption, the Supreme Court has held, applies to research on a
“compound for which there was a reasonable basis for believing that
it may have the desired biological property, research that ‘if success1732
The court also reful would be appropriate for FDA submission.’”
jected Integra’s argument that Scripps’s experiments should be classified as “discovery” or “routine,” and thus outside the FDA
1725. Id. at 206, 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1807.
1726. Merck KGaA, 496 F.3d at 1339, 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1677.
1727. Id. at 1340, 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1677 (alteration in original) (quoting
Merck KGaA, 545 U.S. at 207, 74 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1807).
1728. Id. at 1339, 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1677.
1729. Id. at 1340, 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1678.
1730. Id. at 1347, 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1683.
1731. Id. at 1340, 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1678.
1732. Id., 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1678 (quoting Merck KGaA, 545 U.S. at 207, 74
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1807).
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1733

Exemption.
The safe harbor of § 271(e)(1) “does not depend on a
distinction between ‘discovery’ and ‘routine,’ but on whether the
threshold biological property and physiological effect had already
1734
been recognized as to the candidate drug.”
The court recognized
that experiments are conducted in order to gain information, no
1735
matter the phase of the research.
The Federal Circuit did not address “research tools” because “the
parties emphatically confirmed that research tools were not at is1736
sue.”
Although he found the majority’s interpretation of
§ 271(e)(1) “overly expansive,” Judge Rader stated in his dissent-inpart and concurrence-in-part that he would have addressed research
1737
tool patents.
In his view,
the exemption covers activities that develop information that will
ultimately be submitted to the FDA, not patented processes and
tools beyond the scope of the “patented compounds” that the Supreme Court placed within the statutory exemption. In this case,
two of the patents are research tools that deserve protection. This
court should remand with instructions that the district court examine and protect these research tool patents.1738

6.

Design patents
There are two distinct requirements for establishing design patent
1739
infringement.
The first, called the ordinary observer test, requires
that “in the eye of an ordinary observer, giving such attention as a
purchaser usually gives, two designs are substantially the same, if the
resemblance is such as to deceive such an observer, inducing him to
1740
purchase one supposing it to be the other.”
The second, called the
point of novelty test, requires that “no matter how similar two items
look, ‘the accused device must appropriate the novelty in the pat1741
ented device which distinguishes it from the prior art.’”
“Both the
1733. Id. at 1347, 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1683.
1734. Id., 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1683.
1735. Id., 83 U.S.P.Q.2d 1683 (citing Merck KGaA, 545 U.S. at 202, 74 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) at 1805).
1736. Id. at 1348, 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1683.
1737. Id. at 1348–49, 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1684–85 (Rader, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part).
1738. Id. at 1348, 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1684.
1739. See Bernhardt, L.L.C. v. Collezione Europa USA, Inc., 386 F.3d 1371, 1383, 72
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1901, 1910 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (stating that a claim alleging design
patent infringement is only successful if both the ordinary observer and point of
novelty tests are satisfied).
1740. Gorham Co. v. White, 81 U.S. (14 Wall.) 511, 528 (1871).
1741. Litton Sys., Inc. v. Whirlpool Corp., 728 F.2d 1423, 1444, 221 U.S.P.Q. (BNA)
97, 109 (Fed. Cir. 1984) (quoting Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Talge, 140 F.2d 395, 396,
60 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 434, 434 (8th Cir. 1944)).
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ordinary observer and point of novelty tests are factual inquiries that
are undertaken by the fact finder during the infringement stage of
1742
proceedings, after the claim has been construed by the court.”
Because the point of novelty determination is part of the infringement analysis, the initial burden is on the patentee to “present, in
1743
some form, its contentions as to points of novelty.”
The point of
novelty can be either a single novel design element or a combination
1744
of elements that are individually known in the prior art.
The patentee is not free to set forth any combination of elements as the point
of novelty; rather, the point of novelty must include features of the
1745
claimed design that distinguish it from the prior art.
1746
In Egyptian Goddess, Inc. v. Swisa, Inc., Egyptian Goddess asserted
1747
its design patent on an “ornamental nail buffer.”
The district court
granted Swisa’s motion for summary judgment of non-infringement
on the ground that the Swisa nail buffers did not contain the point of
novelty of the patented design, i.e., the “fourth side without a pad”
1748
required by the claims.
Egyptian Goddess appealed the judgment
1749
but not the underlying claim construction.
The Federal Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision to limit
the claimed design to a “hollow tubular frame of generally square
cross section . . . with rectangular abrasive pads . . . affixed to three
1750
sides of the frame . . . with the fourth side of the frame bare.”
Because the parties agreed that the “Swisa buffers do not contain a
fourth side without a raised pad,” the Federal Circuit found that the
summary judgment of non-infringement had been properly
1751
granted.
The court concluded that “no reasonable juror could
conclude that [the patentee’s] asserted point of novelty constituted a
1752
non-trivial advance over the prior art” because the difference be1742. Bernhardt, 386 F.3d at 1383, 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1910.
1743. Id. at 1384, 72 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1911.
1744. See Lawman Armor Corp. v. Winner Int’l, LLC, 449 F.3d 1190, 1192, 79
U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1382, 1382 (Fed. Cir. 2006) (supplemental opinion on petition
for rehearing) (clarifying the definition of a point of novelty to include a combination of design elements in appropriate situations).
1745. See Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. Hercules Tire & Rubber Co., 162 F.3d
1113, 1118, 48 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1767, 1770 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (“The accused design
must also contain substantially the same points of novelty that distinguished the patented design from the prior art.”); Litton, 728 F.2d at 1444, 221 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at
110 (declaring that infringement occurs when the point of novelty is not distinguishable from the prior art).
1746. 498 F.3d 1354, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1046 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
1747. Id. at 1355, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1047.
1748. Id. at 1356, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1048.
1749. Id., 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1048.
1750. Id., 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1047.
1751. Id. at 1358–59, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1049.
1752. Id. at 1358, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1049.
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tween the Swisa buffer and the claimed design was not minor in view
1753
of the prior art.
Judge Dyk dissented. In his view, the “non-trivial advance” standard created a new rule that “eviscerates the statutory presumption of
validity” because it “conflat[es] the criteria for infringement and obviousness,” and thus improperly requires the patentee to affirmatively
1754
prove non-obviousness.
Judge Dyk also believed that the “nontrivial advance” test was too narrow to be applied to all designs, improperly extended a “obviousness-like test” to each point of novelty,
and was “devoid of support in the case law” and “contrary” to several
1755
precedential cases.
On November 27, 2007, the Federal Circuit vacated the majority
opinion and granted Egyptian Goddess’s petition to rehear the case
1756
en banc.
1757
In Arminak & Associates, Inc. v. Saint-Gobain Calmar, Inc., Calmar
argued that the district court had construed the claims of its design
patent too narrowly by adding excessive detail on the ornamental fea1758
tures rather than simply describing what is shown in their drawings.
The Federal Circuit disagreed, finding that the court’s “meticulous
1759
and accurate description . . . did not constitute error.”
The Federal Circuit explained, “[o]ur case law does not prohibit detailed
claim construction of design patent drawings. It merely disapproves
claim construction that goes beyond the novel, nonfunctional ornamental features visually represented by the claimed drawings, or that
fails to encompass the claimed ornamental features of the design as a
1760
whole.”
The Federal Circuit also affirmed the district court’s finding that
an “ordinary observer” was a “contract or industrial buyer for companies that purchase the stand-alone trigger sprayer devices, not the re1761
tail purchasers of the finished product,” as Calmar had argued.
This marked the first time that the court had “squarely addressed”
1762
this “unanswered question remaining after Gorham.”
Ordinary ob1753. Id., 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1049.
1754. Id. at 1359, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1050 (Dyk, J., dissenting).
1755. Id. at 1359–60, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1050–51.
1756. Egyptian Goddess, Inc. v. Swisa, Inc., No. 2006–1562, 2007 WL 4179111 (Fed.
Cir. Nov. 26, 2007).
1757. 501 F.3d 1314, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1258 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
1758. Id. at 1319, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1261.
1759. Id. at 1321, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1262.
1760. Id., 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1262 (citation omitted).
1761. Id. at 1324, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1264.
1762. Id. at 1322, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1263 (discussing Gorham Co. v. White,
81 U.S. (14 Wall.) 511, 528 (1871)).
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servers, the court noted, are typically “those who buy and use . . . the
actual product that is presented for purchase,” even if it is but a com1763
In this case, the record showed
ponent of an assembled product.
that Calmar had never sold any of its patented shrouds directly to retail customers but to contract buyers or industrial purchasers who as1764
sembled the final product.
The court then stated the following:
To hold that such a purchaser is the appropriate hypothetical ordinary observer fits squarely with our precedent that the ordinary
observer is a person who is either a purchaser of, or sufficiently interested in, the item that displays the patented designs and who has
the capability of making a reasonably discerning decision when observing the accused item’s design whether the accused item is substantially the same as the item claimed in the design patent.1765

Since the evidence showed that a contract or industrial purchaser
would not be deceived into thinking that Arminak’s accused shroud
1766
was one of the patented designs, there was no infringement.
The Federal Circuit also determined no infringement under the
“point of novelty” test because the Arminak products did not appropriate the “prominent horizontal line” or “bulge outwardly in a bul1767
bous fashion” features of the Calmar patents.
In so holding, the
court found that the district court had not improperly merged the
point of novelty test and the ordinary observer test, and had properly
compared the accused design to “the design feature, as it appears in
the Figures of the patent as issued,” and not to the patentee’s own
1768
description of its patents.
V. INEQUITABLE CONDUCT
The Federal Circuit recently stated in Cargill, Inc. v. Canbra Foods,
1769
Ltd.
that “[t]o hold a patent unenforceable due to inequitable
conduct, there must be clear and convincing evidence that the applicant (1) made an affirmative misrepresentation of material fact,
failed to disclose material information, or submitted false material information, and (2) intended to deceive the U.S. Patent and Trade1770
mark Office (“PTO”).”
The court further added that the materiality element of inequitable conduct may be satisfied by “the standard for materiality set forth
1763.
1764.
1765.
1766.
1767.
1768.
1769.
1770.

Id., 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1263 (quoting Gorham, 81 U.S. at 527).
Id. at 1321, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1262.
Id. at 1323, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1264.
Id. at 1324, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1264.
Id. at 1325, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1265.
Id. at 1327, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1267.
476 F.3d 1359, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1705 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
Id. at 1363, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1708.
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in the current version of PTO Rule 56 . . . [or] the earlier ‘reasonable
1771
“The intent element of inequitable conduct
examiner’ standard.”
requires that ‘the involved conduct, viewed in light of all the evidence, including evidence indicative of good faith, must indicate suf1772
ficient culpability to require a finding of intent to deceive.’”
Intent
to deceive in certain instances is “inferred from the facts and circum1773
stances surrounding the conduct at issue.”
The court continued, stating that “[i]f a district court finds that the
requirements of materiality and intent have been established by clear
and convincing evidence, it must then ‘balance the equities to determine whether the patentee has committed inequitable conduct
1774
Accordingly,
that warrants holding the patent unenforceable.’”
“[u]nder the balancing test, ‘[t]he more material the omission or the
misrepresentation, the lower the level of intent required to establish
1775
inequitable conduct, and vice versa.’”
The Federal Circuit reviews “the district court’s findings on the
1776
threshold issues of materiality and intent for clear error.”
By contrast, “the ultimate decision regarding inequitable conduct [is re-

1771. Id. at 1364, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1708. The pertinent part of the current
version of Rule 56 states as follows:
[I]nformation is material to patentability when it is not cumulative to information already of record or being made of record in the application, and
(1) It establishes, by itself or in combination with other information, a
prima facie case of unpatentability of a claim; or
(2) It refutes, or is inconsistent with, a position the applicant takes in:
(i) Opposing an argument of unpatentability relied on by the
Office, or
(ii) Asserting an argument of patentability.
A prima facie case of unpatentability is established when the information
compels a conclusion that a claim is unpatentable under the preponderance
of evidence, burden-of-proof standard, giving each term in the claim its
broadest reasonable construction consistent with the specification, and before any consideration is given to evidence which may be submitted in an attempt to establish a contrary conclusion of patentability.
37 C.F.R. § 1.56(b) (2006). The earlier reasonable examiner standard states that “information is material where there is a substantial likelihood that a reasonable examiner would consider it important in deciding whether to allow the application to issue as a patent.” Cargill, 476 F.3d at 1364, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1708 (quoting 37
C.F.R. § 1.56(a) (1991)).
1772. Cargill, 476 F.3d at 1364, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1708 (quoting Impax Labs.,
Inc. v. Aventis Pharm., Inc., 468 F.3d 1366, 1374-75, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1001, 1007
(Fed. Cir. 2006)).
1773. Id., 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1708.
1774. Id., 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1708 (citations omitted).
1775. Id., 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1708 (quoting Critikon, Inc. v. Becton Dickinson
Vascular Access, Inc., 120 F.3d 1253, 1256, 43 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1666, 1668 (Fed.
Cir. 1997)).
1776. Id., 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1708.
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viewed] for abuse of discretion.”
The court will find abuse of discretion “when (1) the court’s decision is clearly unreasonable, arbitrary, or fanciful, (2) the court’s decision is based on an erroneous
construction of the law, (3) the court’s factual findings are clearly erroneous, or (4) the record contains no evidence upon which the
1778
court rationally could have based its decision.”
1779
In Dippin’ Dots, Inc. v. Mosey, the Federal Circuit affirmed the dis1780
The court relied on
trict court’s judgment of inequitable conduct.
the “reasonable examiner” standard in determining that the applicant’s failure to disclose sales more than a year prior to the filing of
the patent application was material, because the reasonable examiner
would have considered the sales important in determining whether to
1781
allow the application.
Combining the omission of disclosure of
sales prior to the critical date with the applicant’s touting of postcritical sales as evidence of commercial success to overcome an obviousness rejection provided justification for an inference of deceptive
1782
intent required for a finding of inequitable conduct.
1783
In Cargill Inc. v. Canbra Foods Ltd., discussed above, the Federal
Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment that two related patents
1784
were unenforceable due to inequitable conduct.
The district court
found that two documents, which contained the applicant’s internal
testing data but were not disclosed to the examiner during prosecution, “unquestionably would have been viewed as worthy of serious
1785
consideration by the PTO.”
The Federal Circuit determined that
the district court’s finding effectively applied the “reasonable examiner” standard for materiality because the undisclosed documents
contained data on a “crucial issue during prosecution” and were contrary to assertions made by applicants to the Patent Office about a
claimed feature (i.e., the oxidative stability) of the claimed inven1786
tion.
The Federal Circuit found that “[a] reasonable examiner
would certainly want to consider test data that is directly related to an
important issue of patentability, along with the applicant’s interpretation of that data,” and thus held that the district court’s determina1777. Id. at 1365, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1709.
1778. Id., 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1709 (quoting Impax Labs., Inc. v. Aventis
Pharm., Inc., 468 F.3d 1366, 1375, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1001, 1007 (Fed. Cir.
2006)).
1779. 476 F.3d 1337, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1633 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
1780. Id. at 1346, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1642.
1781. Id. at 1345, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1639.
1782. Id. at 1346, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1639-40.
1783. Cargill, 476 F.3d 1359, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1705.
1784. Id. at 1362, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1706.
1785. Id. at 1365, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1709.
1786. Id., 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1709.
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tion regarding the materiality of the undisclosed documents was not
1787
clearly erroneous.
The Federal Circuit also affirmed the district court’s finding of an
intent to deceive, based on three circumstantial factors: (1) the applicant’s repeated omission of the data, (2) the applicant’s “specific
motive to conceal the two specific documents,” and (3) “the high de1788
gree of materiality of the undisclosed test data.”
The Federal Circuit found that each of the examiner’s five rejections involved the issue of the oxidative stability of the applicant’s claimed composition,
and thus “[t]he repeated nature of that rejection demonstrates that
the applicant should have been aware of the materiality of the omit1789
Relying on Critikon, Inc. v. Beacton Dickinson Vascular
ted test data.”
1790
Access Inc., the Federal Circuit held that “[s]uch a high degree of
materiality, coupled with evidence that applicant should have known
of that materiality, creates a strong inference of an intent to de1791
ceive.”
With respect to the ultimate issue of inequitable conduct, the Federal Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment of unenforceability, finding it within the district court’s discretion to weigh its findings
of materiality and intent against the reasons offered for withholding
the highly material test data to determine that the rationale for withholding the test data did not overcome the weight of the evidence
1792
proving inequitable conduct.
The Federal Circuit also affirmed the district court’s judgment of
1793
inequitable conduct in eSpeed, Inc. v. Brokertec USA, LLC.
First, the
Federal Circuit found that the district court had not clearly erred in
concluding that the false statements in the declarations the appli1794
cants had submitted to the PTO were material.
Second, the Fed1795
aferal Circuit, relying on Rohm & Hass v. Crystal Chemical Co.,
firmed the district court’s finding of an intent to deceive, stating
“[t]he district court was free to draw an inference that these declarations were ‘the chosen instrument of an intentional scheme to de-

1787.
1788.
1789.
1790.
1791.
1792.
1793.
1794.
1795.

Id. at 1366, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1710.
Id. at 1366–68, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1710–11.
Id. at 1366, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1710.
120 F.3d 1253, 43 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1666 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
Cargill, 476 F.3d at 1367, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1711.
Id. at 1368, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1711.
480 F.3d 1129, 1139, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1183, 1190 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
Id. at 1137, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1189.
722 F.2d 1556, 220 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 289 (Fed. Cir. 1983).
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ceive the PTO,’ because ‘[t]he affirmative act of submitting an affida1796
vit must be construed as intended to be relied upon.’”
1797
In In re Omeprazole Patent Litigation, the Federal Circuit affirmed
the district court’s conclusion that Andrx’s counterclaims were moot,
that there was no inequitable conduct, fraud, or unclean hands in Astra’s prosecution of one patent, and that Astra’s two related patents
1798
were not unenforceable through “infectious unenforceability.”
In
particular, when the district court found that the asserted claims of
the last patent at issue were invalid as anticipated, the court properly
declined to consider defendant Andrx’s related inequitable conduct
1799
and fraud defenses.
“The district court did consider Andrx’s ‘unclean hands’ argument, but found no evidence to support a finding
1800
of ‘unclean hands.’”
1801
In McKesson Information Solutions, Inc. v. Bridge Medical, Inc., the
Federal Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment that the ‘716
patent at issue (U.S. Patent No. 4,857,716) was unenforceable due to
McKesson’s failure to disclose three items of information during
1802
prosecution.
The facts in McKesson are complex and only briefly
described here.
First, the Federal Circuit found no clear error in the district court’s
finding of inequitable conduct due to the non-disclosure of the socalled Baker patent (U.S. Patent No. 4,456,793), a prior art reference
upon which a patent examiner had relied in rejecting claims of a copending patent application being prosecuted by the same prosecut1803
ing attorney.
The Federal Circuit agreed that the Baker patent was
material to the prosecution of the ‘716 patent because the ‘716 patent contained the same limitations that had been rejected in the co1804
pending application over Baker.
In so holding, the Federal Circuit
rejected McKesson’s argument that Baker was not material because
similar subject matter had been disclosed in other references cited in
1805
the ‘716 patent’s application.
The court found instead that “the
importance of Baker” was not limited to one particular limitation but
“could be material quite apart from the disclosure of anything analo-

1796.
1797.
1798.
1799.
1800.
1801.
1802.
1803.
1804.
1805.

eSpeed, 480 F.3d at 1138, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1190 (citations omitted).
483 F.3d 1364, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1643 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
Id. at 1376, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1653.
Id., 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1652–53.
Id. at 1374, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1651.
487 F.3d 897, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1865 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
Id. at 926, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1886.
Id. at 919, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1880.
Id. at 909, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1873.
Id. at 916, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1878.
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gous to [that] unique identifier limitation.”
In addition, “the existence of differences between Baker and the ‘716 claims does not,
1807
The court concluded
standing alone, render Baker immaterial.”
that, “[a]s the district court held, the overwhelming circumstantial
evidence, coupled with the lack of any credible explanation for non1808
disclosure of Baker, supports the finding of deceptive intent.”
The Federal Circuit also affirmed that inequitable conduct arose
from the prosecuting attorney’s failure to disclose the first examiner’s
rejections of the co-pending application, which contained similar sub1809
ject matter and limitations as the ‘716 patent at issue.
The district
court had not erred, the Federal Circuit found, by considering
whether the claims between the two applications were “in some respects identical,” as opposed to “‘substantially similar,’ and substantial
1810
similarity ‘in content and scope.’”
According to the court, “materiality may be proven in numerous ways,” and “to the extent there is a
difference among ‘in some respects identical,’ ‘substantially similar,’
and substantial similarity ‘in content and scope,’ that difference is inconsequential so long as the evidence clearly and convincingly proves
1811
materiality in one of the accepted ways.”
On that basis, the Federal
Circuit found no clear error in the district court’s finding that the
first examiner’s rejections in the first application were material to the
1812
second application.
The Federal Circuit also rejected as “untenable” McKesson’s argument that the prosecuting attorney had acted in good faith by twice
disclosing the co-pending application during prosecution of the ‘716
1813
patent.
According to the Federal Circuit, the MPEP in the mid1980s broadly defined the duty of disclosure to include material information obtained from co-pending applications, which left “no
doubt that material rejections in co-pending applications fall squarely
1814
within the duty of candor.”
The Federal Circuit concluded that the
district court had not clearly erred in finding that the prosecuting attorney intended to deceive the PTO by not disclosing the first exam-

1806.
1807.
1808.
1809.
1810.
1811.
1812.
1813.
1814.

Id. at 914, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1876.
Id. at 915, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1878.
Id. at 919, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1880.
Id. at 901, 908, 911, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1867, 1872, 1875.
Id. at 920, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1881.
Id. at 919–20, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1881.
Id. at 926, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1886.
Id. at 922, 924–25, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1883, 1885.
Id. at 923, 925, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1884–85.
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iner’s rejections of the co-pending application during prosecution of
1815
the ‘716 patent.
The Federal Circuit also found inequitable conduct based on the
prosecuting attorney’s failure to disclose a notice of allowance of a
third co-pending application, which ultimately issued as the ‘372 pat1816
ent (U.S. Patent No. 4,835,372).
In so holding, the court rejected
McKesson’s argument that inequitable conduct required a “substantial likelihood” that the examiner would have issued a double1817
patenting rejection in view of the allowance of the ‘372 patent.
Rather, materiality could be found where the allowance of the ‘372
patent “plainly [gave] rise to a conceivable double patenting rejec1818
tion.”
“Material information,” the court explained, “is not limited
to information that would invalidate the claims under examination”
but includes information a reasonable examiner would have considered important, whether or not the information would have conclu1819
sively decided the issue of patentability.
The fact that the same examiner had examined both of the applications in question, and that
the prosecuting attorney had informed the examiner of the two applications, did not alter this result, where the prosecuting attorney
testified that the identity of the examiner had not been a factor in his
1820
Consequently,
decisions and materiality rested on other grounds.
the Federal Circuit concluded that there was no clear error in the district court’s findings on materiality or deceptive intent, and hence affirmed the district court’s judgment that the ‘716 patent was unen1821
forceable due to inequitable conduct before the PTO.
Judge Newman dissented from this result, finding that the facts did
not rise to the level of clear and convincing evidence of deceptive intent, as opposed to a mere mistake, particularly where the applicant
had informed the examiner of the co-pending applications and the
same examiner had been involved in the prosecution of two of the
1822
applications.
“This court,” she warned, “returns to the ‘plague’ of
encouraging unwarranted charges of inequitable conduct, spawning
the opportunistic litigation that here succeeded despite consistently
1823
contrary precedent.”

1815.
1816.
1817.
1818.
1819.
1820.
1821.
1822.
1823.

Id. at 924–25, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1885.
Id. at 925–26, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1885–86.
Id. at 925, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1885.
Id., 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1885.
Id., 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1885.
Id., 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1885.
Id. at 926, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1886.
Id. at 926–27, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1886 (Newman, J., dissenting).
Id., 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1886.
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1824

In In re Metoprolol Succinate Patent Litigation, the Federal Circuit
vacated the district court’s finding of inequitable conduct because it
had erroneously equated an incentive to deceive with an intent to de1825
ceive on summary judgment.
In particular, the district court had
found “that Astra’s motivation to not reveal the [inventorship] dispute was great based on the risk of losing its [claims] . . . as anticipated by the prior art,” and thus concluded on summary judgment
1826
that “[t]he intent to deceive [was] clearly present.”
The Federal
Circuit, however, found a genuine issue of material fact as to whether
Astra had intended to deceive the PTO because Astra’s in-house patent counsel testified in his deposition that he “did not know of and
was not concerned about the incentives identified by the district
1827
court in its but for analysis.”
1828
In Nilssen v. Osram Sylvania, Inc., the Federal Circuit affirmed the
district court’s judgment that fifteen patents prosecuted pro se by the
1829
inventor were unenforceable due to inequitable conduct.
In particular, the court agreed that the applicant had: (1) submitted affidavits in support of patentability without informing the examiner of
the affiant’s relationship to the inventor, (2) misrepresented small
entity status to justify small entity payments, (3) misclaimed priority
dates, (4) failed to disclose relevant litigation, and (5) failed to dis1830
close material prior art.
Regarding the applicant’s misrepresentation of priority dates, the court relied on Digital Control, Inc. v. Charles
1831
Machine Works for the proposition that “a misrepresentation that
would not have immediately affected the patentability is still mate1832
rial.”
The Federal Circuit then held that “a claim for priority is inherently material to patentability because a priority date may determine validity, whether an issue arises in prosecution or later in court
1833
challenges to validity.”
1834
In Apotex Corp. v. Merck & Co., the Federal Circuit affirmed summary judgment that Merck had not committed fraud on the court or
made false statements or misrepresentations in an earlier district
1824. 494 F.3d 1011, 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1545 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
1825. Id. at 1013, 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1556.
1826. Id. at 1020, 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1551.
1827. Id. at 1021, 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1551.
1828. 504 F.3d 1223, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1811 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
1829. Id. at 1229, 1235–36, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1815, 1820.
1830. Id. at 1229–36, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1815–20.
1831. 437 F.3d 1309, 1318, 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1823, 1830 (Fed. Cir. 2006).
1832. Nilssen, 504 F.3d at 1233, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1818 (citing Digital Control,
437 F.3d at 1318, 77 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1830).
1833. Id., 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1818.
1834. 507 F.3d 1357, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1302 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
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court case such as to warrant reopening that litigation.
The allegations stemmed from the district court’s ruling that the Apotex patents
at issue were invalid under 35 U.S.C. § 102(g) because Merck had invented and been using the claimed process before Apotex had made
1836
1837
the claimed invention.
The Federal Circuit affirmed this ruling.
Apotex subsequently alleged that Merck had obtained these invalidity
rulings by fraud, e.g., by leaving out the type of mixing equipment,
duration of mixing, and other key details of its process of making the
drug at issue during a videotaped deposition in a Canadian litigation
and making other misrepresentations and misstatements of material
1838
fact.
The district court rejected Apotex’s arguments as attorney ar1839
gument, unsupported by factual testimony or evidence.
1840
The Federal Circuit unanimously affirmed.
“We agree that
Merck’s processing details, which are not asserted to be invented by
Apotex, did not warrant detailed disclosure, and that the presentation of the Merck process did not establish fraud on the court,” the
1841
court explained.
The Federal Circuit further noted, “Fraud upon
the court requires that there was a material subversion of the legal
process . . . [and] it requires rigorous proof, as do other challenges to
final judgment, lest the finality established by Rule 60(b) be over1842
whelmed by continuing attacks on the judgment.”
In addition, the
court found that Merck’s omission of certain process details was immaterial, in that those details were not a part of Apotex’s patented
1843
process.
VI. REMEDIES
A. Permanent Injunction
Historically, permanent injunctions have been a standard part of
patent cases that result in final judgments of infringement and no in-

1835. Id. at 1361–62, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1305–06.
1836. Id. at 1359, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1303.
1837. Apotex USA, Inc. v. Merck & Co., 254 F.3d 1031, 59 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1139
(Fed. Cir. 2001).
1838. Apotex Corp., 507 F.3d at 1362, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1305.
1839. Id. at 1360, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1304.
1840. Id. at 1362, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1306.
1841. Id., 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1305–06.
1842. Id. at 1360–61, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1304–05 (citing Broyhill Furniture
Indus. v. Craftmaster Furniture Corp., 12 F.3d 1080, 1085, 29 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1283, 1287 (Fed. Cir. 1993)).
1843. Id. at 1362, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1305.
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1844

validity.
The Federal Circuit applied a “general rule that courts will
issue permanent injunctions against patent infringement absent ex1845
In 2006, the U.S. Supreme Court receptional circumstances.”
1846
versed this “general rule.”
In particular, in eBay Inc. v. MercEx1847
change, L.L.C., the Court stated that the principles of equity “apply
1848
The
with equal force to disputes arising under the Patent Act.”
Court recognized, “a major departure from the long tradition of equity practice should not be lightly implied. Nothing in the Patent Act
indicates that Congress intended such a departure. To the contrary,
the Patent Act expressly provides that injunctions ‘may’ issue ‘in ac1849
cordance with the principles of equity.’”
The Court stated as follows:
[A] plaintiff seeking a permanent injunction must satisfy a fourfactor test before a court may grant such relief. A plaintiff must
demonstrate: (1) that it has suffered an irreparable injury; (2) that
remedies available at law, such as monetary damages, are inadequate to compensate for that injury; (3) that, considering the balance of hardships between the plaintiff and defendant, a remedy in
equity is warranted; and (4) that the public interest would not be
disserved by a permanent injunction.1850
1851

In Forest Laboratories, Inc. v. Ivax Pharmaceuticals, Inc., the Federal
Circuit affirmed the district court’s entry of a permanent injunction
against co-defendants Ivax and Cipla but narrowed it to cover only
the pharmaceutical product (escitalopram oxalate, or “EO”) that was
the subject of the Ivax abbreviated new drug application (“ANDA”),
1852
The original lanwhich had given rise to the infringement suit.
guage of the injunction “extending to ‘any products that infringe the
‘712 patent’” was overly broad because a court could enjoin infringement of the patent by an adjudicated product, or colorable
1853
variations thereof.
Thus, the injunction could not extend to any
1844. See, e.g., Richardson v. Suzuki Motor Co., 868 F.2d 1226, 1247, 9 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1913, 1929 (Fed. Cir. 1989) (confirming the existence of a long standing
general rule in favor of issuing an injunction upon a finding of infringement).
1845. MercExchange, L.L.C. v. eBay, Inc., 401 F.3d 1323, 1339, 74 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1225, 1238 (Fed. Cir. 2005), rev’d, 126 S. Ct. 1837, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1577
(2006).
1846. eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 126 S. Ct. 1837, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA)
1577 (2006).
1847. Id. at 1837, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1577.
1848. Id. at 1839, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1579.
1849. Id., 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1579 (citations omitted).
1850. Id., 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1579.
1851. 501 F.3d 1263, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1099 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
1852. Id. at 1271–72, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1106.
1853. Id. at 1271, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1106.
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drug that was not the subject of the ANDA, even if that drug were
1854
within the scope of the ‘712 patent.
At the same time, the Federal Circuit affirmed the inclusion of co1855
defendant Cipla in the injunction.
Cipla had been providing information and material that Ivax was using to obtain FDA approval,
and was actively inducing Ivax’s direct infringement by planning “to
manufacture and sell infringing EO products to Ivax for resale in the
1856
United States.”
Even though there was no infringement as long as
Ivax was pursuing FDA approval, Ivax would be liable for, and hence
could be enjoined from, commercial exploitation of EO once it was
1857
approved by the FDA.
Thus, Cipla could also be enjoined because
1858
Judge Schall dissented from this portion of
“[t]hey are partners.”
the opinion because Cipla did not file the ANDA and only provided
information protected by 35 U.S.C. § 271(e)(1); thus, its actions did
1859
not trigger a cause of action under § 271(e)(2).
The permanent injunction in Cross Medical Products, Inc. v. Med1860
tronic Sofamor Danek, Inc. raised unique jurisdictional issues for the
court to consider. Medtronic argued that the Federal Circuit did not
have jurisdiction to consider arguments related to a permanent
1861
injunction that Cross Medical did not present on cross-appeal.
Cross Medical responded that the court may consider arguments as
an “alternative” basis for supporting the court’s permanent
1862
injunction.
The Federal Circuit found, “[o]n the jurisdictional inquiry, this court need not consider whether the district court could
have issued the second permanent injunction on some other
grounds. Rather, this court reviews the district court’s judgment with
1863
an eye to whether an alternative basis might support that decision.”
In light of the court’s finding that there were genuine issues of material fact regarding infringement, the court declined to consider the
merits of the arguments and vacated and remanded the district
1864
court’s summary judgment for further proceedings.

1854. Id., 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1106.
1855. Id. at 1272, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1106.
1856. Id., 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1106.
1857. Id., 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1106.
1858. Id., 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1105–06.
1859. Id. at 1274, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1108 (Schall, J., dissenting).
1860. 480 F.3d 1335, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1065 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (per curiam).
1861. Id. at 1345, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1072.
1862. Id., 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1072.
1863. Id., 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1073 (citing Laitram Corp. v. NEC Corp., 115
F.3d 947, 954, 42 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1897, 1903 (Fed. Cir. 1997)).
1864. Id. at 1345–46, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1073.
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In Acumed LLC v. Stryker Corp.,
the Federal Circuit vacated a
permanent injunction because the district court had relied on an outdated rule “that an injunction will issue, once infringement and validity have been adjudged . . . unless there are some exceptional circum1866
stances that justify denying injunctive relief.”
That rule has since
been replaced by the traditional four-factor test for injunctions in
1867
eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C.
The Federal Circuit declined to
determine whether the “facts found by the district court [could] serve
as independent support for the injunction,” even under the new rule,
because the court “would effectively be exercising [its] own discretion
as if [it] were the first-line court of equity. That role belongs
1868
exclusively to the district court.”
1869
In Abbott Laboratories v. TorPharm, Inc.,
the Federal Circuit affirmed that a district court has jurisdiction to entertain a contempt
proceeding to enforce a permanent injunction, even though it re1870
versed the district court on the merits.
The district court had enjoined co-defendant Apotex from “commercially manufacturing, using, selling, offering to sell, or importing into the United States” a
generic anti-seizure medication after finding that Apotex’s filing of
1871
an ANDA infringed two of Abbott’s patents.
While Apotex attempted to design around the Abbott patents, it arranged for NuPharm to file a new ANDA and assume the “litigation risks” in ex1872
change for Apotex’s payment of the costs.
The district court found
no colorable difference between the Apotex and Nu-Pharm drug
1873
products and held Apotex in contempt for violating the injunction.
The Federal Circuit held that even though the Hatch-Waxman Act
does not specifically grant a district court jurisdiction to pursue a
contempt proceeding, filing an ANDA is an act of infringement and
is therefore subject to the same discretionary authority of the district
court to entertain contempt proceedings as in any other case of pat1874
ent infringement.
The Federal Circuit concluded that the district
court did not abuse its discretion in holding contempt proceedings

1865.
1866.
1867.
1868.
1869.
1870.
1871.
1872.
1873.
1874.

483 F.3d 800, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1481 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
Id. at 811, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1489.
126 S. Ct. 1837, 1839, 78 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1577, 1579 (2006).
Acumed, 483 F.3d at 811, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1489.
503 F.3d 1372, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1829 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
Id. at 1375–76, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1831.
Id., 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1831.
Id. at 1377, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1832.
Id. at 1377–78, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1833.
Id. at 1378–79, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1833–34.
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and expanding its injunction to prohibit the FDA from approving not
1875
only the original Apotex ANDA but the Nu-Pharm ANDA as well.
Nonetheless, the Federal Circuit reversed the district court’s find1876
ing of contempt.
Apotex’s efforts to design around the drug occurred entirely outside the United States, and thus did not violate the
injunction’s prohibition on making, using, selling, offering to sell, or
importing the generic drug into the United States before the Abbott
1877
patents expired.
The injunction also contained no “explicit notice” to Apotex that filing a new ANDA, whether by itself or through a
1878
“straw party,” was forbidden.
Judge Dyk dissented from this portion of the opinion, finding that
the majority’s conclusion raised a “fair ground of doubt as to the
wrongfulness” of Apotex’s conduct, which should have rendered the
1879
summary contempt proceedings inappropriate in the first place.
He argued that the finding of infringement should have been vacated
1880
and remanded for further consideration.
B. Preliminary Injunction
Unlike a permanent injunction, a preliminary injunction is entered
before trial to protect the rights of parties while an infringement trial
1881
is pending.
Preliminary injunctions are rarely granted and require
a consideration of four factors, none of which is dispositive:
(1) probability of success on the merits, (2) harm to the moving party
if the injunction is not granted, (3) the balance of hardships, and
1882
(4) the impact of the injunction on the public interest.
1883
In Monsanto Co. v. McFarling, the district court enjoined a farmer
from infringing a Monsanto patent by saving and replanting genetically modified soybean seeds in subsequent years, in violation of his
1884
license agreement with Monsanto.
The injunction, however, allowed the farmer to “plant Roundup Ready soybeans acquired from
any lawful dealer, but to do so [the farmer] must sign any applicable
1875. Id. at 1381, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1835.
1876. Id. at 1383, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1837.
1877. Id. at 1382, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1836.
1878. Id. at 1383, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1837.
1879. Id., 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1837 (Dyk, J., dissenting).
1880. Id. at 1385, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1838.
1881. See, e.g., Cordis Corp. v. Medtronic, Inc., 835 F.2d 859, 863, 5 U.S.P.Q.2d
(BNA) 1118, 1121 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (“The purpose of an interlocutory injunction is to
preserve the status quo and to protect the respective rights of the parties pending a
determination on the merits.”).
1882. Nutrition 21 v. United States, 930 F.2d 867, 869, 18 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1347,
1348–49 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
1883. 488 F.3d 973, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1942 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
1884. Id. at 976, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1943–44.
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1885

technology agreement required by Monsanto.”
Monsanto objected
to the clause allowing the farmer to buy the seeds from a lawful
dealer, but the Federal Circuit found it was up to Monsanto to ensure
1886
that its dealers did not sell the seeds against its wishes.
1887
GP Industries, Inc. v. Eran Industries, Inc. involved a rare form of
1888
After Eran Industries fired
an injunction against communications.
several employees, they formed a competing company, GP Industries,
1889
Inc.
Eran sent letters to its distributors and contractors warning
them not to buy a GP product that Eran alleged infringed its pat1890
ent.
On GP’s complaint, the district court granted a preliminary
injunction enjoining Eran from sending such letters due to its tor1891
In addition,
tious interference with GP’s business relationships.
the district court found “that Eran’s accusations were made in disregard of the truth or falsity of the purported infringement” because
Eran had not examined any product actually sold or distributed by
GP or made any effort to determine whether the GP prototype it had
1892
examined was on the market.
The court also reasoned that Eran
had an adequate remedy if GP were found to have infringed the pat1893
ent.
The Federal Circuit reversed the grant of a preliminary injunction
1894
Injunctions against communicating with
as an abuse of discretion.
others about one’s patent rights are rare, the court explained, because they are much more serious than injunctions against infringe1895
ment.
“One has a right to inform others of his or her patent rights.
Thus, an injunction against communication is strong medicine that
1896
must be used with care and only in exceptional circumstances.”
The Federal Circuit also found that Eran’s conduct did not reach
the “objectively baseless” threshold for bad faith required by Globetrot-

1885. Id. at 981, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1948.
1886. Id. at 981–82, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1948.
1887. 500 F.3d 1369, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1604 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
1888. Id. at 1372, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1605.
1889. Id. at 1371, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1605.
1890. Id., 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1605.
1891. Id., 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1605.
1892. Id. at 1372, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1606.
1893. Id., 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1606 (stating that, if successful, Eran “can recoup
any royalties under its patent and can recover damages for other breaches if
proven”).
1894. Id. at 1374, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1607.
1895. Id. at 1373–74, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1607.
1896. Id. at 1374, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1607 (citation omitted).
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1897

ter Software, Inc. v. Elan Computer Group, Inc.
“Objectively baseless,”
the Supreme Court explained in Professional Real Estate Investors, Inc.
1898
v. Columbia Pictures Industries, Inc., requires a showing “that no rea1899
sonable litigant could realistically expect success on the merits.”
In
GP Industries, the Federal Circuit found that the district court had
“not considere[d] the objectively baseless standard in its discussion of
bad faith” and had even made statements that demonstrated that
Eran’s allegations were not objectively baseless, which rendered its
1900
Finding that Eran’s asfindings of subjective bad faith immaterial.
sertions were not objectively baseless, the court reversed the entry of
1901
preliminary injunction.
C. Damages
1.

Lost profits
1902
In Wechsler v. Macke International Trade, Inc., the Federal Circuit
reversed the lower court’s denial of JMOL, because “the jury’s award
1903
of lost profit damages was not supported by substantial evidence.”
The court noted that the plaintiff did not produce a product and did
1904
not have the capacity to do so until after the infringement ended.
In particular, “Wechsler’s expert’s opinion that Wechsler had the capability to manufacture and market his device during the period of
infringement was based solely on the fact that Wechsler manufac1905
tured and marketed his product after the period of infringement.”
The court also found no evidence that Macke’s infringing sales preempted subsequent sales by Wechsler or resulted in a lower price for
Wechsler’s sales because “Wechsler and his expert presented little
1906
more than conclusory evidence on these theories.”
1907
In Mitutoyo Corp. v. Central Purchasing, LLC, the Federal Circuit
affirmed the district court’s finding that Mitutoyo was not entitled to
lost profits due to the lack of evidence of any market overlap between

1897. Id. at 1375, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1608 (citing Globtrotter Software, Inc. v.
Elan Computer Group, Inc., 362 F.3d 1367, 1375, 70 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1161, 1168
(Fed. Cir. 2004)).
1898. 508 U.S. 49, 26 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1641 (1992).
1899. Id. at 60, 26 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1646.
1900. GP Indus., 500 F.3d at 1375, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1607–08.
1901. Id. at 1375–76, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1608.
1902. 486 F.3d 1286, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1742 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
1903. Id. at 1297, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1749.
1904. Id. at 1293, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1747.
1905. Id. at 1294, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1747.
1906. Id., 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1747.
1907. 499 F.3d 1284, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1001 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
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1908

its products and Central’s infringing products.
Mitutoyo’s products were much more complex and expensive than those sold by Cen1909
tral, so there was little overlap in price or prospective customers.
Central also showed that demand for its products was sensitive to
price, “meaning that Mitutoyo’s products are sold almost entirely out1910
side the price range in which Central customers are likely to buy.”
2.

Reasonable royalty
The Federal Circuit affirmed the court’s award of a 140% royalty in
1911
Monsanto Co. v. McFarling.
The case involved a farmer who had
saved and replanted patented genetically modified soybean seeds in
1912
violation of a license agreement with Monsanto.
The district court
awarded a reasonable royalty of $40 per fifty-pound bag even though
the customary royalty was only $6.50 per bag, in addition to $22 for
1913
the seeds themselves.
The Federal Circuit affirmed the royalty
award of 140% of the normal sales price of the seeds, explaining that
the license agreement conferred non-monetary advantages on Monsanto, such as decreasing the risk of underreporting and the consequent harm to Monsanto’s reputation among farmers, “ensur[ing]
Monsanto’s knowledge of the quality of seeds planted each year, and
. . . provid[ing] a bargaining chip for signing up new seed compa1914
nies.”
The court also considered that farmers using Monsanto’s
genetically modified seeds saved approximately $31–61 per acre com1915
pared to using conventional soybean seeds.
The Federal Circuit also found no clear error in the 29.2% royalty
rate awarded in Mitutoyo Corp. v. Central Purchasing, LLC, in light of
the contentious history between Central and Mitutoyo and other evi1916
dence of record.
However, the Federal Circuit reversed the district
court’s inclusion of sales to consumers by another company in the
royalty base, finding that there was no corporate relationship between
Central and that third-party, “and there are no courses of dealing or
other evidence to suggest that Central would have agreed to pay roy-

1908.
1909.
1910.
1911.
1912.
1913.
1914.
1915.
1916.

Id. at 1291, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1006.
Id., 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1006.
Id., 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1006.
488 F.3d 973, 981, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1942, 1947 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
Id. at 976, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1943–44.
Id. at 976–77, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1944.
Id. at 980, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1947.
Id. at 981, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1947.
499 F.3d 1284, 1292, 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1001, 1006 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
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alties based on both its sales” and the consumer sales of the other
1917
company.
The Federal Circuit vacated the royalty award in Paice LLC v. Toyota
1918
1919
Motor Corp. due to a lack of evidence.
The district court had imposed sua sponte an “ongoing royalty” of twenty-five dollars per
automobile after a jury found that Toyota had infringed one of
Paice’s patents on drive trains for hybrid automobiles under the doc1920
trine of equivalents.
The Federal Circuit vacated the district
court’s “ongoing royalty” because the order provided “no reasoning
1921
to support the selection of . . . the royalty rate.”
In so holding, the
court also noted that “the fact that monetary relief is at issue in this
case does not, standing alone, warrant a jury trial” under the Seventh
Amendment because not all monetary relief is properly characterized
1922
as “damages.”
In a concurring opinion, Judge Rader contended that the case
should have been remanded for a determination of the reasonable
royalty rate because “the parties had no meaningful chance to present evidence to the district court on an appropriate royalty rate to
1923
compensate Paice for Toyota’s future acts of infringement.”
Judge
Rader added, “in the case of the patentee, who has proven infringement of its property right, an opportunity to negotiate its own ongoing royalty is a minimal protection for its rights extending for the re1924
mainder of the patent term.”
3.

Enhanced damages
The Federal Circuit has held that an award of enhanced damages
1925
The court fashioned a
requires a showing of willful infringement.

1917. Id., 84 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1007.
1918. 504 F.3d 1293, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1001 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
1919. Id. at 1315–16, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1017–18.
1920. Id. at 1296, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1003.
1921. Id. at 1315, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1017.
1922. Id. at 1316, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1017 (citing Root v. Ry. Co., 105 U.S.
189, 207 (1881)).
1923. Id., 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1018 (Rader, J., concurring).
1924. Id. at 1317, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1018.
1925. See, e.g., Beatrice Foods Co. v. New England Printing & Lithographing Co.,
923 F.2d 1576, 1578, 17 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1553, 1555 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (citing Reactive Metals & Alloys Corp. v. ESM, Inc., 769 F.2d 1578, 1582, 226 U.S.P.Q. 821, 824
(Fed. Cir.1985)) (“[I]f a district court enhances damages, it must explain and articulate through findings the basis upon which it concludes that there has been willful
infringement or bad faith.”); see also Jurgens v. CBK, Ltd., 80 F.3d 1566, 1570, 38
U.S.P.Q.2d 1397, 1400 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (holding that bad faith infringement, which
is a type of willful infringement, is required for enhanced damages).
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standard for evaluating willful infringement in Underwater Devices Inc.
1926
v. Morrison-Knudsen Co.:
Where . . . a potential infringer has actual notice of another’s patent rights, he has an affirmative duty to exercise due care to determine whether or not he is infringing. Such an affirmative duty includes, inter alia, the duty to seek and obtain competent legal
advice from counsel before the initiation of any possible infringing
activity.1927

The term “willful” is not unique to patent law and has a wellestablished meaning in the civil context. The Supreme Court addressed the meaning of willfulness as a statutory condition of civil li1928
ability for punitive damages.
The case involved the Fair Credit Reporting Act (“FCRA”), which imposes civil liability for failure to
1929
comply with its requirements.
Whereas an affected consumer can
1930
recover only actual damages for negligent violations of the FCRA,
1931
he can also recover punitive damages for willful violations.
The
Court concluded that the “standard civil usage” of “willful” includes
1932
“In contrast, the duty of care announced in Unreckless behavior.
derwater Devices sets a lower threshold for willful infringement that is
1933
more akin to negligence.”
A unanimous en banc panel substantially rewrote the law of will1934
fulness and enhanced damages in In re Seagate Technology, LLC.
The portion of the court’s decision that is likely to have the greatest
long-term impact is its determination to replace the “affirmative duty
of care” standard set forth in Underwater Devices with a requirement
that the patentee prove that the accused infringer was “objectively
1935
In other words, “a patreckless” in infringing the patent at issue.
entee must show by clear and convincing evidence that the infringer
acted despite an objectively high likelihood that its actions constituted infringement of valid patent” in order to establish willful in1936
fringement.
This requires a two-step analysis: (1) there must be
1926. 717 F.2d 1380, 219 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 569 (Fed. Cir. 1983), overruled by In re Seagate Tech., LLC, 497 F.3d 1360, 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1865 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
1927. Id. at 1389–90, 219 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) at 576 (citations omitted).
1928. Safeco Ins. Co. of Am. v. Burr, 127 S. Ct. 2201 (2007).
1929. Id. at 2205.
1930. 15 U.S.C. § 1681o(a) (2006).
1931. 15 U.S.C. § 1681n(a) (2006).
1932. Safeco, 127 S. Ct. at 2203.
1933. In re Seagate Tech., LLC, 497 F.3d 1360, 1371, 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1865,
1870 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (discussing Underwater Devices Inc. v. Morrison-Knudsen Co.,
717 F.2d 1380, 219 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 569 (Fed. Cir. 1983)).
1934. 497 F.3d 1360, 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1865.
1935. Id. at 1371, 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1870.
1936. Id., 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1870.

1016

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 57:821

clear and convincing evidence that the infringer acted despite an objectively high likelihood that the actions infringed a valid patent, and
(2) if the patentee meets the first requirement, it must then show that
1937
that risk was known or should have been known by the infringer.
The infringer’s subjective state of mind is irrelevant to the first
1938
As the court explained:
prong.
We fully recognize that “the term [reckless] is not self-defining.”
However, “[t]he civil law generally calls a person reckless who
acts . . . in the face of an unjustifiably high risk of harm that is either known or so obvious that it should be known.” Accordingly, to
establish willful infringement, a patentee must show by clear and
convincing evidence that the infringer acted despite an objectively
high likelihood that its actions constituted infringement of a valid
patent. The state of mind of the accused infringer is not relevant
to this objective inquiry. If this threshold objective standard is satisfied, the patentee must also demonstrate that this objectivelydefined risk (determined by the record developed in the infringement proceeding) was either known or so obvious that it should
have been known to the accused infringer. We leave it to future
cases to further develop the application of this standard.1939

As a result of abandoning the “duty of care” standard, the court
also emphasized that “there is no affirmative obligation to obtain
1940
The court, as explained in an earlier section,
opinion of counsel.”
also emphasized that “asserting the advice of counsel defense and
disclosing opinions of opinion counsel do not constitute waiver of the
1941
attorney-client privilege for communications with trial counsel,”
and “relying on opinion counsel’s work product does not waive work
1942
product immunity with respect to trial counsel.”
4.

Attorney’s fees and costs
1943
the district court reIn Propat International Corp. v. RPost, Inc.,
fused to award the defendant its attorneys’ fees and costs even
though it had dismissed the suit because Propat did not own the sub1944
ject patent and thus lacked standing to sue.
The Federal Circuit
affirmed the lower court’s refusal to award fees and costs because
Propat’s interpretation of the ownership issue “was not so reckless as
1937.
1938.
1939.
1940.
1941.
1942.
1943.
1944.

Id., 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1870.
Id., 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1870.
Id., 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1870–71 (citations omitted).
Id., 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1870.
Id. at 1374, 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1873.
Id. at 1376, 83 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1874.
473 F.3d 1187, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1350 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
Id. at 1188–89, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1351.
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to warrant sanctioning” and “the conduct of both parties’ counsel
‘fell far short of a model prosecution and defense of a patent ac1945
Thus, the court affirmed the district court’s decision “to
tion.’”
1946
leave the parties where it f[ound] them.”
1947
In RFR Industries, Inc. v. Century Steps, Inc., the Federal Circuit
found the award of attorney’s fees to be improper because the action
1948
was dismissed upon RFR’s filing of a notice of dismissal.
Voluntary
dismissal did not bestow “prevailing party” status on Century, which is
a prerequisite for the award of attorney’s fees under 35 U.S.C.
1949
§ 285.
1950
Digeo, Inc. v. Audible, Inc. involved an allegedly “exceptional” case
1951
Digeo acquired the patent at issue at a
under 35 U.S.C. § 285.
bankruptcy sale from IPDN Corporations, the successor in interest to
1952
Microtome.
About a year after filing suit against Audible for infringement, however, Digeo discovered that the signatures allegedly
1953
assigning the patent to Microtome had been forged.
The district
court dismissed Digeo’s case for lack of title, but denied Audible’s
1954
motion for attorneys’ fees under § 285.
1955
The Federal Circuit affirmed the denial of attorneys’ fees.
The
court explained, “If there is clear and convincing evidence that a
plaintiff has brought a baseless or frivolous suit against an accused infringer, that is a sufficient basis to require a district court to deem the
1956
case exceptional under § 285.”
The court, however, rejected Audible’s argument that the district court had improperly shifted “the
burden of proof to Audible to show that Digeo had not performed an
1957
appropriate pre-suit” inquiry into its claim.
Audible, the court
noted, had not filed a motion under Rule 11, which authorizes “sanctions for failure to conduct a reasonable inquiry into the legal and
1958
factual bases of claims.”
Rather, Audible brought its motion under
§ 285, which “grant[s] district courts discretionary authority to award
reasonable attorneys’ fees to the prevailing party in exceptional cas1945.
1946.
1947.
1948.
1949.
1950.
1951.
1952.
1953.
1954.
1955.
1956.
1957.
1958.

Id. at 1195, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1356.
Id., 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1356.
477 F.3d 1348, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1915 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
Id. at 1352, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1918.
Id. at 1353, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1918–19.
505 F.3d 1362, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1246 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
Id. at 1366–67, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1248.
Id. at 1365, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1247.
Id. at 1366, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1247.
Id. at 1367, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1247–48.
Id. at 1366–67, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1248–49.
Id. at 1367, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1248.
Id. at 1367–69, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1249–50.
Id. at 1368, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1249.
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1959

es.”
Whereas Rule 11 shifts the burden to the nonmovant (plaintiff) to prove that it had made a reasonable pre-suit inquiry into its
claim, under § 285 the burden remains on the movant to show by
1960
clear and convincing evidence that the case is exceptional.
Although a Rule 11 violation can serve as the basis for finding a case
exceptional, Audible’s failure to file such a motion rendered that
1961
point moot.
The Federal Circuit also rejected Audible’s argument that buying
something “as-is” raised the standard for a pre-suit investigation be1962
cause of a greater likelihood that the patent is faulty.
The court
found that not only did Audible’s argument lack legal support, but
“negligent conduct does not suffice to establish that a case is excep1963
tional.”
Rather, a party moving under § 285 “must prove actual
wrongful intent or gross negligence” in order to show that a case is
1964
Since there was no evidence
exceptional, explained the court.
suggesting that Digeo had been negligent in not learning of the defect in the patent title, the Federal Circuit found that the district
court had properly determined that this was not an exceptional
1965
case.
5.

Pre-filing investigation under Rule 11
1966
In Intamin, Ltd. v. Magnetar Technologies, Corp., the Federal Circuit held that there was no blanket rule that a plaintiff in a patent infringement suit must obtain and thoroughly analyze a sample of the
1967
alleged infringer’s product in order to satisfy its Rule 11 obligation.
In so holding, the Federal Circuit distinguished Judin v. United
1968
States, in which the patentee could have very easily obtained a sample of the accused product for a nominal price and deconstructed
1969
that sample to avoid violating Rule 11.
The Federal Circuit held
1970
The
that Judin did not create a blanket rule for all cases, however.
court explained that in this case, unlike Judin, “the technology presented the patentee with unreasonable obstacles to any effort to ob1959. Id., 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1249.
1960. Id., 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1249.
1961. Id., 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1249.
1962. Id. at 1369, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1250.
1963. Id., 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1250.
1964. Id., 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1250 (citing Mach. Corp. of Am. v. Gullfiber AB,
774 F.2d 467, 473, 227 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 368, 373 (Fed. Cir. 1985)).
1965. Id., 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1250.
1966. 483 F.3d 1328, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1545 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
1967. Id. at 1338, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1552.
1968. 110 F.3d 780, 42 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1300 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
1969. Intamin, 483 F.3d at 1338, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1552.
1970. Id., 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1552.
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tain a sample of Magnetar’s amusement ride brake system, let alone
1971
Thus, the Federal Circuit rethe difficulty of opening the casing.”
jected the defendant’s argument that the suit was frivolous and sanctions appropriate merely because Intamin had not obtained the al1972
legedly infringing product and cut it open for analysis.
VII. INTERNATIONAL TRADE COMMISSION
A. Standing
Standing to appeal from an ITC determination was the central is1973
sue in Fuji Photo Film Co. v. International Trade Commission, which
also marked the fifth time that the Federal Circuit had heard an ap1974
or
peal from the ITC’s investigation into lens-fitted film packages,
1975
from related district court and U.S. Customs proceedings.
This particular appeal stemmed from an ITC enforcement proceeding, in which the Commission imposed a civil penalty of $13.7
million on respondent Jazz Camera for importing over twenty-five
million disposable cameras that had been impermissibly recon1976
The Commission also imposed civil penalties on two of
structed.
Jazz’s officers, one of whom appealed while the other settled with the
1977
ITC.
Fuji, the patent holder and complainant, appealed the
Commission’s determination that the remaining 1.7 million dispos1978
able cameras imported by Jazz had been permissibly repaired.
1979
The Federal Circuit dismissed Fuji’s appeal for lack of standing.
A private plaintiff, unlike the federal government, may not sue to assess civil penalties for past violations, unless the private plaintiff is
threatened with injury as a consequence of ongoing unlawful con1980
duct.
In this case, there was no threat of ongoing harm to Fuji because Jazz had gone bankrupt and been liquidated under Chapter 11,
while its sanctioned officer was proscribed only from activities con1971. Id., 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1552.
1972. Id., 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1552.
1973. 474 F.3d 1281, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1495 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
1974. For the International Trade Commission’s notice of determination on remand, see Certain Lens-Fitted Film Packages, Inv. No. 337-TA-406 (Int’l Trade
Comm’n Sept. 12, 2007), http://www.usitc.gov/secretary/fed_reg_notices/337/337TA-406.Notice.1189628776.pdf (reducing the civil penalty on remand).
1975. Fuji, 474 F.3d at 1285, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1497.
1976. Id. at 1288–89, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1499.
1977. Id. at 1289, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1499–1500.
1978. Id., 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1500.
1979. Id., 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1500.
1980. Id. at 1289–90, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1500 (citing Friends of the Earth,
Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs., Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 188 (2000)).
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1981

ducted “‘for, with, or otherwise on behalf of’ Jazz.”
Moreover, even
if Fuji had been harmed by Jazz’s importation of 1.7 million allegedly
reconstructed cameras, the Commission would not necessarily impose any additional penalties for those cameras, while any penalties it
1982
did impose would have been paid to the U.S. government, not Fuji.
The cessation of Jazz’s operations also meant there was no continuing need for Customs to determine which Jazz cameras would be ex1983
cluded from entry.
Thus, even if the Federal Circuit’s interpretation of Jazz’s cease and desist order might affect the interpretation of
the general exclusion order, this was not a sufficient basis to establish
1984
standing.
The appropriate route to clarify the exclusion order was
through the ITC, where all parties could participate, and not by obtaining an advisory opinion from the Federal Circuit when there was
1985
no Article III case or controversy.
B. Claim Construction
1986

In OSRAM GmbH v. International Trade Commission, the Federal
Circuit reversed the Commission’s determination of no violation of
1987
The patent claims
§ 337 due to an erroneous claim construction.
in question included certain luminous pigment powders, “which produce a spectral shift in the light emitted by . . . LEDs” and other elec1988
troluminescent devices such that the light appears white.
The
claims required that the pigments have a “mean grain diameter” of a
1989
certain size.
The Commission interpreted this term to refer to the
“volume-based average[, which] is calculated by multiplying the diameter of each grain by its volume, summing the products thereof,
1990
and dividing that sum by the sum of the volumes of the grains.”
The panel majority disagreed, finding that the “mean grain diameter” should be calculated as a “number-based average,” which is “the
sum of the diameters of all the grains, divided by the number of
1991
grains.”
Although both methods were used in the art to calculate
mean grain diameter, the majority found that “experts for both sides
were in full and emphatic agreement that the ordinary meaning of
1981.
1982.
1983.
1984.
1985.
1986.
1987.
1988.
1989.
1990.
1991.

Id. at 1290, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1500.
Id. at 1289, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1500.
Id. at 1290, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1501.
Id., 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1501.
Id. at 1290–91, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1501.
505 F.3d 1351, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1161 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
Id. at 1359, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1166.
Id. at 1354, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1162.
Id. at 1355, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1163.
Id., 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1164.
Id. at 1355, 1357, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1164, 1165.
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the average diameter of these particles is the number-based average,”
although respondent’s expert later changed his position when he re1992
The court
alized this question could decide the issue of liability.
also found that the patent specifications were “in accordance with the
number-based” mean, which better reflects the homogeneity of parti1993
cle size.
In contrast, the volume-based mean overemphasizes large
particles, which are “not as effective at scattering light to produce a
uniform color and intensity” and are thus detrimental to the inven1994
tion.
Furthermore, it was undisputed that “a volume-based measure would exclude the OSRAM products the patents were designed to
1995
cover.”
Judge Dyk dissented, finding no “full and emphatic agreement”
among the experts on this construction nor any “conflicting testi1996
mony” on the part of respondent’s expert.
Judge Dyk also found
the majority’s assumption that the claim term sought to emphasize
small particles over large particles to be “unsupported” and “entirely
1997
speculative.”
The Federal Circuit also reversed the Commission’s claim construc1998
tion in Sinorgchem Co., Shandong v. International Trade Commission
and adopted instead a more narrow construction of the term “con1999
Although there was no dispute
trolled amount” of protic material.
that “controlled amount” had no well-accepted meaning in the
chemical arts, the inventors defined the term in the specification as
follows: “A ‘controlled amount’ of protic material is an amount up to
that which inhibits the reaction of aniline with nitrobenzene, e.g., up
to about 4% of H2O based on the volume of the reaction mixture
2000
when aniline is utilized as the solvent.”
The panel majority interpreted this passage as imposing a numerical limit of up to about 4% H2O on the “controlled amount”; thus,
“each asserted claim can encompass processes that utilized at most
2001
4% water when aniline is the solvent.”
Since it was undisputed that
respondent Sinorgchem always uses more than 4% water when it reacts aniline with nitrobenzene, the majority reversed the Commis1992.
1993.
1994.
1995.
1996.
1997.
1998.
1999.
2000.
2001.

Id. at 1356, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1164.
Id., 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1164.
Id. at 1357, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1165.
Id. at 1358, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1166.
Id. at 1360, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1167–68 (Dyke, J., dissenting).
Id. at 1362, 85 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1169.
No. 2006-1633, 2007 WL 4465270 (Fed. Cir. Dec. 21, 2007).
Id. at *3-7.
Id. at *4 (emphasis added).
Id. at *8.
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sion’s determination of literal infringement and remanded the case
for consideration of infringement under the doctrine of equivalents
2002
and invalidity under the new construction.
In so holding, the Federal Circuit rejected the ITC’s finding that
the phrase “e.g., up to 4% H2O . . . when aniline is utilized as the solvent” was only exemplary language and not part of the limiting defi2003
nition of “controlled amount.”
The Commission had relied on a
passage in the specification that “the amount of protic material tolerated will vary with type of base, amount of base, and base cation, used
2004
in the various solvent systems.”
The panel majority, however,
found “[t]his vague language cannot override the express definitional language,” which they found unambiguously and completely
defined the “controlled amount” as “up to about 4% H2O based on
2005
the volume of the reaction mixture” when aniline is the solvent.
The panel also “attribute[d] no weight” to the expert testimony cited
by the ITC because “the experts did not identify any evidence that
those skilled in the art would recognize that ‘controlled amount,’ or
any term used in the specification has an accepted meaning in the
2006
field of chemistry.”
In addition, the panel rejected the ITC’s argument that this construction was inconsistent with certain embodiments in the specification, explaining, “where . . . multiple embodiments are disclosed, we have previously interpreted claims to exclude
embodiments where those embodiments are inconsistent with unambiguous language in the patent’s specification or prosecution his2007
tory.”
Judge Newman sharply dissented:
[T]here was no disclaimer of the scope set forth in the patent
specifications and claims; there is no prior art to limit the claims in
the way selected by the panel majority; and there is no reason to insert an absolute numerical limit of “about 4%” protic material into
the claims that do not contain a numerical limit, when the specifications of both patents demonstrate significantly higher percentages. There was no evidence contradicting the evidence of the experts concerning the range of protic material set forth in the
specifications’ text and illustrated in the specific examples.2008

“The panel majority,” she continued, “adds inconsistency and unpredictability [to claim construction] by arbitrarily limiting the scope
2002.
2003.
2004.
2005.
2006.
2007.
2008.

Id.
Id. at *4-5.
Id. (quoting U.S. Patent No. 5,117,063 (filed June 21, 1991)).
Id. at *5.
Id. at *5 n.3.
Id. at *6.
Id. at *8 (Newman, J., dissenting).
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of the claimed invention in a way that conflicts with the teachings of
the specifications and the knowledge in the field of the inven2009
In contrast, she found “no error of fact or law” in the
tions.”
Commission’s claim construction or infringement finding, which
were “not only supportable on the required standard of review, but
2010
they also are correct.”
C. Imposing a Cease and Desist Order Against an Individual
2011

In the same Fuji Photo Film Co. v. International Trade Commission
opinion discussed above in Part VII.A, the Federal Circuit affirmed
the authority of the ITC to impose and enforce a cease and desist or2012
der against a corporate officer.
The Federal Circuit found that the
Commission “could properly enjoin Jazz’s officers, employees, and
agents from causing Jazz to engage in future violations” when it
2013
found Jazz was infringing Fuji’s patents.
In addition, the cease and
desist order against Jazz was specifically directed against Jazz’s “principals, stockholders, officers, directors, employees, agents, . . . and to
each of them, insofar as they are engaging in conduct prohibited by”
2014
the cease and desist order.
The Federal Circuit, however, declined
to consider the corporate officer’s argument that he had not been
given adequate notice of the cease and desist order, finding that he
2015
had failed to properly raise it in his opening brief.
D. Stay of District Court Proceedings
2016

In In re Princo Corp., the Federal Circuit examined when an ITC
decision “becomes final” for purposes of lifting a district court’s stay
2017
of related proceedings, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1659(a).
In particular, § 1659 provides that a district court, on timely request by an
ITC respondent, must stay a related proceeding with respect to any

2009. Id. at *13.
2010. Id. at *8-9.
2011. 474 F.3d 1281, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1495 (Fed. Cir. 2007); see supra Part
VII.A (discussing standing to appeal).
2012. Fuji, 474 F.3d at 1291, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1501.
2013. Id., 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1501; see Wilson v. United States, 221 U.S. 361,
376 (1911) (“A command to the corporation is in effect a command to those who are
officially responsible for the conduct of its affairs.”).
2014. Fuji, 474 F.3d at 1292, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1502.
2015. Id. at 1293, 82 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1502.
2016. 478 F.3d 1345, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1997 (Fed. Cir. 2007), reh’g denied, 486
F.3d 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
2017. Id. at 1348, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1998.
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claim that involves the same issues as those before the ITC until the
2018
ITC’s determination “becomes final.”
In this case, Philips sued Princo in district court for infringing six
2019
patents on technology for manufacturing compact disks.
Princo
intervened in an ITC investigation on the same patents and moved
2020
the district court to stay its proceedings, pursuant to § 1659(a).
The district court granted the stay but refused to extend it after the
2021
Commission made a final determination.
While the appeal was
pending, the district court rejected Princo’s patent misuse defense
and entered summary judgment of infringement in favor of Phil2022
ips.
The Federal Circuit, in separate appeals, reversed the Commission’s patent misuse determination, vacated the district court’s
judgment against Princo, and remanded both matters back to the
2023
presiding forums.
The district court again denied Princo’s motion
for a stay, granted summary judgment to Philips, and rejected
2024
Princo’s patent misuse defense.
Princo filed a petition for a writ of mandamus to vacate the district
court’s order and stay the case until the Commission had concluded
2025
its remand proceedings.
The Federal Circuit temporarily stayed
2026
On the merthe district court’s proceedings pending its decision.
its, the Federal Circuit found that the phrase “becomes final” in
§ 1659 is similar to language in other statutes, which have been interpreted to refer to the time when the decision is no longer subject to
2027
appellate review.
In contrast, other statutes that use “materially different” phrases, such “final decisions,” have been construed as refer2028
ring to finality by the presiding forum.
The court also found that
the purpose behind § 1659, to avoid concurrent infringement proceedings in two different forums, would be best served by extending
2029
the stay to include the appeal.
Accordingly, the Federal Circuit
granted Princo’s petition and held that the district court proceedings
must remain stayed until the Commission’s determination was no
2030
longer subject to judicial review.
2018.
2019.
2020.
2021.
2022.
2023.
2024.
2025.
2026.
2027.
2028.
2029.
2030.

Id. at 1348–49, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1999.
Id. at 1348, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1999.
Id., 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1999.
Id. at 1349, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1999.
Id., 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 1999.
Id. at 1349–50, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 2000.
Id. at 1350, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 2000.
Id. at 1350–51, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 2000.
Id. at 1351, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 2000.
Id. at 1354, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 2003.
Id. at 1355, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 2003.
Id., 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 2004.
Id. at 1357, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 2005.
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The Federal Circuit added that the stay should be continued even
though the only issue before the district court was damages, an issue
2031
Section 1659, the
over which the Commission has no jurisdiction.
court explained, does not limit the stay to individual issues pending
in the Commission, but extends to any district court “proceedings”
on a claim that involves the same issues in the proceeding before the
2032
Commission.
Since the damages involved the same issues as the infringement issues in the Commission, the district court’s proceeding
2033
remained stayed.
The Federal Circuit also rejected Philips’s argument that Princo
was not entitled to a stay because the appeals court had already re2034
jected Princo’s patent misuse defense.
Princo had diligently pursued its motion to stay, and its entitlement to a stay was not dependent upon a showing that Princo was likely to prevail on the common
2035
issues.
Philips petitioned for a panel rehearing, arguing that the term “becomes final” in § 1659 should be construed in the same fashion as in
19 U.S.C. § 1337, which authorizes the ITC to conduct the type of in2036
tellectual property investigations at issue.
The panel disagreed and
found that the different purposes and legislative histories behind the
two statutory provisions “make it appropriate to interpret the ‘be2037
comes final’ language in § 1337 and § 1659 differently.”
The panel
reiterated: “‘Becomes final’ in that context [in § 1659] refers to final2038
ity after judicial review.”
E. Temporary Stay of an Exclusion Order
2039

In Epistar Corp. v. ITC,
appellant/respondent Epistar Corporation moved the Federal Circuit to stay the ITC’s limited exclusion or2040
der pending the appeal.
Interestingly, the Federal Circuit did not
require Epistar to first exhaust its administration remedies in the ITC
2041
Instead, the
before filing its stay motion in the Federal Circuit.
2031. Id. at 1356, 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 2004.
2032. Id., 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 2004.
2033. Id., 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 2004.
2034. Id., 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 2004.
2035. Id., 81 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) at 2005.
2036. In re Princo Corp., 486 F.3d 1365 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
2037. Id. at 1368.
2038. Id.
2039. No. 07-1457 (Fed. Cir. Sept. 28, 2007).
2040. Motion of Appellant, Epistar Corp. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, No. 07-1457 (Fed.
Cir. July 13, 2007).
2041. This allowance was in stark contrast to general procedural rules. See FED. R.
APP. P. 18(a) (stating that a motion must either show that the agency denied the mo-
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Federal Circuit permitted Epistar to pursue its stay motion in the
court at the same time it was pursuing the same stay motion in the
2042
The Federal Circuit also temporarily granted Epistar’s stay
ITC.
motion before the ITC or the complainant/intervenor even had a
2043
chance to respond.
Although the Federal Circuit ultimately denied Epistar’s motion for a stay, the cost was a two-month delay in en2044
forcing the exclusion order.

tion or that moving before the agency would be impracticable); FED. CIR. R. 18(a)
(stating the same).
2042. Brief of Intervenor at 16-17, Epistar Corp. v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, No. 071457 (Fed. Cir. Dec. 26, 2007).
2043. See Epistar v. Int’l Trade Comm’n, No. 07-1457 (Fed. Cir. July 16, 2007) (referencing, in docket entry number eleven, the Federal Circuit temporarily granting
Epistar Corp.’s motion to stay).
2044. Id. (referencing, in docket entry number fifty-seven, the Federal Circuit denying the Epistar Motion to stay).
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APPENDIX—STATISTICAL FACTS
Table 1
Table 1 presents the total number of patent appeals adjudicated on
the merits during the twelve-month period ending December 31,
2007.
The dispositions are broken down by precedential (“P”) opinions
and non-precedential (“N”) opinions and orders as designated by the
United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (“CAFC”) on
its daily log, which can be accessed at http://www.cafc.uscourts.gov/d
ailylog.html.
Table 1 also includes the origin of the precedential and nonprecedential opinions and orders, the reversal percentage, and the
time in months from docketing date to disposition date.
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Table 2
Table 2 summarizes the disposition of precedential opinions and
non-precedential patent opinions and orders of the Federal Circuit
from January 1, 2007 through December 31, 2007. A list of the patent opinions presented in this analysis is presented in Table 8 of this
Appendix.
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Table 3
Table 3 shows the disposition of precedential opinions and nonprecedential patent opinions and orders according to the unanimity
of the panel. Decisions where all the judges on the panel join the
opinion of the court were counted as unanimous decisions in Table
3. Decisions where at least one judge concurred in the judgment but
not the opinion and no judge dissented were counted as decisions
with concurrence in Table 3. Decisions in which a judge dissented
from a panel opinion were counted as decisions with dissent in
Table 3.

1030

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 57:821

Table 4
Table 4 illustrates the disposition of precedential opinions and
non-precedential patent opinions and orders based on the origin of
the case.
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Table 5
Table 5 shows the origin and disposition of precedential opinions
and non-precedential patent opinions and orders for cases on appeal
from summary judgment.
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Table 6
Table 6 presents the frequency with which individual judges joined
the opinion of the court for precedential opinions and nonprecedential patent opinions and orders. Each opinion was analyzed
to identify the panel members and whether each member joined the
opinion of the court. The number of panels in which each judge
participated was then counted. The number of panels in which each
judge participated is presented in the “Total” column. The number
of occurrences in which each judge joined the opinion of the court is
presented in the “Joined Opinion of Court” column. The frequency
with which each judge joined the opinion of the court was calculated
by dividing the reported number of occurrences in which that judge
“Joined Opinion of the Court” by the reported number panels in
which that judge participated, i.e., “Total Cases.” For the purposes of
this analysis, a plurality opinion that announced the judgment of the
court was counted as the opinion of the court.
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Table 7
Table 7 presents a profile of voting alignments between the judges
in the precedential patent opinions of the Federal Circuit from January 1, 2007 through December 31, 2007.
Each opinion was analyzed to identify the panel members and
whether each member joined the opinion of the court, concurred
with the opinion of the court, or dissented from the opinion of the
court. The data were then analyzed to determine the number of
common panels in which each pair of judges participated. For each
pair of judges this number is reported in a cell labeled “CP.” The
data were further analyzed to determine the number of common
opinions shared by each pair of judges in which that pair participated. For each pair of judges the number of occurrences in which
each pair of judges shared a common opinion is reported in a cell labeled “CD.” The frequency with which each pair of judges shared a
common opinion was then calculated by dividing the of number of
occurrences in which each pair of judges shared a common opinion
by the number of common panels in which each judge participated
(i.e., CD/CP).
A common opinion for the purposes of this analysis means that
both judges joined the opinion of the court, concurred in the judgment of the court or dissented with the opinion of the court. A plurality opinion that announced the judgment of the court was counted
as the opinion of the court. Opinions concurring-in-part and concurring-in-the-judgment were counted as concurrences. Opinions
concurring-in-part and dissenting-in-part were counted as dissents.
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Table 8
Table 8 lists the patent appeals broken down by precedential (“P”)
opinions and nonprecedential (“N”) opinions and orders as designated by the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit
(“CAFC”) on its daily log during the twelve-month period ending December 31, 2007.
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